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PLACES IN THE POLITY OF RHETORIC: 
TOPOI, EVOLUTION, AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF DISCOURSE 
 
Benjamin James Bickel Wetherbee 
 
November 16, 2015 
 
 
This dissertation integrates classical rhetoric with postmodern understandings of 
textual fragmentation. “Places in the Polity of Rhetoric” follows two mutually 
constitutive avenues of inquiry, one of which stresses the importance of understanding 
textual fragments as rhetorical topoi—that is, as generative “places” that allow writers 
and speakers to economically evoke larger fields of cultural meaning in the space of a 
single word, phrase, or image. The other stresses the evolution of rhetorical culture that 
emerges through the interaction between human agents, who use these topoi for rhetorical 
ends, and discursive agents (topoi themselves) who use human rhetors to propagate 
among texts. Implicit in this project is a reassessment of the term topos in rhetorical 
history; in particular, I recover and extend Aristotle’s largely overlooked metaphor of 
topoi as nodes of spatial orientation. Looking toward the future of rhetorical studies, my 
work also relates rhetoric to theories of memes and cultural transmission. 
Because topos remains at once the most momentous and nebulous term in this 
project’s theoretical arc, I begin with an overview of topos and its variants in rhetorical 
history. Chapter 1 notes several points of historical confusion about what topoi are what 
vii 
 
they do before advocating for an essentially functional understanding of topoi as “places” 
that economically orient audiences among matrices of cultural meaning. I revisit 
Aristotle’s use of the term in the Rhetoric and the Physics, stressing this overlooked 
understanding of contextual orientation that underscores Aristotle’s notion of “place”—
among which the classifications of “common” and “special” places, or topics, become not 
a pair of binary categories, but expressions of degree. I proceed through a sort of counter-
history of topical theory centered on the idea of place and orientation, noting 
contributions from figures like Cicero, Quintilian, St. Augustine, Francis Bacon, Vico, 
and Joseph Priestly, while also stressing the friction implicit in the positions of those like 
Boethius, Ramus, Descartes, and Hugh Blair. The chapter concludes with a comparative 
look at Stephen Toulmin, Chaïm Perelman, and Kenneth Burke—three figures who 
exemplify the current range of available positions on topical invention. 
 Chapter 2, “Anatomy of a Topos: A Terminological Symposium,” places topos in 
relationship to the keywords of trope, fragment, and, most importantly, evolution. I craft 
this chapter as a theoretical and conceptual toolbox designed to aid rhetorical critics in 
analyzing topical fragments as they relate to texts, contexts, human agents, and to other 
fragments. I bookend chapter 2 with two discussions of topoi and evolution. The first 
stresses the conceptual affordances of evolution in relation to other constitutive terms of 
rhetorical and discursive analysis, such as “construction” and “sedimentation.” The 
second relates topoi back to Darwinian ideas of change and transmission, specifically by 
comparing topical theory to memetics, or meme theory, as espoused by thinkers like 
Daniel Dennett and Limor Shifman. The intermediate sections examine how different 
varieties of trope and fragment interact with the evolving sphere of rhetorical culture. 
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Recovering the active understanding of trope as “turn” or “direction,” I describe how 
tropes like metaphor and metonymy describe different vectors of motion among related 
topoi. I also describe how different categories of rhetorical fragments—archetypes, 
quotations, god-terms, ideographs, and ideologemes—imply different relationships 
among topoi and their cultural contexts. 
Chapters 3 and 4 examine specific topoi. Chapter 3, “Epideixis and/as Cultural 
Evolution,” takes up the topoi of “gay marriage,” as used by the religious right and its 
political opponents, and Occupy Wall Street’s “we are the 99%” to exemplify how 
individual fragments push and pull on cultural and political formations of discourse. This 
chapter reconfigures the genre of epideictic, traditionally described as the rhetoric of 
“praise and blame,” as the rhetoric of incremental sustenance and change at the 
macrocosmic cultural level—that is, of cultural evolution. I describe, moreover, how 
deliberative (pragmatic, political) and epideictic rhetorics often alloy together in the 
space of a single rhetorical text; topoi within such texts often aid rhetors’ deliberative 
goals while also subtly revising the larger arena of semantic space from which 
deliberative rhetorics draw in the first place. 
I return, in Chapter 4, “The Terministic Scream,” to the example of Mitt 
Romney’s “binders full of women,” as well at the adage “good fences make good 
neighbors,” widely attributed to Robert Frost. In this chapter, I draw on Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s concept of “internally persuasive discourse” to analyze how certain topoi 
aurally imply the voices of others. “Voice,” here, becomes a deeply social phenomenon, 
notable for its topical utility and connotative density: the “voices” we quote in our chosen 
topoi evoke adjacent stores of cultural knowledge, as well as subtle appeals to ethos. I 
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close the chapter by reflecting on the rhetorical ethics of proliferating dominant (straight, 
white, and male) voices through our chosen topoi. 
My conclusion extends such questions of ethics and rhetorical praxis, which 
matter especially as we accelerate further into the increasingly fragmented digital age—
the era of “likes,” “shares,” retweets, hashtags, and Internet memes. We find ourselves, 
that is, in the age of Amazon-review activism. Even if one works for Avery, the faint 
echoes of the Romney campaign now affixed to the noun “binder” probably offer little 
harm. But other fragments may echo more loudly. I stress that there is nothing 
fundamentally new about discursive fragmentation, which is why even ancient rhetorics 
can assist the current inquiry. But fragments now travel with greater velocity, reach, and 
fecundity than ever before. We, as human rhetors, find ourselves in increasingly dynamic 
interaction with transitory fragments of discourse; it matters both to political progress and 
cultural evolution which fragments we circulate, and how.
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SHOPPING FOR A BINDER 
 
Imagine this. You need to resupply for the new semester. You need to organize. 
So, you open your laptop, fire up Amazon.com, select “Office Supplies” from the drop-
down menu, and plug “binder” into the search bar. And binders fill your screen: binders 
… binders … so many binders. After scrolling through two or three two or three dozen 
results, you see just what you want. Your cursor lands on a product title: “Avery Durable 
View Binder with 2-Inch Slant Ring.” 
That should do it. You click. And to ensure this the binder for you, you scroll 
down to customer reviews. The first review you see rates the product five stars. Good. 
The review’s title? “A presidential choice is the choice for me.” Wait—what?
I refer, here, to a real review from a real Amazon user known as “Bazinga”—and, 
at that, a review fellow users have vetted scrupulously in tones of high esteem. “13,162 of 
13,732 people found the following review helpful,” Amazon proclaims. But “helpful” 
probably isn’t the word for it. What this statistic really tells me is that a great many 
readers, through intention or chance, have come across a joke they appreciate and an 
argument they endorse. At least 13,162 people have felt themselves “in on it” with 
Bazinga, even if our hapless connoisseur of affordable office supplies is not. Sometimes a 
binder is just a binder—but no such luck for Avery’s durable, two-inch model, which 
found itself at least briefly swept up in a deluge of political satire. 
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 Bazinga’s short text is less a review of a binders than a brief, sarcastic polemic 
about institutional sexism and American presidential politics. “As a woman,” she tells us, 
“I’m not adept at making decisions that concern me. So when I need the right choice, I 
turn to the presidential candidate that KNOWS.” She continues: “My education, my 
ideas, my opinions, my choices, please PLEASE keep them safely stored away here and 
far away from the men that might fear them (I mean, want to use them to hire me 
somedaynever).” Bazinga posted her review on October 17, 2012, a day after the second 
presidential debate between incumbent president Barack Obama and GOP challenger 
Mitt Romney. Romney “lost” that debate, as the media told it, largely through the 
utterance of a single gaffe: “binders full of women” (see Wetherbee, “Picking Up”; 
Shifman 122-27; Neuman; Parker). When the Republican challenger spoke this 
unfortunate phrase in response to a question about gender equity in the workplace, social 
media positively lit up with memetic glee; “binders full of women” was suddenly born as 
an Internet meme and proliferated rapidly through Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr pages, 
inspiring countless riffs on its central theme (see “Binders”). In one image, Lord of the 
Rings’ Boromir (as portrayed by Sean Bean) exasperatedly pronounces that “One does 
not simply fill binders with women”—a variation of The Fellowship of the Ring’s quote, 
“One does not simply walk into Mordor.” In another, one that Bazinga actually appends 
to her review (see fig. 1), a tough-as-nails Dirty-Dancing-era Patrick Swayze warns that 
“No one puts Baby in a binder.” 
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 Bazinga’s review represents the “viral” spread of these “binders” memes beyond 
their immediate venues of Facebook and Twitter and into the prototypically utilitarian 
genre of the Amazon product review. In this case, though, it mattered little that the 
review has nothing to do with Avery’s two-inch slant-ring binders in particular: 13,162 
readers welcomed the joke in spite of (or often because of—the breach of genre is part of 
the ironic appeal) its setting. In late 2012 especially, this discursive artefact tells us, 
Figure 1: Screen capture of Amazon user Bazinga's review of Avery binders; retrieved 14 Sept. 2015. 
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humorously criticizing the Romney campaign mattered more than researching the quality 
of Avery binders.  
The sort of discursive event that “binders” represents, whereby a fragment of 
discourse separates from its text of origin and develops an independent life through 
replication across other texts, demands attention from scholars of rhetoric. In 2012, a 
series of Internet memes— “binders,” as well as Romney’s reference to Sesame Street’s 
Big Bird and his comment about the “47 percent” of America Republicans can’t win 
over, plus Obama’s “you didn’t build that” remark and his pointed “horses and bayonets” 
remark about Romney’s outmoded military policy—significantly influenced the political 
landscape and the tenor of each candidate’s campaign (see “2012”). Obama won, in 
significant part, because he won the “meme war.” Bazinga’s review is illustrative of this 
reality. Among the reasons her review received so many positive “upvotes” was, no 
doubt, her lightning-quick seizure of the kairotic moment following the debate—but also 
important, I suspect, is her shrewd inventory of the “binder” meme’s connotations. 
Without actually repeating the phrase “binders full of women” (the reference is obvious 
enough—or was in October 2012), she disentangles the trap Romney had sprung on 
himself. She voices distrust of any “confusing electronic doohickey that I couldn’t 
possibly understand” and concludes the review by “hurry[ing] home to make dinner.” 
What Bazinga illustrates is that “binders full of women” harmed Romney not just through 
its unintentionally humorous phrasing, but because this stylistically ostentatious nugget 
intersected coherently with a number of preconceptions about Romney and the 
Republican Party—preconceptions of backwardness, misogyny, and misplaced nostalgia. 
The image of Romney’s binder—itself a metonym for the androcentric corporate world, 
 5 
 
the sort of place that would dismissively “file away” its female employees—seemed to 
contain countless damning pages on the GOP nominee himself. 
We should pay attention to fragments like “binders.” Rhetorical theory, I hasten to 
add, has long heeded the circulation of discursive fragments: think of Aristotle’s idia or 
“special topics” and Cicero’s commonplaces, Erasmus’ stylistic copia in the Middle 
Ages, Vico’s axioms in the Enlightenment, and the “god-terms” of Kenneth Burke and 
Richard Weaver’s, plus Michael Calvin McGee’s “ideographs,” in modern rhetoric. And 
today, the Internet foregrounds the speed and vibrancy of the memes like “binders,” 
which behave as a particularly potent and ostentatious breed of what Burke once termed 
“timely topics” (Rhetoric 62). What I believe we still need and lack, however, is a full, 
systematic look at how rhetors and fragments (what we could call human and discursive 
agents) interact in the context of cultural change. We need to ask how the selection and 
circulation of discursive fragments bears on the textual composition of human cultures—
and how culture and ideology, in turn, constitute for the rhetorician the arena that 
provides Aristotle’s “available means of persuasion” (Rhetoric 1.2.1355b). 
In this project, I stress that rhetorically potent fragments of discourse—for 
example, meme-worthy phrases like “binders full of women” and “we are the 99%,” 
ideographic terms like “freedom” or “patriot,” or connotatively dense visuals like the 
Confederate flag—should be understood as rhetorical topoi. By topoi, I refer to 
generative “places” rich in cultural connectivity; many discursive fragments, I am 
suggesting, circulate by virtue of their economical utility to human rhetors. In late 2012, 
one need not pronounce that Mitt Romney is an androcentric plutocrat representing the 
most callously elite, laissez-faire wing of a political party known for its misogyny and 
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backwardness—not when “binders full of women” suggests as much, and more, in the 
tidy space of four words, and without the discomfort of saying what one means with quite 
such brutal clarity. 
In the economy of rhetoric, though, fragments like “binders,” though, must either 
evolve or die out. The title of this project, Places in the Polity of Rhetoric, riffs on a 
phrase Charles Darwin fondly repeats in On the Origin of Species: “places in the polity of 
nature” (ch. 4; 82, 84, 90, 93). Describing the analogy between the selective breeding of 
animals and the “natural selection” of species, Darwin comes to this phrase: 
But how, it may be asked, can any analogous principle apply in 
nature? I believe it can and does apply most efficiently . . . from the simple 
circumstance that the more diversified the descendants from any one 
species become in structure, constitution, and habits, by so much will they 
be better enabled to seize on the many and widely diversified places in 
polity of nature, and so be enabled to increase in numbers. (84) 
“Polity”—the etymological cousin of the polis in whose service Aristotelian and 
Ciceronian rhetoricians ply their trade—here implies an epistemological parallelism, for 
Darwin, between nature and human culture. As John Angus Campbell has demonstrated, 
metaphorical and analogical thinking figured heavily into Darwin’s practices of rhetorical 
invention (“Charles Darwin”); here, Darwin suggests a productive similarity between 
civic life and natural life, one that hinges on the idea of “place” as a node of functional 
utility and contextual purpose. Fitness, for Darwin, entails the ability to “seize on” or 




 Topos means “place,” and I will argue that the rhetorical term is best understood 
in a manner surprisingly similar to what Darwin suggests. To say that topoi evolve (and I 
will argue they do) is to suggest that an unstable, shifting constellation of significant 
“places” composes the arena of our rhetorical polity. Topoi evolve, and human culture 
evolves in part through the interaction of human actors with specific topoi. It may often 
be productive to view such processes through the metaphor of “selection” in nature, just 
as Darwin borrowed the metaphor artificial selection to explain his own naturalistic 
theories (see Origin ch. 4; 66). But statements about the evolution of topoi need not be 
strictly metaphorical. The Darwinian philosopher Daniel Dennett notes that evolution 
universally requires three “conditions”—“variation,” “heredity or replication,” and 
“differential ‘fitness’”—but that “this definition, though drawn from biology, says 
nothing specific about organic molecules, nutrition, or even life” (Darwin’s 343). The 
sorts of fragments-as-topoi I describe in this project do vary in form and connotation, 
they do replicate from text to text, and they do exhibit differential “fitness” for rhetorical 
utility. (This last condition explains why “binders” waned once Romney more or less 
retreated from public life.) Topoi, moreover, cluster together into meaningful sub-
constellations; the evolution of individual topoi, therefore, bears on the evolution of 
larger cultural formations, and human rhetors’ use of certain topoi affects the textual 
makeup of culture itself. 
 A disclaimer is in order: I am well aware that the banner of Darwinism flies 
nowhere over collegiate humanities buildings—and that, in some circles, such a banner 
itself circulates as a topos of “biological determinism” and other unsavory connotations. 
As a student and teacher of rhetoric and writing, though, I am a proud humanist. My 
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career and my livelihood lie in the humanities. This project remains rooted primarily in 
histories and theories of rhetoric, a humanistic discipline, though it undertakes, especially 
in Chapters 2 and 3, what I think is a productive dialectic with Darwinian theories of 
evolution and memetics, which were born outside the humanities. My intention, of 
course, is not to ruffle the feathers of fellow humanists or invite accusations of 
imperializing “scientism”—though I realize I risk both. My optimistic conviction, rather, 
is that the strongest relationship between the humanities and sciences is not mutual 
antagonism, but mutual interest in inquiry. If Darwinian ideas can, in this case, elucidate 
rhetorical theory, rhetorical theory can (and should) reciprocally intervene in traditionally 
scientific conversations such as those on cultural evolution. 
 Because topos remains at once the most momentous and nebulous term in this 
project’s theoretical arc, I begin with an overview of topos and its variants in rhetorical 
history. Chapter 1 notes several points of historical confusion about what topoi are what 
they do before advocating for an essentially functional understanding of topoi as “places” 
that economically orient audiences among matrices of cultural meaning. I revisit 
Aristotle’s use of the term in the Rhetoric and the Physics, stressing this overlooked 
understanding of contextual orientation that underscores Aristotle’s notion of “place”—
among which the classifications of “common” and “special” places, or topics, become not 
a pair of binary categories, but expressions of degree. I proceed through a sort of counter-
history of topical theory centered on the idea of place and orientation, noting 
contributions from figures like Cicero, Quintilian, St. Augustine, Francis Bacon, Vico, 
and Joseph Priestly, while also stressing the friction implicit in the positions of those like 
Boethius, Ramus, Descartes, and Hugh Blair. The chapter concludes with a comparative 
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look at Stephen Toulmin, Chaïm Perelman, and Kenneth Burke—three figures who 
exemplify the current range of available positions on topical invention. 
 Chapter 2, “Anatomy of a Topos: A Terminological Symposium,” places topos in 
relationship to the keywords of trope, fragment, and, most importantly, evolution. I craft 
this chapter as a theoretical and conceptual toolbox designed to aid rhetorical critics in 
analyzing topical fragments as they relate to texts, contexts, human agents, and to other 
fragments. I bookend chapter 2 with two discussions of topoi and evolution. The first 
stresses the conceptual affordances of evolution in relation to other constitutive terms of 
rhetorical and discursive analysis, such as “construction” and “sedimentation.” The 
second relates topoi back to Darwinian ideas of change and transmission, specifically by 
comparing topical theory to memetics, or meme theory, as espoused by thinkers like 
Daniel Dennett and Limor Shifman. The intermediate sections examine how different 
varieties of trope and fragment interact with the evolving sphere of rhetorical culture. 
Recovering the active understanding of trope as “turn” or “direction,” I describe how 
tropes like metaphor and metonymy describe different vectors of motion among related 
topoi. I also describe how different categories of rhetorical fragments—archetypes, 
quotations, god-terms, ideographs, and ideologemes—imply different relationships 
among topoi and their cultural contexts. 
Chapters 3 and 4 examine specific topoi. Chapter 3, “Epideixis and/as Cultural 
Evolution,” takes up the topoi of “gay marriage,” as used by the religious right and its 
political opponents, and Occupy Wall Street’s “we are the 99%” to exemplify how 
individual fragments push and pull on cultural and political formations of discourse. This 
chapter reconfigures the genre of epideictic, traditionally described as the rhetoric of 
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“praise and blame,” as the rhetoric of incremental sustenance and change at the 
macrocosmic cultural level—that is, of cultural evolution. I describe, moreover, how 
deliberative (pragmatic, political) and epideictic rhetorics often alloy together in the 
space of a single rhetorical text; topoi within such texts often aid rhetors’ deliberative 
goals while also subtly revising the larger arena of semantic space from which 
deliberative rhetorics draw in the first place. 
I return, in Chapter 4, “The Terministic Scream,” to the example of Mitt 
Romney’s “binders full of women,” as well at the adage “good fences make good 
neighbors,” widely attributed to Robert Frost. In this chapter, I draw on Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s concept of “internally persuasive discourse” to analyze how certain topoi 
aurally imply the voices of others. “Voice,” here, becomes a deeply social phenomenon, 
notable for its topical utility and connotative density: the “voices” we quote in our chosen 
topoi evoke adjacent stores of cultural knowledge, as well as subtle appeals to ethos. I 
close the chapter by reflecting on the rhetorical ethics of proliferating dominant (straight, 
white, and male) voices through our chosen topoi. 
My conclusion extends such questions of ethics and rhetorical praxis, which 
matter especially as we accelerate further into the increasingly fragmented digital age—
the era of “likes,” “shares,” retweets, hashtags, and Internet memes. We find ourselves, 
that is, in the age of Amazon-review activism. Even if one works for Avery, the faint 
echoes of the Romney campaign now affixed to the noun “binder” probably offer little 
harm. But other fragments may echo more loudly. I stress that there is nothing 
fundamentally new about discursive fragmentation, which is why even ancient rhetorics 
can assist the current inquiry. But fragments now travel with greater velocity, reach, and 
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fecundity than ever before. We, as human rhetors, find ourselves in increasingly dynamic 
interaction with transitory fragments of discourse; it matters both to political progress and 




TOPOS AND ORIENTATION 
 
My principal keyword in this project is topos, and the emphasis of this first 
chapter is historical. The phrase “history of topoi,” though, implies at least three 
meanings that I should parse before proceeding. One aligns squarely with the traditional 
history of rhetorical invention as defined by key figures in the received tradition—the 
millennia-long struggle for rhetoric’s advocates to maintain epistemic legitimacy against 
philosophy, science, religious orthodoxy, Enlightenment positivism, literature, and the 
other familiar foes. This history is synonymous with the age-old tug-of-war between 
homo rhetoricus and homo seriosus, to borrow Richard Lanham’s terms (Motives 3-6; see 
also Fish, Doing 482-85), a narrative within which questions arise about the status, 
esteem, role, and utility of the topoi. What purpose do these “places” serve in the 
assembly of arguments, the fracas of civic life, the generation of knowledge? Put another 
way, “history of topoi” here means the history of how rhetoricians might understand, 
deploy, and value topoi in the process of rhetorical invention. This history might take up 
Aristotle’s insistence on the universal utility of the koinoi topoi (Rhetoric 1.2.22 1358a) 
and proceed through complications, rejections, and defenses of this claim by subsequent 
rhetoricians. Such a history, complex as it may be, would most likely adhere to linear 
anthrocentrism: Aristotle enumerated twenty-eight common topics, which were revised 
varyingly by Cicero and Boethius, rejected by Peter Ramus, salvaged by Giambattista 
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Vico, and so forth. In this narrative, the topoi tend to rise and fall alongside invention 
itself—as, for example, the Ramist and belletristic devaluations of invention entail a flat 
dismissal of the topoi by rhetoricians like Ramus and Hugh Blair. 
A slight revision yields “history of topos,” singular, to emphasize the dynamism 
of the concept itself. This second meaning complements the first, certainly, but stresses 
the changing nature of what topos contextually means and does rather than topos’ status 
at the hands of historical rhetoricians. Such abstract concepts, as Foucault puts it, endure 
processes of “displacement” and “transformation”: “the history of a concept is not wholly 
and entirely that of its progressive refinement, . . . but that of its various fields of 
constitution and validity, that of its successive rules of use, that of the many theoretical 
contexts in which it matured” (4). Matters of esteem and utility crop up again, but the 
relationship between the concept and its context takes precedence over the actions of 
individual human actors. In the parlance of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, this would 
be a “philosophical” history of topos, their “philosophy” dealing with concepts as 
“centers of vibrations, each in itself and every one in relation to all the others”: “All 
concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no meaning and 
which can themselves only be isolated or understood as their solution emerges” (What Is 
23, 16). Thus, a historian of rhetoric might trace the “vibrations” around the concept of 
topos—the extent to which it has historically intersected with the various “problems” and 
neighboring concepts of rhetorical invention and analysis. 
Finally, “history of topoi” might refer not to the esteem of topoi and invention as 
debated by historical rhetoricians, nor to the concept of topos and its concurrent 
problems, but to individual topoi themselves. Each of Aristotle’s hundreds of “special” 
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deliberative, epideictic, and judicial topics in the Rhetoric, for example, itself represents a 
concept abstracted from the events of Athenian civic life: A historian of rhetoric might 
single out Aristotle’s epideictic topoi of “justice, manly courage, self-control, 
magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom” (1.9.5 1366b), and attempt to 
account for how such terms came to occupy the Athenian rhetor’s arsenal of ceremonial 
oratory, and how they intersect more broadly with Athenian doxa. (Connotations of the 
phrase “manly courage” among Athenians, for example, surely differed from those 
among Spartans, who probably had little use at all for appeals to “liberality” or 
“gentleness” in their epideictic occasions.) Here, the driving questions become “how did 
this topos become useful for this occasion?” and “what kind of rhetorical work did this 
topos do?” This is quite different from, say, simply asking how Demosthenes used 
censorious topos of over-ambition against Philip of Macedon, or how Barack Obama 
employed the eulogistic topoi of tolerance and opportunity to praise his party’s vision of 
America during the 2004 Democratic National Convention keynote address. 
Rather, the history of topoi I have in mind would reflexively account for what 
Kenneth Burke would call the “agent-agency” ratio (Grammar 15) between the human 
rhetor (agent) and the resource, the topoi, enabling her agency. Or, to turn the screw 
further, we might consider the converse: that we can analyze topoi as agents, that they 
might use human rhetors as rhetors use topoi. In other words, a historian of rhetoric might 
analyze how a the topos of “tolerance” has survived and adapted in the Burkean “scene” 
of American political rhetoric—how the word “tolerance” and the unstable, shifting 
concept it denotes have continually made themselves available to American rhetors 
through the decades. The same historian might turn theorist to speculate about what 
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adaptations the “tolerance” topos might need to make in the future, and how the 
implications of its use, in turn, might ramify though American civic discourse. If history, 
as the term conventionally applies, too often teleologically disembarks in the here-and-
now—in Foucault’s words, history insists on “discovering or constituting a meaning in 
the inertia of the part and in the unfinished totality of the present” (Archaeology 11)—this 
is largely why I finally opt instead for the term evolution. My thesis later in this project 
will be that topoi evolve, and that by studying the evolution of individual topoi rhetorical 
critics can develop a more robust and reflexive understanding of the dynamic relationship 
between human agents, available topoi, and ideological context, without conceiving of a 
corrective totality of rhetorical knowledge as our critical terminus. 
If my project is headed toward a theory of topical evolution—this third sense of 
topical “history”—I will first need a more conventional history of rhetoric to get there. 
This project is not simply a “recovery” of the classical topos nor an attempt to import 
classical theory wholesale into a latter-day setting, but it must begin with history insofar 
as, to again quote Deleuze and Guattari, “every concept has a history, even though this 
history zigzags, though it passes, if need be, through other problems or onto different 
planes. In any concept there are usually bits or components that come from other 
concepts” (What Is 18). In other words, there are many potential histories of topoi 
because the concept of the topos—in its connotations, its inflections—has historically 
borrowed from and informed so many neighboring concepts. Many historical 
commentaries on topoi—including those by William Grimaldi, Paul Slomkowski, and 
Sara Rubinelli to which I refer below—are essentially corrective. They focus on classical 
topical theory, primarily Aristotle’s, and aim to right scholarly and historical 
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misconceptions about the meaning of the ancients’ work. They are essentially forensic in 
their implications. I, too, will begin with Aristotle, and I too take great inspiration from 
his work. I, though, am finally glad to revise Aristotle—or Cicero, or Quintilian—when 
doing so serves the larger purpose of my project. “The trick to writing history,” advises 
Sharon Crowley, “is deciding which story to tell” (Review 245). That is: while not every 
story is true, even the true ones are selective and motivated. The history I begin with, in 
short, is the one is the one that stirs up the material needed to revitalize topoi as nodes of 
rhetorical orientation. This is not the only “correct” understanding of the term, but it is 
the one that, in my view, offers the most fruitful contribution to rhetorical criticism today. 
 
What is a topos? The term has proven particularly vexing, and introductions to 
topoi customarily acknowledge its ambiguity. Edward P.J. Corbett, for example, laments 
that Aristotle, from whom we inherit the earliest recorded commentary on topoi, never 
explicitly defined the term in his Rhetoric or Topica (45-46), while subsequent 
rhetoricians have offered up a field of definitions that are, in John Muckelbauer’s words, 
“confusing if not downright contradictory” (132). Thomas Conley, in surveying research 
prior to 2000, notes that common uses of topos vary, but remain broadly hobbled by a 
Boethian/Ramist emphasis on categorization and judgement, as opposed to invention 
(“What Counts”). To better understand the term topos, one can begin with key points of 
the term’s internal tension. I identify four: 
1. The metaphor of place. Commentaries on topoi tend to note the etymologically 
assured metaphor of “place”: topoi are those “locations” where rhetors might “go” in 
order to invent an argument for a certain scenario; in Quintilian’s famous words, they are 
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“secret places where arguments reside, and from which they must be drawn forth,” 
similar to the “usual haunts” where a hunter stalks a specific prey (5.10.20-22). But 
orators are not literal bowmen, and there exists little consensus as to what rhetors should 
hope to “find” on such excursions (or if “find” is even be the proper verb—should it be 
“discover,” “extract,” “construct”?). One question worth further pursuing, then, is how 
locational metaphors historically and theoretically contribute to an understanding of 
topoi. 
2. Two (incompatible?) definitions. From Aristotle’s Rhetoric, we inherit a 
distinction between the universally heuristic “common” topics (koinoi topoi) and 
situationally specific “special” topics (idia), sets of useful concepts and assumptions that 
Aristotle allocates to deliberative, epideictic, and judicial oratory, but subsequent 
rhetoricians have applied more specifically to, for example, engineering reports and 
literary criticism (Miller and Selzer; Fahnestock and Secor; Wolfe). From Aristotle’s dual 
understanding of topoi we inherit a broader dual understanding: topos today might refer 
to either (a) an argumentative heuristic or scheme, or (b) a shared assumption, motif, or 
stock argument that circulates in a given culture (see also Leff, “Topics”). It will behoove 
rhetoricians to inquire into the worth of each definition, and into their potential points of 
intersection. 
3. Rhetoric versus dialectic. Aristotle’s Topica is a treatise on dialectic, designed 
specifically for the logic-games likely practiced in Athenian academies during the 
author’s lifetime. The topoi of the Topica, therefore, occupy a different caste than those 
listed for application in the enthymemes of public discourse in the Rhetoric. But all are 
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named topoi—and from Aristotle we inherit a debate over which art “owns” the topoi, a 
debate entailing a familiar tug-of-war between rhetoric and philosophy. 
4. The profusion of synonyms. Muddling the situation further is a list of synonyms 
for topos—the Latin locus or “seat” (sede) of argument, the commonplace, Stephen 
Toulmin’s warrant—none of which are quite synonymous. Variations exist among 
different translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric alone: George A. Kennedy deliberately 
retains “topos” for the common topoi but generally reserves the English cognate “topic” 
for the special. John Henry opts for “topic” across the board while W. Rhys Roberts 
elects “line of argument” for the common topoi and “commonplace” for the special. 
Which terms do rhetoricians wish to claim for which purposes? 
I will circle back to these points of tension at the end of this chapter. They are, in 
a manner of speaking, themselves a set of topoi—or meta-topoi—heuristic placeholders 
that provide a sense of direction to the history I wish to tell and a sense of thematic 
coherence as I tell it. By attending first to such controversies that we inherit from 
rhetorical history, we can then begin to refine our conceptual vocabulary toward modern 
application. Below, I trace a conceptual history of the term topoi and its variants from 
classical times to recent scholarship. Though this history, I will advocate for functional 
(as opposed to formal) understanding of topoi as discursive nodes that economically 
orient audiences among larger fields of cultural knowledge. This understanding of topoi 
begins with a particular rereading of Aristotle, but I trace the idea through a series of 





Aristotle and His Contemporaries 
“Special” and “Common” Topics 
Before I come to a rereading of topoi as “places” of orientation, it is important to 
review the complexity surrounding Aristotle’s use of the term. The concept of the topos 
almost certainly predates Aristotle (384-322 BCE): it was, in Corbett’s words, “in the air 
when [Aristotle] wrote his Rhetoric. He merely picked it up and, as he usually did, 
impressed it with his own stamp” (45). It is difficult to gauge how and to what extent 
Aristotle and his contemporaries might have differed on the concept, but there is little 
reason to suspect that Aristotle’s chief rival, the sophistic pedagogue and speechwriter 
Isocrates (436-338 BCE), understood topoi much differently than Aristotle. Though we 
have lost Isocrates’ primary treatise on rhetoric, derivations of the word topos appear 
scattered throughout his recorded orations. For instance, In the Helen, which slightly 
predates Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Isocrates refers to topoi twice, but suggests a slightly 
different meaning in each instance, neither of which refers to a literal “place” or “region” 
(Kennedy, On Rhetoric 44-45). In the first example, he writes that “although [the older 
Sophists] so clearly have shown that it is easy to contrive false statements on any subject 
that may be proposed, [some men] still waste time on this commonplace” (208.5; 
emphasis added). The second instance refers to Theseus’ high opinion of Helen: “But lest 
I seem through poverty of ideas to be dwelling unduly upon the same theme and by 
misusing the glory of one man to be praising Helen, I wish now to review the subsequent 
events also” (216.38; emphasis added). Larue Van Hook’s respective translations of 
topos to “commonplace” and “theme” highlight, to begin, the difficulty modern scholars 
have in parsing topos as a concept. More important, though, the Helen illustrates that 
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topos encompassed a large conceptual ground among Athenian rhetoricians. In the first 
instance, the term refers to a generative procedure, the sophistic method of inventing 
arguments on all sides of an issue. In the second, topos, confusingly translated as 
“theme,” refers to the citation of an authoritative ancient “witness,” much like Aristotle 
describes at the end of the Rhetoric, Book 1 (1.15.13-17; 1375b-1376a). 
In Aristotelian parlance, Isocrates’ first would be a sort of “common” topos and 
his second a “special” topos. The common topics, or koinoi topoi, are for Aristotle a set 
of twenty-eight “elements of enthymemes”—heuristic patterns rhetors can apply to probe 
any situation for arguments (Rhetoric 2.22.13; 1396b). These are, in the order Aristotle 
provides, arguments from opposites; grammatical form; correlatives; more and less; 
consideration of time; turning an accusation back against an opponent; definition; varied 
or ambiguous meaning of a word; division; induction; authority; subordinate parts; 
consequences; opposites; accusations of hypocrisy; consequences by analogy; results to 
causes; contrasted choices; identification of purpose with cause; reasons for and against; 
implausibilities; contradictions; causes of false impressions; cause and effect; a better, 
alternative plan; comparison and contrast; hypothetical mistakes; and meanings 
etymologically implicit in in an opponent’s name (2.23; 1397a-1400b). These topoi, in a 
sense, represent a condensation of the dialectical topoi Aristotle enumerates at far greater 
length in his Topica, a work scholars largely recognize as a textbook for the dialectic 
logic-games practiced in Athenian academies like Plato’s (Slomkowski 9-42; Rubinelli 1-
8). 
Scholars have made a great deal of the koinoi topoi, largely because this similarity 
to the dialectical “laws” enumerated in the Topica promise universal heuristic potential 
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that bridges the gap between philosophy and rhetoric (Grimaldi, Aristotle 2: 291; Studies 
115-35). For Grimaldi, “The change from the particular to the general topics can be 
viewed . . . as a change from a static to a dynamic phase of topical analysis”; Aristotle’s 
koinoi topoi presage the “hypothetical form of medieval logicians” like Boethius, a form 
that links antecedents and consequents through generalized principles (Aristotle 2: 291-
92). In a similar vein, the koinoi topoi appeal to many scholars because they bring order 
and heuristic continuity to the bedlam of rhetorical praxis. For example, Sharon Bracci 
Blinn and Mary Garrett have employed the koinoi topoi as tools for cross-cultural 
analysis, A.C. Braet has aligned them with “argumentative schemes,” and Frank J. 
D’Angelo has likened them to both “structural paradigms” (“Paradigms,” “Topoi, 
Paradigms”) and cognitive processes (Conceptual 40-54; see also “Evolution”). Conley 
has mapped the koinoi topoi onto Stephen Toulmin’s conceptual scheme of claim, data, 
and warrant (“Logical Hylomorphism”), and a number of scholars have advanced the 
common topoi as tools of pedagogy, discursive competency, good citizenship, and critical 
thinking (Clark and Delia; Fleming; Jost; Winterowd; Yarborough; Zompetti). 
Amid such enthusiasm over the koinoi topoi, two points are often overlooked. The 
first is that it is particularly injurious to conceive the rhetorical koinoi topoi as a mere 
translation or “dumbing down” of the dialectical topoi because the two categories serve 
different ends. Specifically, while the dialectical topoi suit logical syllogistic reasoning, 
in which debaters make explicit each possible premise in a belabored debating game, the 
rhetorical enthymeme must economically bypass much tacitly shared knowledge while 
integrating appeals to ethos and pathos as well as logical proofs (see Burnyeat; McAdon, 
“Probabilities”). Indeed, a close look at the koinoi topoi can support what Eugene Garver 
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has identified as the primacy of character in Aristotelian rhetoric: note the koinoi topoi of 
reversed accusation, hypocrisy, and meanings derived from an opponent’s name. All 
serve less to demonstrate logical proof than to impeach the ethos of an adversary—even, 
in the final case, to revert to a sort of cultured name-calling. In discussing the reversed 
accusation topos, for example, Aristotle stresses that the rhetor should never “[reproach] 
others for [failing to do] what he does not do—or would not do—himself” (2.23.7; 
1398a). Such a topos falls beyond the purview of dialectic because dialectic deals with 
logic and ideas, not the ethē of the speakers and the emotional attachments of audiences 
to those speakers. In rhetoric, though, logical, ethical, and pathetic appeals effectively 
fuse together in the fiber of the argument. In short, the koinoi topoi necessitate a more 
elastic understanding of the rhetorical situation than their dialectical counterparts 
because, as Garver has argued, Aristotelian rhetoric merges elements of both politics and 
dialectic, and thus obliges rhetors to demonstrate goodwill and credibility as they 
advance arguments (77). 
The second point—more of an omission in commentaries on Aristotle than an 
overt misconception—is that Aristotle actually privileges the idia, or special topics, over 
the common. Aristotle writes, 
[The common topoi] will not will not make one understand any genus; for 
they are not concerned with the underlying subject. As to [the specifics], 
to the degree that someone makes better choice of the premises, he will 
have created knowledge different from dialectic and rhetoric without its 
being recognized; for if he succeeds in hitting on first principles, the 
knowledge will no longer be dialectic or rhetoric but the science of which 
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[the speaker] grasps the first principles. Most enthymemes are derived 
from these species that are particular and specific, fewer from the 
common. (Rhetoric 1.2.21-22; 1358a). 
This is a difficult passage because it seems, on one hand, to uphold the familiar division 
in Aristotelian taxonomy between science, which comprises demonstrable certainties, and 
the artful disciplines of rhetoric and dialectic, which deal in probabilities. On the other 
hand, Aristotle’s use of the term “enthymeme”—which he earlier defines as a “rhetorical 
syllogism” (1.2.8; 1365b)—refocuses discussion to the realm of rhetoric, and the 
admission that rhetors can furtively breach the boundary between rhetoric proper and 
science suggests a fissure in the traditional boundaries of Aristotelian taxonomy itself. 
The same uncertainty arises again when Aristotle begins his commentary on special 
political topoi: “Insofar as someone tries to make dialectic or rhetoric not just mental 
faculties but sciences, he unwittingly obscures their nature by the change, reconstructing 
them as forms of knowledge of certain underlying facts, rather than only of speech. 
Nevertheless, let us now say what is worthwhile to analyze, while leaving the full 
examination to political science” (1.4.6-7; 1359b). Again, Aristotle here sounds reluctant 
to wander into the realm of particulars lest he sap the integrity of political science by 
ceding ground to rhetoric. And yet, the majority the Rhetoric’s Book 1—twelve of its 
fifteen chapters—deals in special topoi, as opposed to a single chapter in Book 2 that 
exclusively addresses the koinoi topoi. Aristotle, too, refers to his detailed discussion of 
emotion and character in the first seventeen chapters of Book 2 as a set of topoi (1.3.17; 
1380b), so it not unreasonable to argue that his discussion of the idia encompasses those 
pages as well (Kennedy, On Rhetoric 124n27; see also Grimaldi, Studies 147-51). In any 
 24 
 
case, the space Aristotle allots to the special topoi bears out his thesis that most 
enthymemes will derive directly from the idia. 
 Kennedy describes the Rhetoric’s idia as a set of “knowledge about politics, 
ethics, and psychology at the popular level that Aristotle regards as requisite for 
responsible and effective argument in public address” (On Rhetoric 51). Book 1 of the 
Rhetoric enumerates hundreds of such topoi, organized primarily around their utility in 
deliberative, epideictic, and judicial oratory—for example, deliberative topics centered on 
the idea of “good” (1.6; 1362a-1363b), topics of praiseworthy virtue in epideixis (1.9.1-
27; 1366a-1367a), or judicial topics about wrongdoers and doing wrong (1.12; 1372a-
1373a). Most of these idia are “artistic” topoi through which the rhetor invents his own 
persuasive materials, but Aristotle includes the “inartistic” proofs of laws, witnesses, 
contracts, torture, and oaths among his discussion of the special topics of judicial 
rhetoric. (Isocrates’s citation of Theseus in the Helen is an example of an inartistic 
special topic.) 
As Carolyn R. Miller explains, the special topoi as a whole exist in a 
“vulnerable,” intermediary space between what Michael Leff has termed the “materialist” 
and “inferential” models of topical invention (Miller, “Aristotle’s” 65; Leff, “Topics” 42; 
cf. c.f. Virno 34-40; McAdon, “‘Special Topics’”). They are Aristotle’s sustained effort 
to validate rhetoric as both a source of heuristic epistemology—though the common 
topics may represent this effort in its “purest” form—and to defend rhetoric against 
Plato’s famous “antirhetorical topo[s]” that rhetoricians occupy a charlatan’s trade with 
no concern for real knowledge (Gorgias 450c-458b; Fish, Doing 472). That is, the idia 
are “material” in that they derive from the ideological particularities of Athenian culture, 
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thus illustrating the thesis that rhetoricians must stay abreast of popular developments and 
opinions in their own societies—a thesis later propounded more forcefully by Cicero’s 
Crassus in De Oratore. But the idia are not just a rote litany of stock arguments, either. 
Like the koinoi topoi, they matter precisely for their heuristic potential. When Aristotle, 
for example, meticulously subdivides the idea of “virtue” for application in epideictic 
oratory, he intends to key rhetoricians into the sets of connotations stemming from terms 
they might use—“courage” linking to manliness and wartime heroism, “liberality” 
linking to wealth and generosity, “justice” to fairness under the law, and so on (1.9.5-13; 
1366b). Using the best term entails evoking the proper set of emotional connotations 
among the audience. 
There is little doubt that Aristotle valued the idia highly, but Miller hypothesizes 
that the special topics have ebbed from contemporary scholarship because they “are the 
victims of the academicizing of rhetoric” (“Aristotle’s” 65). In other words, when one 
reins in rhetoric away from the arena of public praxis and into the ivory tower she 
obviates the idia because special topics apply meaningfully only in an immediate 
sociocultural setting. To instead highlight the koinoi topoi, as many recent scholars have, 
is to align rhetoric more with philosophy and less with cultural studies, emphasizing the 
universal and timeless over the immediate and ephemeral. It is, moreover, somewhat 
convenient to fixate on the unchanging common topics since the special topics, by nature, 
exist in perpetual flux, requiring the rhetorician to also dabble heavily in politics, 
psychology, sociology, and popular culture. This inconvenient but important point 
surfaces in Dudley Bailey’s 1964 essay “A Plea for a Modern Set of Topoi,” in which the 
author entreats some ambitious rhetorician to “round up the patterns that . . . inform the 
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coherent use of our language, to place them in some sensible order, and to discuss their 
logical implications” much as one might undertake “a laborious gathering of eggs” (114, 
115; see also Bilsky et al.). The word “laborious” seems most operative. Aristotle’s 
original drafting of the Rhetoric, Books 1 and 2, was probably just that: a painstaking 
attempt to recall and classify all the most vital premises and procedures applying to 
specific situations in Athenian oratory. 
 
“Place” and Orientation 
As will become increasingly clear, it is my contention that a “laborious gathering” 
of topoi is more challenging than even Bailey acknowledges. My reasons, though, begin 
with a conceptual understanding of topoi that we inherit from Aristotle, and here it 
becomes necessary to pause and dwell on the actual Aristotelian definition of topos in 
order to draw out the intricacies of the spatial metaphor implied in the term. Aristotle 
notoriously declines to define topos in either the Topica or Rhetoric, barring their 
ambiguous classification as “the elements of enthymemes” (Rhetoric 2.22.13; 1396b). 
Such opacity has spurred many historians of rhetoric and philosophy to extrapolate 
definitions from his uses of the term in the Topica and Rhetoric. Slomkowski, for 
example, synthesizes work by Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus toward the conclusion 
that Aristotelian topoi are “hypotheses in hypothetical syllogisms” (67), while Rubinelli 
prioritizes the common topics to aver that Aristotle saw topoi as “strategies of 
argumentation for gaining the upper hand and producing successful speeches” (13). 
And yet, as both Miller and Muckelbauer have noted, Aristotle’s frankest 
discussion of the term topos comes not in the Topica or Rhetoric, but the Physics (Miller, 
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“Aristotelian”; Muckelbauer 123-41). To be sure, the Physics is not a treatise on rhetoric, 
nor should it be read as such. But neither is it a work of “hard science” in any modern 
sense; like much of Aristotle’s corpus, it fuses science and philosophy, supplying a 
window to the “imaginative background” that encompasses Aristotle’s work in general 
(Russell 203-06). The conceptual discussion of topos—“place”—in the Physics says 
nothing directly of rhetoric or dialectic, but it does elucidate for modern rhetoricians the 
Athenians’ metaphorical connotations of the term when applied to rhetorical invention. In 
particular, it reveals Aristotle’s understanding of such connotations. In Book 4 of the 
Physics, Aristotle conceives topos as a concept useful in understanding both the motion 
of physical bodies—understood as the changing relationship between bodies and 
places—and spatial orientation (4.1.4-5; 210a). The matter of orientation offers an 
especially revelatory parallel to the common and special topoi of the Rhetoric: 
And so, too, a “place” may be assigned to an object either primarily 
because it is its special and exclusive place or because it is “common” to it 
and all other things, or is the universal that includes the proper place of all 
things. 
 I mean, for instance, that you, at this moment, are in the universe 
because you are in the air, which air is in the universe; and in the air 
because on the earth; and in a like matter on the earth because on the 
special place which “contains and circumscribes you, and no other body.” 
(Physics 4.2.31-36; 209a-209b; emphasis to special and common added) 
This final phrase expresses Aristotle’s definition of topos proper, which he later iterates 
more precisely as “a surface-continent that embraces its content after the fashion of a 
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vessel” (4.4.29; 212a). Topos, for Aristotle, contrasts with both the “form” and “matter” 
of a body insofar as matter takes no specific shape and “form determines the thing itself, 
but place the body-continent” (4.4.5-14; 211b). In other words, a book comprises a 
certain set of matter—paper, ink, binding, and so forth—arranged into a certain stable 
shape, its form, to which we attach the label “book.” The book’s place, though, is not that 
form but the “envelope” of space (4.4.79; 211a) by which one describes its relation to 
other books, the library, the city, the earth, and so on. If “book” is the object’s 
recognizable form, the book’s topos is that object’s location in the context of other 
discernible locations. It seems fair to surmise that this specific, “special,” topos 
immediately surrounding the book corresponds roughly to the idia of rhetoric, while the 
broader, more abstract “common” topoi (library, earth, air, etc.) that contextualize the 
relative location of special places correspond to the koinoi topoi (Miller, “Aristotelian” 
135; Muckelbauer 128-29). Aristotle’s particular phrasing indeed invites such a 
comparison. 
Because Aristotle’s discussion of topos in the Physics culminates in its 
articulation and defense of the definition of place proper—that is, of “special” places—it 
becomes apparent that the philosopher’s primary concern is again with the particular. He 
does not, for instance, take pains to taxonomize all possible areas of large, abstract 
“place,” and instead refers passingly to universe, air, water, and earth as they become 
convenient. It would, again, be reckless to attempt any one-to-one equation between 
physical and rhetoric topoi, but historians of rhetoric miss an opportunity in ignoring the 
Physics. Read alongside this treatise, the Rhetoric’s relationship between the special and 
common topics becomes clearer: the difference between common and special topics is 
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not, as Grimaldi suggests, a matter of dynamism and stasis, but one of locational scope. 
The koinoi topoi are those “common” domains that, by Aristotle’s taxonomy, categorize 
all the available idia. In this sense, Isocrates’ aforementioned citation of Theseus is a 
special topos that would fall into Aristotle’s “common” domain of argument by authority, 
and possibly into the intersecting domain of argument by attention to the time. (Many of 
the common domains, it seems fair to assert, will intersect other common domains.) 
Conversely, the common sophistic topos that Isocrates mentions, that of probing any 
situation for contrasting binary arguments, would contain a wealth of idia about specific 
circumstances. These, in fact, are detailed in the Protagorean Dissoi Logoi: for example, 
“it is bad for the ship-owner if his merchant-ships are involved in collision or get 
smashed up, but good for the shipbuilders. Furthermore, it is bad for everyone else, but 
good for the blacksmiths if a tool corrodes or loses its sharp edge or gets broken to 
pieces” (§1). Returning to the Rhetoric, Aristotle’s lopsided emphasis on the idia 
suggests he wanted students first to familiarize themselves with a broad range of specific 
topoi pertinent to Athenian culture, but then develop the ability to “go looking” for 
additional ones in the proper “common” domains if need be. 
Having clarified the relationship between the koinoi topoi and idia through the 
Physics, it becomes easier to return to questions of definition. Rubinelli’s understanding 
of topoi as “strategies of argumentation” seems to privilege the common topics in a 
manner consonant with later rhetoricians and philosophers, but less with Aristotle 
himself. Slomkowski’s definition of topoi as “hypotheses in hypothetical syllogisms” 
narrows the focus but retains emphasis of form, while Aristotle, again, contrasts “place” 
with form. The same criticism could be leveled against many other formalist discussions 
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of Aristotelian topoi (e.g. Braet; Conley, “Logical Hylomorphism”; Dyck). Against such 
approaches, Aristotle’s understanding of topos might compel a more dynamic and 
contextual definition; if physical “places” are “envelopes” of space surrounding bodies 
and orienting perception to their location vis-à-vis other bodies, Aristotelian rhetorical 
topoi might be understood as discursive “places” in the cultural polity that both 
circumscribe rhetorical energy and orient audiences to other nodes of rhetorical 
significance. This definition resembles Ralph Cintron’s understanding of topoi as 
culturally specific and practice-based “storehouses of social energy” that “organize our 
sentiments, beliefs, and actions in the lifeworld” (“Democracy” 100; see also Arthos; 
Leff, “Up from Theory”; Conley, “What Counts” 584). The likening of topoi to 
“storehouses” evokes Aristotle’s own comparison between topos and “vessel” in the 
Physics—place is like “an immovable vessel” and vessel “a movable place” (4.4.15; 
212a)—but Muckelbauer is quick to note, and Cintron would likely agree, that “topos is 
far more dynamic than a static vessel; it does not simply receive an object, but ‘exerts an 
influence’ and has a certain force” (130). Rather than “an effect of an external 
demarcating force called rhetoric or writing,” Muckelbauer continues, “Aristotle 
indicated that place is the demarcating force itself” (131). 
Topos, thus, is not discursive form itself, but the place form inhabits in order to 
forge a coherent relationship with rhetorical culture. More than any other point—more 
than the division between the special and common—this understanding of topos as the 
mediator between form and cultural context is Aristotle’s most valuable lesson on topoi. 
Toward clarifying this point a step further, an additional word is in order about the topical 
process of orientation as it applies in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and more generally. 
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On the former front, the spatial metaphor of topos supports an expansion of what 
“count” as special topics in Books 1 and 2 of the Rhetoric. As I note above, the idia of 
deliberative, epideictic, and judicial rhetoric in Book 1 are traditionally considered 
special topoi, and some scholars defend the discussions of emotions and character in 
Book 2 as such too. Yet, there is good cause to view Aristotle’s maxims in Book 2, 
chapter 21—which are rarely referred to as topoi—as examples of special topics par 
excellence (see Billig 229). A maxim is an assertion, Aristotle tells us, but one that 
speaks to generalized courses of action rather than particulars about individuals (2.21.2; 
1394a). He quotes Euripides for the example, “There is no one of men who is free”—a 
maxim that becomes a proper enthymeme when followed by another premise, “For he is 
a slave of money or of chance” (2.21.2; 1349b). Maxims, thus, can exist as traditional 
“elements of enthymemes” like other topoi or they can “be enthymematic but not part of 
an enthymeme”—the sort that is “most well liked” (2.21.6; 1349b). Many maxims, in 
other words, imply complete enthymemes by economically linking to tacitly shared 
information or beliefs through a single, memorable statement. A latter-day maxim like 
“Freedom isn’t free,” for example, ties neatly into a set of American assumptions about 
our own unalienable liberties, the sacrosanct value of military service, and the connection 
between the military abroad and preserving freedoms at home. Such maxims are “most 
well liked,” as Aristotle puts it, because the lay public can contribute its own knowledge 
and belief to complete the enthymemes they imply, thus completing a circuit of 
identification. By employing a single catchy aphoristic form to orient audiences amid a 
larger matrix of cultural-political space, Aristotelian maxims illustrate with especial 
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lucidity the function of Aristotelian topoi in general. Wherever this orienting function 
operates, the Aristotelian topos is at work. 
This lesson from the Rhetoric, the idea that the briefest of discursive forms can 
carry out the important rhetorical work of orienting audiences, is worth generalizing. 
“Orientation,” as Burke tells us, “is . . . a bundle of judgments as to how things were, how 
they are, and how they will be” (Permanence 14). Signs “orient” us, key us into these 
“bundles of judgments,” insofar as “[e]ven a so-called ‘single’ sign (such as a specific 
pitch, or color, or form) is in reality a complex of events interpreted by the senses as a 
unit” (12). A saying like “freedom isn’t free,” in other words, coheres as “a unit,” but the 
difference between interpreting such a maxim as a single “body” or form and interpreting 
it as a topos lies in the question of orientation, of how such a maxim also locates 
audiences in a larger context. So it is that Aristotelian topoi transcend static formalism: In 
the words of Richard Leo Enos and Janice Lauer, “Topoi . . . may appear as dormant 
‘places’ but can also energize ideas through the socially shared understanding of . . . 
modes of relational thought” (81). By mislabeling topoi as static or “dormant,” 
rhetoricians elide the generative ability of topoi to relationally link to other nodes of 
rhetorical importance. In this sense, the spatial metaphor is not just a convenient way to 
speak of Aristotelian topoi, but the very key to their epistemological vitality. 
 
Roman Rhetoric and the “Material” Topoi 
The discussions of topoi (loci, sedes of argument) in Roman rhetorical handbooks 
owes a heavy debt to Aristotle, poses important revisions to the system Aristotle offers. 
But these revisions, I believe, hold intact the important metaphor of spatial orientation. 
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The Romans’ most momentous alteration to topical theory is the refiguring of topoi (or 
“commonplaces”) as discrete elements derived from the “material” of popular cultural—a 
sort of expansion of Aristotle’s idia into a comprehensive and elastic system. The 
primary players as I turn to ancient Rome are, predictably, Cicero (106-43 BCE), the 
lawyer, statesman, and provocative theorist of rhetoric as a broad meta-discipline, and 
Quintilian (38-100 AD), the influential pedagogue and Ciceronian disciple. Cicero’s 
writings on rhetoric sum to both a theory of oratory that takes great inspiration from 
Aristotle, seen, for example, in De inventione and Topica, and an ethical meta-theory, 
seen most prominently in De oratore and Orator, that explores how rhetors can and 
should responsibly deploy the strategies and devices of rhetoric. This meta-theory, as 
Jeffrey Walker argues, is distinctly Isocratean in its insistence that “a rhetorical education 
must include a philosophico-literary education” that deeply acquaints the orator with a 
breadth of knowledge pertaining to “life and culture” (81). Cicero’s Crassus, the author’s 
primary mouthpiece in the dialogue of De oratore, “advocates [what] resembles the old 
sophistic paideia, or Isocratean paideia, which after Plato and Aristotle had been 
displaced . . . into the more specialized subfields of the philosophic schools, leaving 
‘rhetoric’ only the techniques of practical oratory in courts and assemblies” (Walker 81). 
Thus, while Cicero, along with the anonymous author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, 
advances a more-or-less Aristotelian theory of topical invention, he asserts much more 
frankly than his precursor that the responsible orator should also dutifully study literature, 
philosophy, and culture. Aristotle, again, dances around this point while enumerating his 
idia in the Rhetoric, but nowhere does he expresses it directly, perhaps for fear of 
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aligning himself too neatly with Isocrates and his school of quasi-sophistic rhetorical 
pedagogy. 
 Cicero’s contributions to topical theory are best understood not only as an 
extension of Aristotle’s, but also, and more immediately, an extension of the work of 
first-century rhetorician Hermagoras and his ideas as adopted in the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium, the anonymously authored earliest surviving treatise on Roman Rhetoric 
(Walker 59-65). Like Cicero’s De inventione, the Ad Herennium concerns itself 
principally with judicial rhetoric, though its general conclusions extend to the deliberative 
and epideictic as well. Concerning topoi, the author makes one pivotal and influential 
revision to Aristotle’s vocabulary: he redefines the parameters of “common” and 
“special”: “The special topics [loci proprii] are those which only the prosecution, or only 
the defense, can use. The common topics [locus comunes] are those which are used now 
by the defense, and now by the prosecution, depending on the case” (2.9). Gone, then, is 
Aristotle’s hard-and-fast distinction between the specific places of the idia and the broad 
regions of koinoi topoi, “special” and “common” instead referring to a topos’ range of 
utility to different rhetors. 
This lexical revision yields a pair of long-term effects: First, it pushes talk of 
“special topics” to the periphery of rhetorical theory, the term now denoting statements of 
specific utility such as the prosecutor’s ethical premise that “wicked men ought not to be 
pitied” (2.9). Cicero, who perhaps finds the Ad Herennium’s distinction between special 
and common trifling, does away with the term “special topics” altogether in De 
inventione, referring to the prosecutor’s same admonishment against pitying the wicked 
as a sort of common topic (2.51; see also Leff, “Topics” 28). Cicero’s reasoning, perhaps, 
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was that, although a premise like “one should not pity the wicked” aids prosecutors 
especially, it circulates widely enough in common Roman culture in general to warrant 
that label (see Leff, “Commonplaces” 446). 
Second, meanwhile, the term “common topics” (or “commonplaces”) comes to 
denote a set of such specific, culturally momentous premises that resemble Aristotle’s 
idia far more than his koinoi topoi. Commonplaces, for Cicero, are “arguments which can 
be transferred to many cases” for the purposes of “amplifying” either undisputed or 
doubtful statements within a “probable line of reasoning” (2.48). Cicero writes: 
A speech . . . is occasionally rendered distinguished or brilliant by 
introducing common topics and some topic backed up by arguments when 
the audience is already convinced. In fact that is certainly the moment 
when it is permissible to say something “common,” when some passage 
peculiar to the case has been developed with great care, and the spirit of 
the audience is being refreshed for what is to come, or is being roused to 
passion now that the argument has been concluded. (2.49) 
Even in a judicial context, then, the Ciceronian commonplace plays an epideictic role. Its 
primary purpose is not to advance a case in terms of “pure” logic, but to ground such 
arguments in the cultural resin wrought of shared assumptions—again, to orient. 
Commonplaces work to “amplify” logical arguments, Cicero stresses, insofar as 
audiences will invest themselves emotionally in appeals to “common sense” more so than 
pure logical deduction and identify with rhetors on the basis of shared assumptions (see 
Leff, “Burke’s Ciceronianism”). From the Romans, then, modern rhetorical theory 
inherits the notion of “commonplace” as a shared idea, statement, or assumption. Latter-
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day definitions of the term reflect Cicero’s understanding accurately: Commonplaces are, 
in David Bartholomae’s words, “culturally or institutionally authorized concept[s]” that 
supply their “own necessary elaboration” (63). Or as Crowley has put it, they are 
“[a]rgumentative canards” or statements that circulate within ideology (Toward 50, 70-
75; Crowley and Hawhee 96-108; see also Goss). 
 Much like Aristotle’s compendium of idia, the Ad Herennium and De inventione 
each aggregate a set of commonplaces useful to aspiring rhetors, though the scope of the 
Roman handbooks is limited principally to judicial rhetoric. As such, these books tend to 
organize commonplaces in the style of the sophistic Dissoi Logoi, offering one topic 
useful to the prosecution and a counter-topic useful to the defense. For example: one of 
Cicero’s common topics “attacks the villainy of a man who, attempting to arrogate the 
control of not only acts but words, both does what he pleases and calls his deed by 
whatever name he pleases” (De inventione 2.55). A defendant might parry this charge, 
Cicero advises, through “[t]he common topic . . . in which he expresses indignation that 
the prosecutor attempts to put him in jeopardy not only by distorting facts but even by 
altering the meaning of the language” (2.56). Here again, as in Aristotle’s topoi, the 
importance of ethos and pathos resurfaces: Cicero’s commonplaces are meant not just to 
advance logical arguments, but to bolster and impeach credibility, as well as stir the apt 
emotions. In Leff’s words, these commonplaces “are complete products that integrate 
logical argument, emotional appeal, and style into a single structure” (“Commonplaces” 
448). It becomes clear, however, that while a set of commonplaces cumulatively cohere 
into an ideological worldview, they map out no logically airtight set of beliefs. Rather, as 
Michael Billig notes, they expose the “contrary” nature of “common sense” (234). 
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Bearing out the either-or tradition of Protagorean logic, the Ad Herennium and De 
inventione tend to pair “common-sense logoi and their equally common-sensical anti-
logoi,” mapping out a rhetorical landscape of contradictory themes—justice versus 
mercy, bravery versus foolishness, and so on—for aspiring rhetors to navigate (Billig 
235). 
 The sophistic point-counterpoint organization of Ciceronian commonplaces 
around the judicial matters of persons and things indicates a shift away from the 
dialectically inflected common topics of Aristotle: In Leff’s words, “The focus of 
[Cicero’s] system shifts from the discovery of inferential connectives to the discovery of 
materials for arguments” (“Topics” 29), although locational and spatial metaphors still 
inform Romans’ discussion of topics. Cicero, in his Topica, refers to topoi as the “seats” 
(sedem) from which arguments are drawn (1.7), while Quintilian, in Institutio Oratoria, 
makes a lengthy analogy between topical regions and hunting grounds: 
For just as all kinds of produce are not produced by every country, and as 
you will not succeed in finding a particular bird or beast, if you are 
ignorant of the localities has its usual haunts or birthplace, as even the 
various kinds of fish flourish in different surroundings, . . . so not every 
kind of argument can be derived from every circumstance, and 
consequently our own search requires discrimination. . . . [I]f we know the 
circumstances which give rise to each kind of argument, we shall easily 




Quintilian, here, nods back to Aristotle’s koinoi topoi, to the topical “region” as a 
heuristic tool designed to probe a given circumstance for possible arguments. But 
whereas Aristotle’s adapted his “common” domains from the tools of dialectical debate, 
Quintilian organizes his “regions” or “haunts” around cultural and regional specificity in 
a manner consonant with the Ciceronian model of “material” topics, whereby the 
metaphor of “raw materials,” as well as that of location, informs topical invention (De 
inventione 1.34). Particularly, it is significant that Quintilian refers to the political region 
of the nation-state. His metaphor emphasizes regional custom—that is, topoi derived 
from attention to the particulars of a literal place or polity—that have no necessary 
parallel in dialectical debate. One implication of Quintilian’s metaphor is that the 
effective rhetor must largely construct his argument from the material doxa shared by his 
audience, again reflecting the topos as a cultural reflector—a device used to economically 
sum up the ethos of the polis. 
 Quintilian also advances what has itself become a commonplace caution about the 
use of topoi: that an overreliance on topics can leave students of rhetoric “fettered by . . . 
rigid laws” and blind to the particularities of a given case (5.10.100-01). This is much the 
point Vico would later raise in his lectures on rhetoric (Art of Rhetoric §13) and that 
Northrop Frye would echo in Anatomy of Criticism: “[T]opoi or rhetorical commonplaces 
. . . are so dull when stated as propositions, and so rich and variegated when used as 
structural principles in literature” (103)—an insight that might be applied not only to 
literature, but imaginative discourse in general. The concern, as Quintilian first voiced it, 
appears to be twofold. First, Quintilian cautions against the commonplace so common it 
becomes a bald cliché: such commonplaces “will seem to have been tacked on to the 
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speech, not interwoven into its texture, either because it is out of keeping with the 
circumstances or like most of its kind is inappropriately employed not because it is 
wanted, but because it is ready for use” (2.4.30-31; see also Billig 229-30). For present 
purposes, it bears further emphasis that such clichés will come to lack the vibrancy of 
orientation. Second, Quintilian’s concerns align with a Ciceronian skepticism toward 
logical formalism in topical reasoning. In the Topica, a later work ostensibly designed to 
recapitulate Aristotle’s own Topica for Roman audiences, Cicero places greater emphasis 
on arguments from definition, cause and effect, and so forth, thus lending the treatise’s 
topical system a “more ‘dialectical’ cast than the theory contained in De inventione” 
(Leff, “Topics” 30). Yet, Cicero’s categorization of all such topics under the heading of 
rhetorical invention signals a project quite different from Aristotle’s, an attempt to 
“unify” rhetoric and dialectic in a manner that privileges rhetorical concerns over the 
purely philosophical (Leff, “Topics” 31; Stump 22-23). In the context of Cicero’s 
revision, Quintilian’s concern about overreliance on topics indicates a need to keep the 
dialectical elements of rhetorical invention in check—to maintain sight on the particulars 
of a case and its rhetorical context. 
 Cicero and Quintilian offer no additional conceptual meta-theory in the vein of 
Aristotle’s Physics, but it is worth nodding, in conclusion, to the theory of mnemonic loci 
discussed in the Ad Herennium. In Roman rhetorical mnemonics, the orator mentally 
constructs an elaborate series of images and settings designed to help navigate difficult 
orations from memory. This is a rather different art from that of topical invention, but the 
Ad Herennium’s author does use the same word, loci, to name both rhetorical 
commonplaces and the imaginative “backgrounds” that aid mnemonic recall. The Ad 
 40 
 
Herennium’s commentary on memory, thus, proves useful in parsing the Romans’ 
connotations of the term loci. It reads, “The artificial memory incudes backgrounds [loci] 
and images. By backgrounds I mean such scenes as are naturally or artificially set off on 
a small scale, complete and conspicuous, so that we can grasp and embrace them easily 
by the natural memory—for example, a house, an intercolumnar space, a recess, an arch, 
or the like” (3.29). The “image,” then, is to be the subject of the memory that rests within 
a contextualizing locus much like script is arranged on a tablet or papyrus (3.30). Rhetors 
should “equip ourselves with a large number of backgrounds,” unobtrusive places that 
suit the images they house without distracting from those images themselves (3.30, 3.32). 
A number of similarities, thus, emerge between mnemonic and inventional loci: the 
orator’s need to develop rhetorical competence through a copia of loci; the need for loci 
to suit subject matter; the need to balance an “amplifying” locus with its logical or 
imagistic counterpart. But perhaps most valuable, as in Aristotle’s topoi, is the idea that 
the locus orients the orator and audience: the image of a man in a vacuum might mean 
nothing, while the same man in a courtroom or church might summon for the orator the 
necessary argument about his guilt, piety, or so forth. Obvious differences between 
invention and memory aside, it is worth entertaining the thesis that commonplaces are 
analogous to their mnemonic counterparts, that they orient audiences in the chaos of 
cultural space. “The places of memory and invention,” as Richard McKeon has argued, 
are both “sources of invented novelty and of established fact by faculties of symbolic 
imagination, factual memory, discursive reason, and intuitive understanding” (207). 
Insofar as such “established fact” derives from social consensus and shared experience, 
commonplaces help rhetors and audiences navigate their collective memory together. In 
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this sense, while commonplaces may be material, they are not only material, but also 
architectural, cultural, semiotic—materials arranged to let audiences know where they 
stand in a rhetorical world. In this sense, modern rhetorical theory benefits from close 
attention to the Roman theory of commonplaces, but that theory in turn benefits from the 
meta-theoretical idea of “place” that Aristotle originally provided. 
 
Boethius to the Enlightenment 
The history of rhetorical invention—and topoi along with it—is famously rocky 
between the Middle Ages and the Enlightenment. While Cicero’s effective synthesis of 
rhetoric and dialectic would deeply influence Renaissance humanists (Leff, “Topics” 31; 
Conley, Rhetoric 111-14), the specifically rhetorical tradition of topical invention entered 
a decline beginning the early Middle Ages, a decline that can be traced roughly to the 
work Boethius (480-524), the neo-Platonist analytic philosopher and so-named “last of 
the Romans” (Stump 13). Boethius wrote two treatises on topics: In Ciceronis Topica, a 
lengthy, meandering commentary on Cicero’s Topica and other works; and De topicis 
differentiis, a brief, curt formulation of the philosopher’s own understanding of topical 
theory, and one that projected a strong influence on the thinking of the Middle Ages. The 
former is notable for a slight revision to the world of Ciceronian rhetoric. While Boethius 
generally reveres Cicero as a patriarch of Roman thought, he, wittingly or not, injects a 
heavy dose of philosophical formalism into Cicero’s topical system. Where Cicero and 
Quintilian had stressed, to varying degrees, the primacy and particulars of the rhetorical 
situation itself, Boethius stresses philosophical forms and boundaries around what 
“counts” as argument: “Many things produce belief, but because they are not reasons, 
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they cannot be arguments. . . . For example, sight produces belief in things seen, but 
because sight is not a reason, it cannot be an argument” (In Ciceronis Topica 1.276-77). 
Boethius appears interested in limiting the scope of topics to dialectical deliberation; as 
he excises from topical invention many methods for reaffirming belief that already exists 
(1.277), he deprives the art of the epideictic, identity-building quality suggested by 
discussions of commonplaces in the Ad Herennium and De inventione. Where Cicero 
once advised “saying something common” as a way to amplify a speech and galvanize an 
audience, Boethius banishes this sense of “commonplace” from the proper domain of 
topical invention. Such exclusion has had a lasting effect, reifying the primary association 
of topics with dialectical formalism (see Bird) and ushering an entire tradition of specific 
topical tools—from Aristotle’s idia to Roman commonplaces—into a quarantine zone. 
 What Cicero and the Ad Herennium refer to as a commonplace, Boethius 
derisively calls a “sophistic” topic, and claims “is not even rightly called an argument” 
(De topicis differentiis 1.1182A). This is because topics, according to the system 
Boethius develops in De topicis differentiis, come in exactly two forms, neither of which 
the commonplace fits: First, “maximal propositions . . . that . . . need no proof from 
without” are a variety of topic upon which syllogisms are constructed (1.1185B). Such 
propositions differ from commonplaces in their logical certainty. Whereas, as Billig 
stresses, Ciceronian commonplaces reflect the porousness and frequent contradiction of 
“common sense,” Boethius lists as topics abstract propositions such as, “a thing was only 
capable of what its natural form allowed” (1.1190A). Second, such maximal propositions 
function under a set of differentiae similar to Aristotle’s koinoi topoi: categories like from 
the parts, from definition, from similars, or in the case of the example above, from the 
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form (see De topicis differentiis 127-28). Boethius reinstates the supremacy of logic over 
rhetoric; as Leff shrewdly puts it, his project’s “effect is less to synthesize Aristotle’s 
dialectic with the Ciceronian system than it is to collapse the latter into the former” 
(“Topics” 38). In the fourth and final book of De topicis differentiis, Boethius accounts 
for rhetoric, suggesting that the primary difference between dialectic and rhetoric is that 
the former deals in “theses”—matters of universal truth—while the latter deals in 
“hypotheses, that is, questions hedged in by a multitude of circumstances” (4.1205C-D). 
Boethius maintains, though, that “[d]ialectical and rhetorical places are strictly 
analogous. . . . The conclusion is that rhetoric is a subset of dialectic, more limited in 
scope, in that its proper realm of operation is the particular, whereas dialectic deals in 
universals” (Moss 17). Rhetorical proofs are merely dialectical proofs tailored to a given 
circumstance. By expunging “sophistic” topoi of orientation from the mechanics of 
dialectic and rhetoric alike, Boethius also erases the richness of Aristotle’s spatial 
metaphor and its influence on Cicero and Quintilian. 
 The dialectical formalism of Boethius was, however, not the only theory 
informing Early Medieval rhetoric. Inspired in large part by Boethius’ precursor St. 
Augustine of Hippo (354-430), who famously unified of scriptural argument with 
classical rhetoric in the final book of his De doctrina christiana, a new kind of rhetorical 
“place” began to emerge, often associated with use of scriptural excerpts as topoi in 
Christian rhetoric (what St. Thomas Aquinas would later term loci theologici), but 
extending to the wide-ranging use of commonplace-books between the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance (Moss 21). Attitudes toward rhetoric in the Early Middle Ages saw a tension 
between the dialectician Boethius and the largely Ciceronian Augustine, for whom 
 44 
 
rhetoric’s importance superseded dialectic, insofar as “only in rhetoric—the art of 
Christian eloquence—could the word of God be adequately treated” (Conley, Rhetoric 
81). Cicero was, of course, not Christian, but a shared commitment to artful persuasion 
and the use of textual-cultural authority provided consubstantial ground between Cicero 
and early Christian rhetoricians. Cicero’s topos of citing virtuous authority proved 
particularly appealing (Topica 20.78; Moss 21). Of course, this practice of rhetorically 
invoking authoritative quotations endures in modern rhetoric, be it religious—where, for 
instance, scriptural touchstones provide links between “timeless” Biblical authority and 
latter-day issues—or secular, where the words of quintessentially American figures from 
Jefferson to Lincoln to King to Reagan serve to ground diverse arguments in the 
“common sense” of American virtue and exceptionalism. Thanks largely to the legacy of 
Boethius, such quotations are rarely counted as topoi. The insights of Aristotle and 
Cicero, though, suggest it may be just and productive to regard them as such, insofar as 
authoritative quotes economically firm up notions of “common sense” and ideologically 
orient audiences. 
 Between the Middle Ages and Renaissance, such quotations were often compiled 
in commonplace-books—a subject I lack the space to treat thoroughly, but whose history 
Ann Moss recounts impeccably in Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of 
Renaissance Thought. The spirit of commonplace-books also derived from the Stoic 
philosopher Seneca and the tradition of the hupomnemata, or “the formation of the self 
across . . . scattered logoi” (Foucault, “Writing” 238). Seneca, in particular, wrote that we 
should “follow . . . the example of bees,” who fly from flower to flower extracting the 
necessary parts for the making of honey-comb (Epistles 2: 84). This metaphor, and the 
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related one of the Medieval florilegia or gathering-of-flowers, sum to an understanding or 
rhetorical self-development that echoes the Ciceronian and Isocratean concern for the 
knowledgeable, well-rounded orator. This orator, as Cicero says, combines a wealth of 
commonplaces—the “honey” or “flowers”—with the wisdom to assemble them into a 
beautiful whole (Orator 15.48, 70.234). The tradition of commonplace-books departs, 
though, from that of public civic oratory insofar as commonplace-books were often 
private compositions designed for quiet self-improvement or amusement by individuals 
with little ambition to appear as public rhetor (see Morson, Words 248-51). In this sense, 
they differ drastically from the pragmatically oriented handbooks of Roman rhetoric. The 
point to stress, however, for the historian concerned with topos and its synonyms, is that 
the tradition of commonplace-books has strengthened the idea of the commonplaces as 
authoritative or otherwise noteworthy fragments of discourse—thus fusing ethos and 
logos in a short space. This understanding of “commonplace” persisted, to varying 
degrees, as an undercurrent even as rhetorical invention fell into general disfavor.  
The Boethian decline of rhetoric in the Middle Ages eventually gave way to a 
famous recovery of classical texts, chiefly Cicero’s, during the Renaissance, when 
humanists returned to newly rediscovered works like De inventione with vigor (Conley, 
Rhetoric 111-14). Thus it is, for example, that Desiderius Erasmus’ (1466-1536) De 
copia—though not a treatise on topics—evinces the Ciceronian spirit of rhetorical 
abundance. The lasting legacy of Renaissance philosophy, however—exemplified by 
figures like Peter Ramus (1515-72), Francis Bacon (1561-1626), and their Enlightenment 
successors Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and John Locke (1632-1704)—elevated dialectic 
and scientific empiricism at the expense of rhetorical epistemology (see Vancil). Ramus’ 
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Arguments in Rhetoric Against Quintilian acerbically defames the classical rhetorical 
tradition, beginning with Aristotle, for overstretching the epistemic reach of rhetoric. 
Invention and arrangement, Ramus avers, belong properly to dialectic, while rhetoric 
should comprise only the ornamental canons of delivery and style. He faults Aristotle, 
too, for overcomplicating the question of invention: 
[Aristotle] entangled the arts of invention in as many ways as we have 
them now, despite the fact that only one general theory—separated into 
the ten topics of causes, results, subjects, adjuncts, opposites, 
comparisons, names, divisions, definitions, and witnesses—could be 
adapted to make clear most easily and plainly all questions, all parts of 
speech, and all finally all subjects. (111) 
Implicit in Ramus’ condensation of Aristotle’s Topica down to ten words is a flat 
dismissal of anything resembling the idia of the Rhetoric the commonplaces of the 
Romans—along with the rich functions of cultural orientation either might imply—since 
such culturally-discursively specific topics spill beyond the boundaries of dialectic. The 
Ramist perspective held sway for centuries, codified notably in Antoine Arnauld and 
Pierre Nicole’s influential Logic or the Art of Thinking (1662)—better known as the Port-
Royal Logic—which dismisses rhetorical topics as needless on the grounds that “nature 
alone furnishes us a general knowledge of reasoning that is sufficient for us to understand 
what is said about it in the topics” (181). Implicit especially in Ramus and the Port-Royal 
authors’ arguments, but also in those of the Medieval logicians like Boethius, is an elitist 
distaste for the vulgarity of popular culture and an aversion to the idea that rational men 
need to verse themselves in the opinions and discourses of “common sense.” Where 
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Aristotle grudgingly accepted the blurred boundaries between scientific and rhetorical 
knowledge, the Enlightenment erected a clear hierarchy that relegated topics to an 
abridged list of categories or banished them altogether. So it is that a comprehensive 
reclamation of the Ciceronian commonplaces feels edgy and the expansion of topoi to 
fully account for the Aristotelian metaphor of “place” can feel borderline heretical: 
anyone to make these theoretical moves still has to wade upstream against Boethian and 
Ramist currents. 
 Of the late Renaissance philosophers, only Bacon was somewhat generous to 
rhetoric, though he, too, wished to reposition invention beyond the rhetorician’s purview. 
In an interesting reconfiguration of foes and allies, Bacon’s The Advancement of 
Learning maligns dialectical induction “whereby the Principles of sciences may be 
pretended to be invented” as “vicious and incompetent” since it masquerades as true 
invention—scientific invention—without meeting the rigorous criteria of scientific 
empiricism (221). Rhetorical invention, meanwhile, “is not properly an invention: for to 
invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummons that which we 
already know”; yet rhetorical “Remembrance or Suggestion,” as Bacon redubs invention, 
is to be a subservient ally of scientific inquiry (222-23). Thus, topoi for Bacon are those 
places “which may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath 
formerly collected, and to the end we make use thereof” (224). Acknowledging that most 
of his contemporaries reject them as impractical and variable, Bacon then comes to a 
surprising defense of the special topics: “I do receive particular Topics, this is places or 
directions of invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of great use; 
being mixtures of Logic with the matter of sciences,” they aid scientific inquiry insofar as 
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“every degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which followeth” (224). 
Bacon vindicates the special topics, but at a great cost to the integrity of rhetorical 
invention: reduced to a mnemonic aid for true, scientific inquiry, the special topics 
become a logically linear set of scientific premises that cumulatively inform all 
subsequent knowledge. Though such “invention” little resembles the messy, culturally 
rooted systems of Aristotle or Cicero, there may be some veracity to Bacon’s thesis that 
topics “help us . . . to produce what we know already” (224)—if one, that is, interprets 
such a statement as upholding the primacy of epideixis rather than ceding rhetoric’s 
ground to science. This was surely not the most immediate, principally intended meaning 
of Bacon’s assertion, but he may have hit a salient point in spite of himself. 
 
Vico and the Primacy of Topoi 
Phrased another way, a generous reading of Bacon suggests that rhetorical topics 
might function at the intersection of invention and memory—a thesis forwarded more 
overtly by two subsequent and often overlooked rhetoricians, Giambattista Vico and 
Joseph Priestley. Vico (1668-1744), a counter-Enlightenment philosopher and professor 
of rhetoric in his home of Naples, had little influence on the study of rhetoric during his 
lifetime, though recent rediscovery of his work has highlighted Vico’s remarkably 
prescient, almost postmodern thinking on rhetoric (see Verene; Marshall; Schaeffer, 
Sensus Communis; Grassi; Goetsch). Reacting most immediately against the rational 
empiricism of Descartes, Vico ambitiously sought to establish a “science” of human 
understanding beginning with the phenomenology of culture, the shared experience of 
“common sense” unknown to the natural sciences. Against the Ramist consignment of 
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rhetoric to ornament, Vico conceived rhetoric as “a science of narration” (Verene 165), a 
process that derives meaning from our perceived place in history. Vico, thus, revitalizes 
invention as a method of generating discourse from shared cultural memory; he 
emphasizes, among other things, the power of myth and rhetorical tropes in thought and 
language—including the four “master tropes” of metaphor, metonym, synecdoche, and 
irony that would later occupy the thought of Burke (New Science 2.404-11; Burke, 
Grammar 503-17). For Vico, rhetorical exchanges perpetuate the stores of what he calls 
“poetic wisdom,” the intimate knowledge of the “history of ideas, the customs, the deeds 
of mankind” (New Science 368). The concept of “poetic wisdom,” thus, supplies a 
sweeping countermeasure to the Cartesian location of “wisdom” within abstract 
rationality; by accounting for custom, belief, literature, and history, “poetic wisdom” is 
also rhetorical wisdom in the Isocratean and Ciceronian sense. 
 It is difficult to overstate the importance of topoi within Vico’s conception of 
rhetoric. Vico’s, as Ernesto Grassi has put it, is a “topical philosophy,” since, for Vico, 
“topics is the faculty which renders minds ingenious” (15). Human ingenuity, in other 
words, derives not from the discipline of Enlightenment rationalism, but through intimate 
knowledge and experience of the key nodes of culture. Vico’s contributions to topical 
theory entail (1) a modest defense of classical topoi against their Enlightenment 
detractors, (2) a pioneering look at the relation between topoi, memory, and metaphor, 
and (3) an innovative application of axioms as a sort of provocative special topoi. In On 
the Study of Methods in Our Time, Vico reprimands his contemporaries for disregarding 
the topics; this is “harmful,” Vico argues, “since the invention of arguments is by nature 
prior to the judgment of their validity, so that, in teaching, . . .  invention should be given 
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priority over philosophical criticism” (§3; 14). Topics are vital, says Vico, in finding the 
“middle term” (15)—that is, the culturally momentous middle premise supporting an 
enthymeme. Yet, as Donald Philip Verene argues, Vico is not simply upholding a sort of 
Boethian formalism here, but advocating that students acquaint themselves thoroughly 
with “common sense,” which they can then apply to topical invention (169; Vico, Study 
13). In his lectures on rhetoric, Vico echoes a point of Quintilian’s, warning that “unless 
you enrich [topoi] with ample and varied learning, you will be like the one who indeed 
knows all the letters of the alphabet but, when he combines them in written words, they 
have no meaning” (Art of Rhetoric §13). He then supplies examples of specific arguments 
derived from Aristotle’s koinoi topoi, illustrating for students how common sense might 
inform such argumentative forms, and vice versa (§14). “It is not my province to give 
precepts,” Vico here quips, alluding again to the primacy of varied knowledge and 
experience: the koinoi topoi may be useful, but their heuristic value is secondary to the 
manifold stores of poetic wisdom that students of rhetoric must study. 
 Elsewhere, Vico posits bigger ideas about the nature and role of topoi. 
“Imagination,” writes Vico in his labyrinthine, ambitious treatise on The New Science, “is 
nothing but the springing up again of reminiscences, and ingenuity or invention is 
nothing but the working over of what is remembered” (2.699). The “regulating art” for 
reminiscence and invention alike, he says, “is topics.” To fully understand the idea of 
topoi Vico has in mind, it is also necessary to understand his notion of memory 
(“reminiscence”), which Verene summarizes as a union between conventional memory; 
imagination, or fantasia, derived from myth and cultural semiotics; and invention, “the 
power of the subject to move from one act of formation of sense to others” (97, 105). In 
 51 
 
short, Vico makes explicit the implied connection between Roman loci of invention and 
mnemonics: he conceives topoi as “places” in the collective memory of history and myth 
that sum to our set of “common sense,” and from which, among other things, arguments 
can be derived (see Williams and Enos). He stresses, further, that such topoi—for 
example, the names and images of Gods like Jove and Neptune (Verene 105)—are not 
only read or spoken, but felt. “The first founders of humanity applied themselves to a 
sensory topics,” Vico hypothesizes, “by which they brought together those properties or 
qualities or relations of individuals and species which were, so to speak, concrete, and 
from these created their poetic genera” (2.495). Thus, much as Burke would later define 
man as the “symbol-using animal” (Language 3-24), Vico seems to suggest that we are 
topical animals—that from our experience, both visceral and discursive, we piece 
together significant bits and fragments into an ordering narrative of life, history, and 
purpose, and that all further invention must derive from this topical copia. 
Given the primacy of topoi in Vico’s theories of culture and rhetoric, it is fitting 
he would arrange the most famous section of The New Science—his list of 114 
foundational axioms that appear early in Book 1—much as one would a set of topoi, à la 
Aristotle’s idia or Cicero’s commonplaces in De inventione (Marshall 195-206). These 
axioms address a breadth of subject matter, from historical fact (“The Phoenicians were 
the first navigators of the ancient world” [302]) to core ideas of Vico’s philosophy 
(“Common sense is judgment without reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire 
people, an entire nation, or the entire human race” [142]) to recalcitrant political jabs (“It 
is a vulgar tradition that the first form of government in the world was monarchical” 
[255]). Many of Vico’s axioms, as David L. Marshall deftly puts, are “not so much true 
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as provocative” (201). This is not to say that Vico disbelieved his own axioms, but, to the 
point, that “Vico’s axioms interpellate the reader. They behoove the reader to respond. . . 
. [They] replicate for the reader . . . what Vico takes to have been the originary 
interpellative situation in which language was invented, when [early humans] sensed in 
the thunder and lightning a will intent on singling them out.” In this sense, and as I 
discuss at length in chapter 4, Vico’s topoi strongly anticipate Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
discourse theory, which emphasizes speaker, addressee, and the responsive purpose of the 
“utterance” (Bakhtin, “Problem”)—and thus the ability of the topos to suggest a complete 
horizon of conversation. Viccian invention, thus, is not just the discovery of persuasive 
materials, but the act of provoking and carrying on a formative cultural dialogue among 
addressors and addressees—and Viccian topoi, like the axioms, are the discrete resources 
one draws upon to spur such a dialogue. 
 
The Belletrists and Priestley 
Though Vico continues to inspire interest among modern students of rhetoric, the 
most influential eighteenth-century rhetoricians in their own time were the Scottish 
belletrists, most notably Hugh Blair (1718-1800) and George Campbell (1719-1796). 
Blair and Campbell were largely silent on the matter of topoi, chiefly because their 
configuration of rhetoric generally discounted invention in favor of style and taste—a 
rhetorical-literary tradition rather unlike that of Isocrates and Cicero in that it emphasized 
elite refinement over practical cultural literacy. In his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles 
Lettres, Blair advises that “it is one thing to discover the reasons that are most proper to 
convince men, and another to manage these reasons with the most advantage. The latter is 
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all that rhetoric can pretend to do” (118). Blair dubs the topics “superfluous,” a “trifling 
and childish” distraction from the rhetor’s subject matter (118-19). 
 If the belletristic dismissal of topical invention dominated rhetorical pedagogy in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there existed at least one significant voice to the 
contrary. As one grammarian wrote in 1801, 
Dr. Blair has not only omitted but discountenanced [the topics]; and such 
an opinion have I of the good sense of this writer, that I should much 
doubt of its utility, if the very reason of the thing, as well as the authority 
of the ancients and some of the most respectable among the moderns, did 
not sanction and recommend it. Dr. Priestley’s reasons for the use of the 
topics appear to me unanswerable. (John Walker 306) 
Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), a scientist, teacher, rhetorician, and dissident English 
cleric, was, as Crowley notes, the only prominent rhetorician of his era to advocate the 
topics (Methodical 10-11), though his writing did carry some influence for teachers like 
the one above. Though historians often wrongly lump him in with the belletrists, Priestley 
parted ways with Blair and Campbell on both politics, where Priestley was a reformer 
and belletrists conservatives, and rhetorical theory, where Priestley defended invention, 
though under a new heading (George 82). Inspired by the associationist psychology of 
David Hartley, Priestley conceived his Lectures on Oratory and Criticism as synthesis of 
rhetorical principles with “the doctrine of the association of ideas” (i). Therein, invention 
is rebranded as “recollection,” as the faculty of “readily recollecting, and judiciously 
selecting, what is proper for [one’s] purpose, out of the materials with which the mind 
was previously furnished. The dominant interpretation, here, is that, in the words of 
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Michael G. Moran, “Priestley . . . demoted invention from a process of discovery to a 
process of memory” (180), much, one might say, as Bacon subordinated rhetorical 
invention to that of science. Yet, as Vico amply demonstrates, discovery-versus-memory 
hardly holds a tenable binary, and a more generous reading of Priestley places his theory 
somewhere on a continuum between Bacon and Vico. 
 Priestley does insist that the orator know his subject matter thoroughly before 
composing a speech (3), but this claim is likely less a nod the primacy of empiricism than 
a restatement of the same concern voiced by Quintilian and Vico, that topical forms 
without knowledge devolve into empty husks. As a religious dissident who eventually 
fled to asylum in America, Priestley intended his claim as a moral one against ignorance 
and stereotyping (see Lawson). Priestley’s commentary on topoi appears fairly 
conventional, though he does emphasize the association of abstract ideas—“wisdom” and 
“goodness,” for example—as they function as the “middle terms” of enthymemes (7). He 
also provides examples of special topics concerning questions of person, time, place, 
motive, and so forth, all of which highlight commonplace associations audiences are 
likely to make: women are less prone to violent crime than men; young men are more 
violent than old; Spaniards are less prone to drinking than Germans; Italians are more 
jealous Frenchmen; and so on. These topics are not necessarily true, but the associations 
they reflect (Germans with drinking, youth with hot-temperedness, etc.) hold rhetorical 
sway, echoing the cultural emphases of many classical rhetoricians. Priestley’s topoi, 
thus, are designed to summon from memory those associations most useful to a given 
case—that is, tap into currents of orientation—while the author’s ethical meta-
commentary cautions against exploiting associations that are damaging or false. 
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Topoi in Twentieth-Century Scholarship 
While several scholars after Priestley—including John Quincy Adams during his 
tenure as a professor of rhetoric at Harvard—allotted space in their writing to the 
explanation and effect of topoi, Priestley represents the last significant innovation on 
topical invention before the twentieth century. One can organize twentieth-century 
approaches to topoi around three notable theorists: Stephen Toulmin, Chaïm Perelman, 
and Kenneth Burke. 
 Toulmin, a Cambridge-educated analytic philosopher, is well known by 
rhetoricians for The Uses of Argument, a 1958 treatise on logical epistemology. This 
book, by the author’s admission, was never intended to inform rhetorical theory (vii-ix), 
but its coinage of “warrant” proved found fertile ground in rhetorical scholarship. By 
Toulmin’s formula, an argument comprises three essential components: the claim, or 
conclusion; the datum, or information justifying the conclusion; and the warrant, the 
usually tacit premise that links datum and claim (89-93). In Toulmin’s now-famous 
example, the argument “Harry was born in Bermuda, so Harry is a British subject” 
justifies the claim Harry’s citizenship via the datum of his birthplace and the unstated 
warrant that “A man born in Bermuda will be a British subject” (92). Otto Bird, in a 1961 
review, likened Toulmin’s warrants to the topics of medieval logic, illustrated most fully 
by Boethius: “The resemblance is so close . . . that is appears we are witnessing 
something of a re-discovery of the Topics” (534). While Bird is correct that Toulmin’s 
schema most resembles that of Boethius, Thomas Conley refigures Aristotle’s topoi, 
common and special alike, into a Toulminian scheme whereby they become synonymous 
with warrants (“Logical Hylomorphism” 95-96). Ed Dyck’s article “Topos and 
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Enthymeme,” though it does not invoke Toulmin specifically, configures Aristotelian 
topoi as “binary relations” within a formula that recalls Toulmin’s analytic method. 
Toulmin, thus, represents the most prominent name in a wave of latter-day criticism 
informed by a philosophy that is essentially Boethian. 
 Perelman, a Polish philosopher of law, and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, a Belgian 
academic, are responsible for The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (1958), 
which stands as arguably the most ambitious and through twentieth-century work on 
rhetoric. Its epistemology is heavily Aristotelian, and it has inspired a good deal of 
scholarship on topical invention (e.g. Crosswhite; Olson; Warnick). The authors structure 
The New Rhetoric’s 300-page final section on “Techniques of Argumentation” as a latter-
day recapitulation of Aristotle’s koinoi topoi, keeping many, such as arguments from the 
parts and from division, and scrapping some, such as arguments from the opponent’s 
name, in favor of more useful modern classifications (see Warnick 120-28). On the term 
topos (locus), itself, the authors recite the familiar spatial metaphors of Aristotle and 
Cicero, concluding that “loci form an indispensable arsenal on which a person wishing to 
persuade another will have to draw, whether he likes it or not” (84). The strength—and 
profound achievement—of The New Rhetoric is to update Aristotle’s general categories 
of argument into a more relevant, detailed, and pragmatic system that accords with 
twentieth-century civic discourse. The weakness of The New Rhetoric, if one chooses to 
view it as such, is that it slights the Aristotelian idia and the Ciceronian commonplaces in 
favor of broad categorical discussion yielded from a latter-day set of “common topics” 
(Leff, “Commonplaces” 445-46). Thus, while The New Rhetoric represents a 
monumental leap in the modern study of persuasion, it is not a terribly innovative text on 
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the concept of topoi. Its neo-Aristotelian scope, in other words, does not extend to the 
Aristotelian notion of topoi as nodes of orientation. 
 One book that might challenge The New Rhetoric as the most valuable study of 
rhetoric in the twentieth century is Burke’s A Rhetoric of Motives, an expansive, dizzying 
synthesis of rhetoric, literature, and philosophy. As modern students of the discipline well 
know, Burke’s Rhetoric introduces the primacy of “identification,” the concept that a 
speaker, to persuade an audience, must first demonstrate a common, “consubstantial” 
ground. Burke’s mentions of topoi are few and far between, but they are consistently 
provocative. Once he claims that “Aristotelian ‘topics’ . . . shift . . . easily and 
impeccably between ideas and images” (86). Elsewhere, he suggests that identification 
functions “first by inducing the auditor to participate in form, as a ‘universal’ locus of 
appeal, and next by trying to include a partisan statement within that same pale of assent” 
(59). Burke’s Rhetoric, as he avows, takes primary inspiration from Aristotle and Marx 
(Burke, “Methodological”), but it makes sense that his project has been linked to both 
Cicero and Vico as well (Leff, “Burke’s Ciceronianism”; Schaffer, “Burke and Vico”). 
Burke points to the intersection between identity, politics, and form, a space one might 
call the Burkean topos—a subject of inquiry that recalls Cicero’s quest for copious 
rhetorical knowledge and Vico’s link between imagination, memory, and invention. In 
short, though Burke comments sparingly on topoi directly, he conveys the spirit of the 
topos that might break loose from its usual set of moorings and drift freely in the plane of 





Conclusion: Toward a Functional Understanding of Topoi 
Given the vexed history of topos as a concept—its various meanings and 
connotations, its synonyms, its disappearances from and resurgences into the theoretical 
conversation around rhetoric—it makes sense why rhetoricians struggle with the question 
of what a topos is. I have no ambition to definitively settle that question, but I will 
advocate for a certain attitude toward topoi that I think most benefits rhetorical criticism, 
especially as it applies in the postmodern era of rapid circulation and plural, fragmented 
discourses (see McGee, “Text”). In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke stresses that rhetoric 
exists in the mess of the “Human Barnyard,” that its “ideal culminations are more often 
beset by strife as the condition of their organized expression, or material embodiment” 
(24). The center cannot hold, Burke reminds us: “Ideal culminations” of consensus, 
stability, and stasis give way to discord and division—which exists as Burke’s perpetual 
counterpart to identification. Rhetoric operates not from the ontology of stable, agreed-
upon forms but from the “material embodiment” of strife itself. Because the nature of 
allegiances and disagreements remain always in flux, so too are the rhetorical materials 
for coping with them. Insofar as topoi are the “places” of such argument, it seems to fair 
to suggest that they are also places in motion. 
 Thus, rather than the ontological question of what they are—a question bound up 
to a high degree in assumptions of stability and stasis—I will advance a revised question, 
one aligned more squarely with the spirit of rhetoric itself: what do topoi do? I pursue 
this question, for now, by returning to the four points of tension I identify toward the 
beginning of this chapter, and I will address them in reference to the history of the 
concept I recount above. I will also address them in reverse order, beginning with the 
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question of synonyms, then rhetoric versus dialectic, and the two prevailing definitions of 
topoi. I will conclude with the most important matter, the metaphor of space. 
 The matter of synonyms largely concerns stylistic choice. Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, for instance, opt for the Latin term loci rather than the Greek topoi 
even though, as I note above, their conception of the concept most broadly intersects with 
Aristotle’s koinoi topoi. I do not believe this lexical choice itself hinders their project. 
Yet, there are connotations to the different synonyms that bear emphasis. Most important, 
following Crowley and Debra Hawhee, I think it wise to differentiate between topoi and 
commonplaces. Crowley and Hawhee use commonplace “to refer to statements that 
regularly circulate within members of a community” while applying topics to 
“procedure[s] that generate arguments” (89). While this is not the exact theoretical 
ground I wish to stake out, I second the general division. “Commonplace,” because of its 
connotations in popular discourse (the clichéd, ubiquitous, or commonsensical), is well 
suited to describe the idea of “common topics” (as opposed to the Greek koinoi topoi) we 
inherit from the Romans. This concept of the commonplace, I believe, intersects broadly 
with that of the topos, but the two should not be regarded as entirely synonymous. I 
return to this point below. 
 Other synonyms offer other problems. Roberts’s phrase “lines of argument,” in 
his translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, expresses to some pragmatic effect the function of 
the koinoi topoi, but sheds the central metaphor of place and with it all implied relation to 
the idia and other sorts of topoi. Similarly, “topic” may be a proper cognate but, to my 
ear, demands a counterproductive association of topoi with headings, “topic” sentences, 
and abstract themes or “main ideas” (see D’Angelo, “Topic Sentence”). Besides that, as 
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Kennedy stresses, “one of the reasons for studying [Aristotle’s] Rhetoric is to learn its 
traditional terminology, of which topos is an important instance” (“Reworking” 173). As 
my lengthy discussion of Aristotle above illustrates, there are metaphorical intricacies 
bound up in the term topos from which its English translations distract. So it is that, when 
referring to the “places” of argument in the classical sense, or in subsequent theories and 
commentaries that owe a debt to Aristotle, I will deliberately employ the term topoi, the 
term that best implies the metaphorical act of location in all its richness. I would 
encourage other rhetoricians to follow suit. 
 At stake in the tug-of-war between rhetoric and dialectic (or, for that matter, the 
same between rhetoric and philosophy, or science) is, among other things, the richness of 
the concept topos itself. Aristotle, as I explain above, aggregates specific rhetorical topoi 
(the idia) that fit into larger overlapping “regions” of function (the koinoi topoi). While 
the koinoi topoi intersect conceptually with their dialectical counterparts discussed in his 
Topica, Aristotle conceives of rhetoric as an art that begins with specific, “special” places 
and maxims, while dialectic begins with categories of debate. In Roman rhetorical 
handbooks, these specific rhetorical places become opposing sets of commonplaces 
outlining the contradictory nature of common sense. In Vico and Priestley, they become 
the interconnected nodes of cultural memory. The point to stress, once more, is that all 
these rhetorically focused theories stem from the primacy of the specific. 
 Where logicians like Boethius and Ramus have sought to demote rhetoric, they 
have often done so by consigning topoi to dialectical formalism—the differentiae and 
ostensibly universal “maximal propositions” of Boethius, or the ten topics of Ramus. This 
is not to say that dialectical topoi (or “topics”—as the term stripped of locational 
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connotation makes more sense in dialectic) are useless, but it is to say that their role 
ought to be decidedly secondary in rhetoric, whose need and means both, as Crowley, 
Burke, and others have argued, arise from specific events of disagreement within specific 
cultures (see Crowley, Toward 27). I am not, then, denying the existence, or even the 
utility, of dialectical topics, but I do contend that rhetoric requires its own conception of 
topoi that speaks from and to the particularities of rhetorical practice. 
 By a similar token, the two prevailing definitions of topos—the argumentative 
heuristic and the commonsensical assumption or “stock argument”—suggest two 
different traditions broadly corresponding to dialectic and rhetoric. Both, as Leff argues, 
“entail strengths and liabilities”: the dialectical tradition of procedural topoi grants 
invention “greater internal coherence and integrity” but “slight[s] the special, material 
circumstances that surround issues of public debate,” while the “material perspective 
places [topoi] in closer contact with actual situations” but offers little systematic 
coherence (“Topics” 42). Are the two traditions irreconcilable? I will argue not. It is 
possible to perceive topoi as both heuristically generative and culturally “material” and 
specific if one approaches them not as universal procedures or differentiae, nor stock 
arguments acquired by rote memorization, but nodes of discourse that allow rhetors to 
make connections, to link to other nodes in cultural-ideological space. As I argue above, 
it matters less what topoi are—what form they take—than how they allow rhetors to forge 
connections. 
So it is that the topical metaphor of space becomes not just convenient, but 
epistemologically vital. This was true for Aristotle, as I argue above, and it ought to be 
true still. In the Physics, again, Aristotle conceives topos as the “envelope” of space just 
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surrounding an object’s form and articulating its position in relation to a larger context—
not form itself but the “demarcating force” that mediates between form and context. I 
also suggest above that Burke’s concept of “orientation” aligns particularly well with that 
of topical space. For Burke, orientation implies “the linkage of outstanding with 
outstanding,” the associative connection to ideas about “how things were, how they are, 
and how they may be” (Permanence 14). To say that topoi orient audiences is similar to 
Miller’s insight, employing the linguistic concept of semantic space, that “[a] topos might 
be thought of as . . . a point in semantic space that is particularly rich in connectivity to 
other significant or highly connected points” (“Aristotelian” 141-42). There are a number 
of useful ways to further articulate such an idea. Crowley and Cintron each independently 
describe such linkage as “ideologic,” a term denoting not strictly “logical” connections, 
but those made among ideological premises and beliefs (Crowley, Toward 75; Cintron, 
Angels’ Town 131). From a slightly different angle, Roland Barthes describes the “sign” 
as “the associative total or concept and image,” enabling an understanding of topoi as 
“signs” that express particular rhetorical potency (Mythologies 114). In any case, the 
point to stress is that, as Miller contends, topoi are best conceived not as parts of 
arguments or containers of meaning, but as nodes that link outward to other nodes of 
meaning in ideological space (“Aristotelian” 136, 141). It matters less what form a topos 
takes than how potently it links outward, thus making itself available for rhetorical use. 




ANATOMY OF A TOPOS: A TERMINOLOGICAL SYMPOSIUM 
 
At the 2012 Democratic National Convention, Julian Castro, then Democratic 
mayor of San Antonio, delivered a rousing keynote address that I still remember as one of 
the clear highlights of the four-day event. In a doubtlessly calculated move, the young 
Latino statesman’s speech brought to mind a certain ethos of American pluralism and 
multicultural hope witnessed eight years prior in another Democratic keynote address—
that of a relatively unknown but oratorically electric senate candidate, Barack Obama. 
Much like Obama eight years prior, and again in 2008, Castro’s speech sounded the feel-
good tones of opportunity, education, and melting-pot democracy. One forceful thesis he 
advanced throughout was that the spirit of American exceptionalism (which he endorsed) 
requires a social apparatus allowing the underprivileged a chance to succeed—to become 
exceptional. As he put it: 
Now, in Texas, we believe in the rugged individual. Texas may be the one 
place where people actually still have bootstraps, and we expect folks to 
pull themselves up by them. But we also recognize there are some things 
we can't do alone. We have to come together and invest in opportunity 
today for prosperity tomorrow. (Emphasis added) 
By the theory I’m advancing, both the phrases rugged individual and bootstraps (itself 
synecdoche for pull yourself up by the bootstraps, though Castro goes on to supply that 
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bit of the saying, too) qualify as topoi inasmuch as their connotative, ideological densities 
forge links outward, orienting audiences among a larger matrix of cultural values. Such 
links connect to commonplaces (“the individual is responsible only for himself,” etc.), 
myths (the founding fathers’ story; the Horatio Alger narrative), and other topoi about the 
spirit of America and the value of individual achievement (see Crowley, Toward 70-75, 
97-100). Both could be broadly characterized as conservative topoi insofar as they 
generally fortify the political positions of the American political right, which values 
individual responsibility and rebukes government overreach on the fronts of taxation and 
social welfare. Even Texas adopts a metatopical timbre in such contexts. It is a socio-
geographical place that, symbolically condensed, serves also as a rhetorical “place” 
exemplifying a set of ideals about the frontier myth, the American dream, the rugged 
individuals Castro references, and so on—not to mention the image of the cowboy boot, 
and all it culturally entails, implicit in Castro’s description of Texas as the “one place 
where people still actually have bootstraps.” 
Each of these three topoi, in itself, supplies the rhetorical critic with a wealth of 
material. To manage my scope, I will take an abridged anatomy of the bootstraps topos 
only. First, bootstraps clearly represents a trope (or “figure of speech”) as well as a 
topos: If one defines the term broadly, bootstraps qualifies as a metaphor, a use of one 
concept or image to express another—here, the abstract idea of individual achievement. 
Insofar as the ideology of individualism almost completely governs this particular trope, 
though, bootstraps might also be more properly regarded as metonym—the use of an 
adjunct image to express the more complete phenomenon of individualism, much as Wall 
Street is metonym for mega-conglomerate capitalism. Finally, bootstraps could also be 
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regarded as synecdoche, the part for the whole: one image of blue-collar garb standing in 
for the entire symbolic apparatus of hard work and honest labor—everything from jeans 
and hardhats to the steel mill or coalmine to the totality of capitalist industry. Finally, 
Castro’s particular use of bootstraps, in its reversal of political allegiances, also 
exemplifies the trope of irony. By linking bootstraps to social opportunity, Castro invites 
audiences to ironically understand the trope’s dominant associations with the political 
right, who, the enthymeme goes, won’t even allow individuals the chance to hoist 
themselves up by the bootstraps. (To add a further layer of irony, pulling oneself up by 
the bootstraps is a physical impossibility, and the phrase was once used to suggest 
comparably incredible feats. It is a testament to American belief of individualism that 
such a topos has evolved to suit a more-or-less unironic reading.) 
 Bootstraps is also a textual fragment, a replicable micro-genre that transtextually 
recurs. This is true of the word itself, the phrase or saying it stands in for, and the image 
of the hard-working individual it represents. The lattermost category represents a 
narrative or literary archetype, a stock role so common it is perceived as universal; here 
Castro, invoking his Texan ethos, suggests such a recognizable character, an embodiment 
of can-do American spirit. In Ciceronian topical terms bootstraps also links resolutely to 
a set of bedrock commonplaces—“America is the land of opportunity”; “the individual is 
responsible for himself”; “winners never quit”; and so forth—that circulate among the 
American ideology of individualism and provide nodes of rhetorical fortification and 
amplification. The saying “Pull yourself up by your bootstraps” itself doesn’t quite fit the 
classical conception of “commonplace” in that it only implies, rather than explicitly 
voices, dominant “common sense.” But it does share with Ciceronian commonplaces an 
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aphoristic quality: it is a sort of authorless quotation (subsets of which include aphorisms, 
dicta, adages, proverbs, slogans, and so forth) perceived to contain cultural wisdom and 
credibility. (The literal impossibility of pulling oneself up by the bootstraps translates 
more pressingly into a directive to individually overcome any and all obstacles. Few 
Americans likely consider the logistics of the physical act described.) The rhetorical 
oomph of bootstraps, moreover, depends largely on its connection to a series of other 
fragments, most importantly a series of transcendent ideographs and god-terms like 
“individuality,” “freedom,” and “opportunity” that set the conceptual, interpellative 
parameters of ideological thought. In other words, by regarding Castro’s bootstraps as a 
socially performative utterance, one necessarily perceives the topos as an ideologeme, an 
intersection of formal composition and culturally, intertextually derived meaning. 
 Castro’s particular use of the bootstraps topos, finally, also implies something 
rhetorical commentaries on topics and commonplaces rarely consider: the prospect of 
change. On one hand, of course, rhetoric deals centrally with change. Social conflicts, 
imperfections, and incongruities pose the very need for rhetoric, for an epistemological 
recourse for problems born of uncertainty and probability. But while rhetoric represents 
what we do with language to effect social change, rarely do we consider the reciprocal 
effects—those on rhetorical devices and methods themselves. By attempting to realign 
bootstraps with a new set of ideological coordinates, Castro not only forges a deliberative 
argument about social policy and individual opportunity, but he reveals the potential 
instability of what once appeared to be a cultural fixity. Bootstraps still chiefly suggests a 
set of conservative assumptions, but Castro’s use of the term reveals that someday it 
might not—or, at least, that its associative meanings might become less clear-cut. By 
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attending to questions of cultural change, the rhetorician might make use of the 
similarities between topoi and what cultural evolutionists call memes, or replicable units 
of cultural transmission, of which bootstraps is a good example. 
 The preceding three paragraphs enfold a litany of key terms. The fact that none of 
these terms are quite synonymous with topos validates, I think, the particular 
resuscitation of the classical term that I am advocating. But each italicized term above 
does share significant conceptual ground with topos. In the previous chapter, I attempted 
to recover a revitalized understanding on the historical topos, one rooted centrally in the 
Aristotelian notion of “place” as a mediating and orienting force that forges associative 
links in cultural space. The present chapter adapts this concept for modern rhetorical 
inquiry, stressing the density of connotations by which topoi can economically link 
outward to stores of knowledge interspersed through the ideological cosmos (Barthes, S/Z 
13; Weaver 213). I name this chapter a terminological symposium because I believe the 
most fruitful theoretical inquiry into rhetorical topoi will emerge from its examination, 
and cross-examination, via the conceptual vocabulary of the available adjacent concepts. 
Following the structure above, by which I briefly parse Castro’s use of bootstraps, I 
group these relevant concepts into three categories: those dealing with tropes, 
fragmentation, and cultural evolution. Each set of terms ferries discussion further from 
the traditional arenas of topical invention, and, I will argue, outward toward a fuller, more 
dynamic understanding of topoi as they function and evolve in social practice. My 
purpose, finally, is to develop a more robust and elastic toolbox for the practice of topical 
analysis, particularly as it pertains to evolution. Accordingly, some cursory remarks about 




Evolution’s Place in Rhetorical Theory 
Of tropes, fragmentation, and evolution, the lattermost signifies the most novel 
and substantial contribution of this project—and also the aspect most likely to ruffle 
feathers. Because I examine topoi alongside tropes and fragmentation in the service, 
finally, of understanding the role of topoi in cultural evolution, I want to begin and end 
with this final concept. Here, I offer some thoughts on the conceptual affordances of 
evolution. 
As I suggest in the introduction, it bears note that my selection of terms elicits a 
point of irony: evolution’s status as a topos potentially hinders my attempt to use 
evolution to explain the place of topoi in rhetorical theory. That is to say, evolution is not 
simply a denotative concept but a term laden with diverse and powerful connotations, 
many of which humanists perceive as negative, or at least threatening. As I also note in 
the introduction, my wish is, through evolution, to name a process of incremental change 
accounting for variation, replication, and differential “fitness” among topoi (Dennett, 
Darwin’s 343)—ideas that I believe apply fruitfully to the study of rhetoric. While 
scholars like Daniel Dennett (a philosopher) and Carolyn R. Miller (a rhetorician) have 
taken up the cross-disciplinary reach of evolution in terms I find useful and generally 
respectful to the humanities (see Dennett, Darwin’s, Freedom, Consciousness; Miller, 
“Do Genres Evolve?”), evolution carries in tow the baggage of what Thomas M. Lessl 
has termed “evolutionism,” or the transformation of evolution into a term of scientistic 
quasi-religiosity (xi-xii). This baggage merits consideration, and I return to the matter 
later in this chapter, prefacing my discussion of memetics and Darwinian perspectives on 
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language. Rather than taking a defensive posture, though, I find it most productive to here 
weigh the merits of evolution in relation to similar terms used to theorize language and 
rhetoric. Doing so allows us to observe where evolution intersects and parts ways with 
comparable terms, and therefore what it adds to a conversation on language, rhetoric, and 
society. 
 In introducing evolution, I want to stress the rhetorical formation (and 
reformation) of culture at both microscopic levels (those of individual topoi) and 
macroscopic levels (those of topoi and human actors interacting across time). Three 
notable terms that have allowed theorists to address similar matters are construction, 
sedimentation, and networks, which I will speak to in that order. Social constructivism—
roughly, the idea that social relationships “build” the structures and mores of culture—
has become so commonplace among humanities scholars that self-identification as a 
social constructivist sounds redundant. We can occupy this position, too, without 
reference to the text of its coinage, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s 1966 
sociological treatise The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of 
Knowledge, though Berger and Luckmann’s architectural metaphors of constructions and 
foundations remain woven into our discourse, echoing their Marxism forebears of bases 
and superstructures (see Berger and Luckmann 103-04, 224-25n56). When rhetoricians 
speak of topoi as “building blocks” (see, for example, Rice 32, 39, 49), we are “building 
on” this metaphor to one degree or another. 
 Any attempt here to trace social constructivism’s influence in rhetorical theory in 
the space of a few paragraphs would be laughably abridged. My emphasis, though, is on 
the metaphor itself—the implicit notion that language and society lay groundwork and 
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erect edifices of language and practice in which human culture occurs. Addressing 
language in particular, scholars like Paul J. Hopper and Alistair Pennycook have 
advanced the similar metaphor of sedimentation (c.f. Husserl). Referring to the myth of 
permanence and stability in grammatical structures, Hopper argues that “[s]ystemicity . . . 
is an illusion produced by the partial settling or sedimentation of frequently used forms 
into temporary subsystems” (158; emphasis in original). Accordingly, “emergent 
regularities” of grammatical structure “are aggregations; they are the sediment of 
frequency” (161; emphasis in original). By Hopper’s estimation, rules and conventions 
accrue by repetition, their “sediment” forming thick layers of historical linguistic practice 
that project the illusion of permanence. Sedimentation in language, as in geography, is 
foundational. It enables and delimits individual edifices of discourse. 
 This implied relationship of utility and constraint makes metaphors like 
construction and sedimentation remarkably useful in describing the dependence of 
linguistic practice on preexisting social circumstances. The adjective “preexisting” 
warrants emphasis, though, insofar as sedimentation indicates geological history and 
“construction” typically enters discussion through the passive, deterministic voice—as in, 
“Race and gender are socially constructed”—leaving the phantasmal hand social 
predetermination to do the constructing. My hope is that evolution, by contrast, brings us 
to the present tense and the mechanics of change—change, in particular, that occurs 
though the interactions of human agents (rhetors) and discursive agents (topoi) both. 
(Where rhetorical theory has equipped us well to name the capabilities of these human 
actors, I design this chapter to provide a parallel conceptual vocabulary of topoi and their 
capabilities.) Such networked interaction resembles the project of Bruno Latour and other 
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advocates of “actor-network theory” (ANT), which examines the rhizomatic structures of 
practice that human and nonhuman actants produce (see Latour 75; Deleuze and Guattari, 
Thousand 3-25). Latour justifiably bemoans the transformation of “the social” into an ill-
defined, omnipresent hand that uniformly pulls the strings behind all activity, from law to 
religion to science (8). Calling such an approach the “sociology of the social,” Latour 
advocates instead for a “sociology of associations” built from the specific, associative 
links among human and nonhuman actants working in local settings (8-9). 
 It is fair to similarly call the model of evolution I advocate networked. Moreover, 
the ideological sign-systems through which topoi like bootstraps garner rhetorical energy 
may appear more traditionally “networked” than do Latourian networks. Where specific 
topoi represent discrete and durable interconnected nodes, the “network” of ANT “does 
not designate a thing out there that would have roughly the shape of interconnected 
points, much like a telephone, a freeway, or a sewage ‘network’” (129). What Latour 
offers, finally, is a patient attempt to deal with the complex associative thickets of social 
practice on the microcosmic level. ANT is a practice of persevering description. My 
focus, by moderate contrast, is on semiotics and rhetorical economy, on a theory of how 
semiotic topoi evolve through their “fitness” to be circulated by human rhetors, and how 
that evolution spurs cultural evolution on larger scales. Though the interrelationships 
between humans and objects doubtlessly facilitate, and in some senses govern, the 
rhetorical relationships I focus on, humans and their symbolic practices remain an 
appropriate as a site of study for rhetoric, with its emphasis on language and audience. 
 Evolution is well-suited to a rhetorical perspective insofar as rhetoric and 
evolution both imply the persistence of change. If one compares metaphors borrowed 
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from the sciences, it bears note that studying sedimentation provides a historical record 
of evolution, but that evolution itself also describes a continuing, active process. In the 
present case, sediment represents the durable discursive formations that evolution slowly 
transforms. My purpose, then, in discussing the variation, replication, and differential 
“fitness” of topoi is to describe the instability of rhetorical resources—an instability that 
the attentive rhetorician can witness on a yearly, monthly, and sometimes daily basis. 
Pennycook, I hasten to add, describes something similar through the phrase “fertile 
mimesis,” or the subtle variance that occurs in replicating sedimented discourses (37). 
This term, in effect, invites sedimentation and evolution into a common conceptual 
sphere characterized by the tug-of-war between what Mikhail Bakhtin terms “centripetal” 
and “centrifugal” powers (“Discourse” 272); replication can both reify a discourses and 
propel its gradual revision. 
In moderate distinction to the Latourian emphasis on materials and objects, 
finally, the networks of rhetorical evolution I have in mind emphasize the vibrancy of 
discourse, the economical density of certain topoi that, though such utility, come to 
replicate as what cultural evolutionists have called memes. This emphasis, I hasten to add, 
is not better than Latour’s, but it does apply more immediately to the rhetorical matters of 
speakers, audiences, and the symbols they use. The rest of this chapter addresses the 
theoretical dimensions of one important class of symbol—the rhetorical topos. 
 
Topos and Trope 
If Greek etymology configures topos as a place, a locus by which one effiently 
orients herself among other places and ideas, trope derives etymologically from the 
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concept of “turn” or “direction” (Lanham, Handlist 154-55; White 2-3). If a topos 
represents a node in sematic space linked to other such nodes, tropes supply vectors of 
attention. Tropes propel associative movement among topoi, accelerating some links and 
stemming others. While trope often signifies, in contemporary usage, a mere cliché or 
motif, I think it valuable once again to retain the spatial implications of the term’s 
classical roots. Aristotle’s Rhetoric, for example, employs the Greek tropos to describe 
the common topic of “[turning] what has been said against oneself upon the one who said 
it” (2.23.7; 1398a). Tropos, here, describes not the content of an argument but the 
rerouting or deflection of rhetorical energy—the sort of directional movement White 
identifies as “the soul of discourse” (2). Something similar occurs in the use of tropes like 
metaphor, metonym, synecdoche, and irony. Metaphor, for instance, forges vectors of 
association between two or more (potentially disparate) concepts like argument and war, 
to use George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s most famous example (4-6). A metaphor like 
argument is war, by extension, forges tributary vectors among the associative ideological 
baggage of each term. So it is, for example, that the warrior’s heroic refusal to submit or 
compromise might color our assumptions about argumentation to the point where 
political “compromise” becomes a term of cowardice and distain rather than laudatory 
humility, as it has been before. 
 Historical attempts to categorize figures and tropes have led to confusing, 
contradictory set of taxonomies. The Rhetorica ad Herennium, for example, divides 
figures into those of “diction” and those of “thought,” suggesting an epistemological 
distinction between style and substance (Fahnestock 7-8). In the Institutio Oratoria, 
Quintilian attempts to “purify” the Ad Herennium’s taxonomy into a clearer system, but 
 74 
 
winds up rigidifying formal boundaries among rhetorical figures and needlessly omitting 
or misclassifying some varieties of figurative language (Fahnestock 8-11). As Jeanne 
Fahnestock explains in Rhetorical Figures in Science, the recourse to such formalist 
pigeonholing is to emphasize not “what the figures are [but] what it is they do 
particularly well, what it is they express iconically” (23). Figures and tropes “epitomize” 
lines of reasoning, Fahnestock continues: “An epitome, from the Greek verb meaning ‘to 
cut short or cut open,’ is in one sense a summary, an abstract containing all the essential 
part of a larger work or text, and, in a slightly different sense, it is a representative or 
exemplary selection from and then substitution for something longer” (24). By this 
productive understanding, tropes share with topoi a concern for economy, the ability to 
quickly suggest or link to some larger form or pattern in a short space. If, as Fahnestock 
claims, metaphor epitomizes “argument by analogy” (24), topoi supply the ready nodes 
of ideological significance between which such analogical movement can proceed. 
Tropes epitomize argumentative forms (motions) while topoi describe the available 
linkages through sematic space. 
 Through the millennia, rhetoricians have logged a great many figures and 
tropes—Sister Miriam Joseph, in Shakespeare’s Use of the Arts of Language, compiles 
nearly 200—each of which, I think, critics could examine individually vis-à-vis topical 
invention. In an effort to quickly sample the range of available motions among rhetorical 
nodes, I limit myself here to those four that Burke terms the “master tropes” (Grammar 
503-17) and to which Vico asserts all other tropes of “poetic logic” are “reducible” (New 
Science 131). These are metaphor, metonym, synecdoche, and irony. Each represents a 
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Of all the tropes, metaphor is, in Vico’s words, “the most luminous and therefore 
the most necessary and frequent” (129). This language of “illumination” also surfaces in 
Cicero’s discussion of metaphors, which he suggests “are like those objects in the 
[illumination] of a stage or of a forum are called ‘ornaments,’ not because they are the 
only ornament, but because they stand out from the others” (Orator 39.134; Fahnestock 
18-19, 28). Such is not to say that metaphor is just showy “embellishment,” as H.M. 
Hubbell somewhat misleadingly translates the Latin lumina, but that it appears “bright 
from within, in effect bringing out or expressing its [own] inherent nature” (Fahnestock 
28). On the other hand, as Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By famously 
contends, metaphors also systematically and often transparently structure thought (as in 
the argument is war metaphor noted above), sometimes by “highlighting” one aspect of a 
metaphorical concept while erasing or “hiding” the other (10-13). The distinction 
between “fresh” and “dead” metaphors familiar to students of poetry provides a 
complementary vocabulary on such differential “luminousness”; fresh metaphors (e.g. 
“America is an unsolvable jigsaw puzzle”) draw self-conscious attention to themselves as 
tropes and to the analogical lines they forge, while dead ones (e.g. “Republicans have 
declared war on single mothers”) read prosaically and allow their analogical vectors to 
pass below audience’s overt attention. Even a metaphor like the “declaration of war” on 
single mothers, though, conveys the conceptual asymmetry Lakoff and Johnson speak of. 
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Its sheds a certain angle of light on the relationship between single mothers and 
Republicans, but it evades the reconsideration of war as a concept. Rather, to repurpose a 
metaphor of Burke’s, the dominant associations of “war” provide the fulcrum, the hinge 
or pivot point, needed to move an audience’s perspective about Republicans and single 
mothers (Burke, Rhetoric 56). 
 Michael C. Leff’s incisive essay on “Topical Invention and Metaphorical 
Interaction” puts it this way: Metaphor introduces “new meaning . . . from the selection 
and identification of elements belonging to complex subjects, and the resulting structure 
exhibits a stability of its own without overwhelming the independence of its constituent 
subjects” (219). Where topical argument, traditionally conceived, evokes a linear 
progression among premises, and metaphor relies on immediate “synchronic 
association,” Leff argues that “[i]n practice, . . . the distinction is not so absolute, and 
both rhetorical forms exhibit broadly similar processes of tension and attunement within 
the matrix of their constituent elements” (229). The vocabulary Leff supplies nicely 
complements discussions of topical association. Where, for instance, I.A. Richards 
characterizes metaphor as the “double unit” composed by a “tenor” (the “underlying 
idea”) and “vehicle” that would contain the tenor (96-97), Leff’s “tension” and 
“attunement” stress the reciprocal tug between metaphorical parts and topical 
associations alike. Metaphor rightly becomes the linkage between topical nodes as well 
as the tributary linkages between their constituent nodes of connotation. One component 
of a metaphor cannot “contain” the other, but links to the other through the available 
means of ideological space. Wayne Booth, too, in his article on “Metaphor as Rhetoric,” 
begins to suggest the topical qualities of metaphor though his stress on metaphorical 
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concision (or economy), rhetorical propriety, the role of metaphor in establishing a 
speaker’s ethos: “every speaker who uses any figure of with the intent that it be 
recognized as a figure . . . calls attention to himself in ways that the user of ‘ordinary, 
usual,’ untwisted language does not” (57). In Burke’s terms, metaphorical components 
“possess degrees of being in proportion to the variety of perspectives from which they 
can with justice be perceived” (Grammar 504), and such perspectives, Booth might add, 
reflect back on the character or identity of the speaker. Metaphorical linkages, in other 
words, serve not only to connect points of cultural belief or assumption (what Sharon 
Crowley terms ideologic) but also to reinforce the identity of the speaker as part of a 
broader process of topical orientation. 
 
Metonym and Synecdoche 
The scholarly mania for metaphor—what Fahnestock aptly characterizes as a self-
limiting fixation among rhetorical critics (4-6)—has both distracted from the importance 
of other figures and tropes and produced a wealth of insight that can apply beyond 
metaphor to tropes like metonym and synecdoche. (Nothing, for example, prevents 
Booth’s point about ethos from extending from metaphor to other tropes.) I pair metonym 
and synecdoche not because they are synonymous but because their rhetorical logistics 
are similar. I am not the first to say so. Burke characterizes metonymy, the substitution of 
a more “corporeal or tangible” term for an abstraction, as an act of “reduction,” while 
synecdoche, the substitution of a part for the whole, is, he says, that of “representation” 
(Grammar 506, 507). But he then disclaims any rigid distinction: “Now, note that 
reduction is a representation” (507; emphasis Burke’s)—to which I add that 
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representation is often a reduction. The economical use of topoi and tropes, in fact, 
necessarily implies some form of reduction. Insofar as a metonym like “Wall Street” 
funnels the diverse attributes of market capitalism and corporate America into a single 
term (and socio-geographical image), its reductive qualities are self-apparent. The same 
is true, for instance, of a synecdochical slogan like “change we can believe in” when used 
to (reductively) “represent” the entire corpus of discourse and policy surrounding the 
Obama candidacy and presidency. When I say that metonym and synecdoche “funnel” 
abstract or complex wholes into a single term, I mean not that figurative terms comes to 
“contain” the compact essence of its broader referent, but that these tropes condense 
vectors of rhetorical energy from diverse points in semantic space into a single, 
representative point. Where metaphors spur connection among two such nodes (or two 
clusters of nodes), metonym and synecdoche draw the rhetorical energy from a cluster or 
cloud of nodes into a single point, typically preserving the most dominant connotations of 
the cluster at large. Metonym and synecdoche, in other words, can describe the act of 
rhetorical condensation characteristic of topoi in general. 
 Consider an example I return to in Chapter 4: Mitt Romney’s 2012 campaign 
gaffe “binders full of women,” a self-defeating phrase the candidate uttered during the 
second of three debates with President Obama in October of the election year. As 
synecdoche, this phrase has come to “represent” the text of the second debate as a whole; 
it supplants, in public memory, any broader, laborious textual reconstruction of the 
debate. It also represents the broader narrative of Romney’s decline as a candidate, his 
disastrous cession of ground following a surprising victory over an ill-prepared Obama in 
the first debate. As metonym, Romney’s “binders full of women” stand in neatly for the 
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apparatus of androcentric corporate America—an entity that, along with the Republican 
Party itself (House candidate Todd Akin had recently made disastrous remarks about 
“legitimate rape”), suffered mutually reinforced perceptions of misogyny. Romney’s 
“binders” displayed profound rhetorical gravity: into its “orbit,” as Burke might have put 
it, “binders” drew diverse rhetorical energy scattered about the textual and conceptual 
climate of 2012 American politics (see Burke, Rhetoric 26). The textual (synecdochical) 
and conceptual (metonymic) elements of “binders” both illustrate the topical and kairotic 
uses of tropes. By repeating “binders full of women” circa October 2012, rhetors could 
exploit the transitory moment when the phrase economically connoted a wealth of 
assumptions about corporate America, gender relations, the GOP, and Romney’s 
candidacy. The larger theoretical point to stress is that, among topoi, metonyms and 
synecdoches exploit terminological density, the symbolic reduction of what Burke calls 
semantic “clusters” into single terms (Attitudes 232-34). This sort of compressive 
rhetorical motion allows rhetors to economically suggest a wealth of cultural knowledge 
in the space of a single topos. So it is that the “reductions” and “representations” of 
metonym and synecdoche become a frequent necessity in rhetorical practice. 
  
Irony 
In the New Science, Vico hypothesizes that “irony could not have begun until the 
period of reflection, because it is fashioned of falsehood by dint of a reflection which 
wears the mask of truth” (131). Burke, in a similar vein, views irony and dialectic as 
consubstantial terms: “Irony arises when one tries, by the interaction of terms upon one 
another, to produce a development which uses all the terms” (Grammar 503, 512; 
 80 
 
emphasis Burke’s). When compared to other tropes like metaphor, metonym, and 
synecdoche, irony brings the role of audience or interlocutor into sharpest relief. If 
metaphor could be cast as “dialectic” between two terms or concepts, irony requires 
dialectic among speaker and audience via a certain term or set of terms, necessarily 
emphasizing the active, inferential role of audience to “reflectively” perceive what Vico 
names the discrepancy between “falsehood” as disguised “truth.” Less yielding to terms 
like true and false, Burke’s characterization of irony has much in common with his own 
concept of “perspective by incongruity,” which occurs when “a word belongs by custom 
to a certain category—and by rational planning you wrench it loose and metaphorically 
apply it to a different category” (Attitudes 308). One might add that irony can still take 
effect short of deliberate “rational planning,” but it does require some cognizance of a 
terminological or conceptual incongruity. In irony as in planned incongruity, not 
everything fits in its customary place. 
 Consider Booth’s exchange with Stanley Fish on irony in the 1983 pages of 
Daedalus. Responding to Booth’s book A Rhetoric of Irony, Fish rejects his interlocutor’s 
category of “stable ironies,” or those affixed to a sturdy foundation of understanding 
shared by speaker and audience, on the grounds hermeneutic stability is itself an illusion 
unless one refigures instability as “an endless succession of interpretive certainties” 
(Booth, Rhetoric of Irony 3-8; Fish, “Short People” 191). Booth’s reply may or may not 
settle the debate, but it does slyly perform the author’s own thesis. Booth writes four 
sections. The first is an arrogant, opportunistic parody of academic standoffishness that 
deliberately misquotes Fish; sections two and three then form a conventional (unironic) 
riposte to Fish’s arguments, one that refers back to Part 1 as an example of irony’s 
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functions; and the humorous conclusion, Part 4, confesses, “Everything that I have said 
since Part II began has been an outrageously ironic spoof, parodying the kind of self-
protective, fearful, traditionalist responses that Fish’s brilliant and irrefutable work too 
often evokes” (“New Strategy” 213). Because Booth can safely assume his audience, the 
readership of Daedalus, to be a group of academics “in on” the terms of discussion, he 
can harness a form of stable irony to make his point that stable irony is a functional 
rhetorical category. 
 An ironic topos condenses this sort of relationship into a minute space. Once 
again “binders full of women” proves illustrative. Like many Internet-memes-cum-topoi, 
“binders” relied largely on humor, and its humor derived from an ironic relationship 
among text of the topos itself, its connotative subject matter, and the cultural knowledge 
of audiences. In A Rhetoric of Irony, Booth speaks of a kind of novelistic irony whereby 
“the author and the audience stand together watching the characters from above as they 
make their mistakes” (255). The sort of “comic anticipation” this relationship yields 
travels far beyond novels, though, to characterize the general sense of being “in on it” 
central to the processes of identification and division that Burke describes in A Rhetoric 
of Motives. The ironic topos, one might say, deflects rhetorical energy. To repeat “binders 
full of women” was to turn an author’s own terms against him, to reaffirm an “us” who 
recognize the problems of misogyny and corporate dehumanization and who “stand 
together . . . above” Romney and the class he epitomizes. Irony, here, stems from, first, 
the recognition of what Romney meant to communicate with his unfortunate phrase and, 




Topos and Fragment 
If tropes describe the vectors of rhetorical association typical of topical invention, 
the concept of the fragment describes the textual formation of topoi. This section, 
accordingly, will discuss the processes by which topoi can become abstracted from larger 
texts and the functional vocabulary by which critics can examine such topical fragments. 
The motif of fragmentation recurs prominently in accounts of postmodernity. Against the 
modernist nostalgia for “totalizing ensembles,” for example, Fredric Jameson finds the 
postmodern critic unable “to organize an analysis and an interpretation around any single 
one of these fragments in flight. To select—even as an ‘example’—a single [text], and to 
discuss it in isolation, is fatally to regenerate the illusion of the masterpiece or the 
canonical text and reify the experience of total flow from which it was momentarily 
extracted” (Postmodernism 78). “The pure and random play of signifiers that we call 
postmodernism,” Jameson continues, “no longer produces monumental works of the 
modernist type but ceaselessly reshuffles the fragments of preexisting texts, the building 
blocks of older cultural and social production, in some new and heightened bricolage” 
(96). Postmodernity, one narrative seems to go, textualizes culture and then obliterates 
that text into infinite permutations of fragmentary “reshuffling.” Put another way, 
postmodern cosmology appears to comprise fragments all the way down. 
 If such a conception of culture and reality is correct (or even a half-truth), 
classically wrought models of rhetorical theory face a challenge, and I’m certainly not the 
first to say so. Here is Edwin Black in 1965, well before the heyday of postmodern 
theory, speaking rather clearly to the theoretical discrepancies between classical and 
modern rhetorical systems: “It is easy to develop a rhetorical system out of commonplace 
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topics if one lives in a walled city, many days’ journey from the nearest settlement, with 
well-established and clearly understood traditions and a culture almost tribal in its 
cohesiveness, but these conditions hardly apply to the political refugee in West Germany 
or even the file clerk in Kansas City” (126-27). If Western culture is both variegated and 
fragmentary (and was so even before the overt rise of postmodernity), the commonplaces 
Black refers to will sum to no cultural totality, but only an aggregate of discursive 
splinters that, as Jameson says, signify nothing stable. But Jameson’s encyclopedic 
project of charting the postmodern depths, from literature to architecture to film and 
beyond, differs somewhat from that of the rhetorical critic who must bring a specific 
situation’s persuasive methods (however transitory) into focus. At the risk of “reifying” 
the “total flow” of postmodern discourse, the rhetorical critic still has little choice but to 
home in on details. On the other hand, rhetoric can share with postmodernism an 
emphasis on change. In Celeste Michelle Condit’s words, “to study rhetoric is not to seek 
for a unifying principle” but to “seek for the important discursive units that recur in 
discussions of an era and to explore their interactions” (Meanings 253). Where Jameson 
sees a kaleidoscopic explosion of fragments, the rhetorician might see an intertext of 
fragmentary voices and devices that enable and delimit the range of persuasion. If I find 
Jameson’s position occasionally overwrought, I still believe the two perspectives are 
largely compatible. 
 The definitive statement on rhetorical fragmentation remains Michael Calvin 
McGee’s 1990 essay “Text, Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture.” 
There, McGee entreats rhetoricians to “quit whining about the so-called ‘post-modern 
condition’ and to develop realistic strategies to deal with it as a fact of human life” (278). 
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Owing to the postmodern absence of cultural totalities like those composing the classical 
nation-state, McGee insists on reconfiguring “text” as a “fragment” of its context—which 
leaves smaller fragments, the sort that can become topoi, as fragments of fragments. With 
such heterogeneous patterns in mind, I turn back to topoi. Considered topically, I believe 
there are two sets of interrelated questions for rhetoricians to ask about discursive 
fragments: those about their origins and evolution, and those about their rhetorical 
function in specific situations. Below, I consider topical fragmentation alongside eight 
related terms—archetype, ideograph, god-term, icon, lexia, quotation, and ideologeme—
with these sets of questions in mind, advancing finally toward an understanding of topoi 




As McGee’s taxonomy makes clear, there exist different degrees of discursive 
fragmentation, and therefore different varieties (or “sizes,” “magnitudes”) of fragments. 
My example above of “binders full of women,” for example, is a contextually “small” 
fragment given its specificity to a certain set of rhetorico-historical parameters, while my 
introductory example of “bootstraps” finds broader, though less rhetorically pointed, 
meaning in a much larger swath of American cultural history. Among the conceptually 
“largest” of such fragments would be what the pioneering analytical psychologist C.G. 
Jung termed archetypes. For Jung, these are “archaic or—I would say—primordial types, 
that is, . . . universal images that have existed since the remotest times” (5). I am not 
interested here in testing the veracity of Jung’s insistence that a set of such universals 
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sum to a “collective unconscious” underscoring the cumulative psyche; rather, I am 
interested in how “archetype” presents itself as a narrative and symbolic category of 
discourse. In Northrop Frye’s essays on literary archetypes, for example, the term is a 
step toward total mythopoeic coherence (Anatomy 131-242, Fables 7-20). For Frye, 
literary archetypes—which can take imagistic and generic form both—sum to the 
“grammatical rudiments of literary expression,” a sort of essential symbolary derived 
from the inherited traditions of Ancient Greece and Rome, plus Judeo-Christianity 
(Fables 12, Anatomy 133). Similarly, with a specific nod back to Jung, Ernst Robert 
Curtius sees archetypes as markers of “psychological history” (82). Curtius also forges a 
direct link between archetypes and topoi, “poetic topoi” like the “ideal landscape” 
forming widely recognizable images capable of sustaining “a perpetual exchange” 
between poetry and rhetoric (82, 101, 105). Despite postmodern skepticism toward the 
idea of “primordial images” that function prior to culture, it does behoove rhetoricians to 
take seriously the looming categories of recurring narrative fragmentation—the mother 
figure, the trickster, the ocean, the cosmos—that tend to recur with intense suggestive 
power (see also Rushing and Frentz). To say that culture is evolving and unstable is not 
to insist that durable categories cannot exist. 
 It would be only a small stretch to suggest that Aristotle’s koinoi topoi in the 
Rhetoric represent something like an archetypal taxonomy of argumentation, an attempt 
to exhaustively map out the available space of rhetorical invention. Where Aristotle’s 
bounded “regions” of topical organization could conceivably help Athenian orators 
choose appropriate form and material for their circumstances, so too can archetypal 
images or characters help the novelist, poet, or filmmaker convey a certain attitude or 
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thesis through her selection of familiar “stock” material. Consider the archetype of the 
dutiful, self-effacing mother exemplified to varying degrees by Barbara Stanwyck’s 
character from the film Stella Dallas, Shirley MacLaine’s in Terms of Endearment, or 
even Sigourney Weaver’s Ripley in Aliens. To refer to such a character through narrative 
example (as in a novel or film) or otherwise (say, through reference to one’s own mother 
in a political speech) is to draw forth rhetorical energy from a broad archetypal region. 
Returning to the figurative terms I use above, a politician’s mother might become 
synecdoche for the associations of motherhood in general, and also metonym for abstract 
expressions of “family values” and “proper” gender roles. Both tropes describe the 
funneling of rhetorical energy into a representative node, one that props itself on tacit 
commonplaces: “mothers should be caregivers,” “mothers should give everything to help 
their children succeed,” and so forth. Archetypes, thus, organize realms of topical energy 
and clusters of topical nodes. They are not the smallest or sharpest of fragments, but 
represent broad, durable categories by which audiences might understand other fragments 
they encounter. 
  
Ideograph and God-Term 
Discussions of “ideographs” and “god-terms”—the definitions of which I come to 
momentarily—certainly predate their assignments to those precise labels. In his much-
anthologized 1946 essay “Politics and the English Language,” George Orwell laments the 
proliferation of “meaningless words” in arenas like art criticism and politics. Among the 
“abused” terms in politics, Orwell says, are “democracy, socialism, freedom, patriotic, 
realistic, justice,” each of which “[has] several different meanings which cannot be 
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reconciled with one another” (152; emphasis Orwell’s). The case of democracy is 
particular grim, he adds, since “[i]t is almost universally felt that when we call a country 
democratic we are praising it: consequently the defenders of every regime claim that it is 
a democracy, and fear that they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to 
any one meaning” (152-53). Today, one can sympathize more than ever with Orwell’s 
frustrations—Terry Eagleton, for example, enumerates a similar list of “anti-theoretical” 
post-9/11 terms designed to “shut down thought” (223)—though the problem may be the 
inverse of what Orwell describes. From a topical perspective, a word like democracy isn’t 
so much “meaningless” as it is staggeringly, bountifully meaningful: diverse groups and 
diverse ideologies (quite likely including the “democratic” demagogues Orwell perceives 
as willfully disingenuous) all infer intense “meaning” from such a term, even if their 
varying conceptual systems will link “democracy” to different points of connotation 
(commonplaces, topoi, cultural assumptions, and so on). 
 “Democracy” is a tailor-made example of an ideograph, what McGee describes as 
“pregnant” term that, together with other such terms, amount to “the basic structural 
elements, the building blocks, of ideology” (7). Speaking to my modification of Orwell’s 
point, McGee continues that divergent groups of Americans “are united by the 
ideographs that represent the political entity ‘United States’ and separated by a 
disagreement as to the practical meaning of such ideographs” (8). McGee’s point about 
unity and division is, I think, worth buying wholesale. Nonetheless, I would revise his 
metaphors of ideological “construction.” Ideographs like “religion,” “freedom of speech,” 
and “rule of law,” to use some of McGee’s examples (6-7), indeed function as discursive 
“building blocks”—as fortifying terms one can cement into an essayistic or oratorical 
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edifice—but in the broader, transtexual sphere of ideology I would insist, once more, on 
the metaphors of connectivity and orientation rather than those of monumental 
construction. Emphasis on connectivity recasts ideographs as a special class of topoi. 
Where archetype describes a topical category or region, ideograph describes a “special” 
topic, a mediating force between a specific discursive form (the word “freedom,” 
“democracy,” or “justice” itself) and the range of connectivity that form enables among 
other points in ideological space. Ideographs both unite and divide because their range of 
connectivity is unusually expansive. For example, liberals and conservatives will assent 
to a eulogistic “common ground” evoked by the term “freedom,” a region comprising 
numerous commonplaces about the rights and privileges essential to American identity. 
Both groups, though, will claim “freedom” for their divergent beliefs about the role of 
government intervention, church and state, and so forth, leading to multiple, incongruous 
realms of topical association. 
 McGee attempts to distance his keyword from “more general conceptions of 
‘Ultimate’ or ‘God’ terms” through the ideograph’s “attention . . . to the social, rather 
than rational or ethical, functions of a particular vocabulary” (8). I am not sure the 
distinction is so tidy. God-terms, an expression popularized by both Burke and Richard 
Weaver, represent, in the latter’s terms, the “highest” link in a chain of discourse, the 
“prime mover of human impulse” (211). Many of the god-terms Weaver lists—
“progress,” “freedom,” “democracy” (212-13, 228-29)—are those McGee would classify 
as ideographs and Orwell would decry as “meaningless.” Weaver’s “progress,” for 
instance, “seems to be an ultimate generator of force flowing down through many links of 
ancillary terms” (212), where Weaver’s terms of “force” largely mirror my own of topical 
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connectivity. It is true that Weaver’s final paragraphs of The Ethics of Rhetoric demand a 
“rational” reassessment of American society’s god-terms (232), but such an ethical 
terminus does not negate the conceptual similarity his prior descriptions of god-terms 
have to ideographs. Burke, though he offers a great litany of conceivable “rhetorical 
names for God”—a sort of splintering of the divine to all available avenues of public and 
private life—returns to the example of the Romans, who “knew that you could get a god 
merely by taking an adjective and transforming it into an abstract noun” (Rhetoric 299-
300, 301). So it is, Burke reminds us, that we see the cultural “deification” of abstractions 
like freedom and patriotism. 
 I am suggesting that, while McGee, Weaver, and Burke emphasize different 
rhetorical qualities, they are viewing the same essential concept from different angles. In 
all cases, the sense of connotative reach available to the ideograph/god-term is central in 
configuring its rhetorical potential. One can justly speak of the ideographic qualities of 
the god-term, which, once ascended to its hierarchical zenith of symbolic order, doubles 
as a nexus of ideological organizations and division. (“God” itself is both the original 
god-term and an ideograph; incongruities over the precise socially ordering, connotative 
reach of “God” have motivated both ideological discord and war.) Without literally 
equating religion with capitalism, nationalism, or other –isms, one can also point out the 
“divine” qualities of ideographs. What Burke calls “secular prayer,” or the “coaching of 
an attitude by the use of mimetic and verbal language,” centrally involves the selection of 
appropriate terms, among which the ideographic are supremely important (Attitudes 322; 
emphasis Burke’s); one, in other words, ritually orders her secular life by performing 
allegiance to certain terms, much as one of faith might strive to live in conversation with 
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God. It is easy to order one’s life around ideographs because of their connotative wealth 
and elasticity. Both ideographs and god-terms represent the most well-connected of 
topical nodes. They are, by necessity, both denotatively diffuse (to Orwell’s 
consternation) and connotatively brimming. They are, unlike the transitory “binders full 
of women,” durable and long-lasting, but often convey less rhetorical bite than a 
situationally derived topos-of-the-moment. Ephemeral topoi, though, function largely by 
suggestively tethering current events to the values and ideas evoked by ideographic and 
“divine” topoi. 
 
Lexia and Quotation 
The question of where topoi come from is answerable, at least in one sense, by 
Roland Barthes’s term lexias, or “units of reading” (S/Z 13). In S/Z, Barthes attempts an 
ambitious, draw-out study of Balzac’s short story “Sarrasine,” a work Barthes chops up 
into numbered chunks—lexias—designed to describe the phenomenology of reading. On 
his key term, Barthes elaborates: 
The lexia will include sometimes a few words, sometimes several 
sentences: it will be a matter of convenience; it will suffice that the lexia 
be the best possible space in which we can observe meanings; its 
dimension, empirically determined, estimated, will depend on the density 
of connotations, variable according to the moments of the text: all we 
require is that each lexia should have at most three or four meanings to be 
enumerated. (13-14; emphasis added) 
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It is difficult, here, to take Barthes quite literally (how does one “empirically” list four 
“meanings”?), but the lexia is invaluable as a pragmatic category of textual division. In 
particular, Barthes’s criterion of connotative density translates well to considerations of 
topoi. It is, as I explain above, the connotative density of ideographic terms that 
establishes their role as recurring topoi. When Barthes suggests that some lexias can be as 
short as “a few words,” ideographs come to mind, for it is easy when reading a word like 
“freedom” or “justice” to cognitively abstract the term from the text, and from the 
“voice” of the writer, as an expression of cultural authority rather than that of the 
individual writer. It is difficult to lay down an exact set of criteria which by other phrases 
or sentences might also become abstracted from the text and born into rhetorical 
discourse as topoi—except to say that a connotative serendipity must take place between 
the fragment and the reader’s ideological climate. This was certainly the case with 
“binders full of women,” whose metonymic relations to recent politics were too obvious 
to ignore. In other instances, stylistic flair combines with connotative density to produce 
a memorable fragment. This is the case, for example, with “good fences make good 
neighbors” (popularly attributed to Robert Frost), another fragment I take up in Chapter 
4. 
 The concept of the “lexia” describes how a fragment can wrench free of its text 
and become recognizable as a quotation. Typically, quotations circulate with some 
authorial tag—that is, as belonging to an actual author or at least a collective authority. 
But, in the words of Gary Saul Morson, quotations functionally belong to a “second 
speaker,” not the flesh-and-blood individual who may have once put words to paper or 
voice, but often hazy public memory of the speaker that accompanies the quote (Words of 
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Others 96-97). There exist different genres of quotations—in the Bakhtinian sense of the 
speech genre, a form selected for its communicative or rhetorical function—among 
which Morson, in The Long and Short of It: From Aphorism to Novel, deals with 
aphorisms, apothegms, dicta, witticisms, witlessisms, and maxims in detail, each 
according to its sense of rhetorical purpose (13-14). One might also include slogans, 
which, rather than expressing the authority of an individual, “draw from the collective 
and help establish a distinct, collective identity” while, unlike apothegms, resisting 
contemplative or critical questions (Kopelson 594). Quotations, whatever the genre, 
rarely display anything approaching ideographic density of connotations, but the fusion 
of verbal style with at least significant ideological connectivity remains a good recipe for 
topical fitness. In the arena of rhetorical practice, I am suggesting, quotations can emerge 
as topoi tethered to ethē: they carry a sense of character and credibility in their very form. 
 
Ideologeme 
In her essay “The Bounded Text,” Julia Kristeva introduces the term ideologeme, 
her own neologism, as “the intersection of a given textual arrangement (a semiotic 
practice) with the utterances (sequences) that it either assimilates into its own space or to 
which it refers in the space of exterior texts (semiotic practices)” (36). In other words, the 
term ideologeme compresses textual form and situated purpose into a unitary concept. It 
is an “intertextual function read as ‘materialized’ at the different structural levels of each 
text, and which stretches along the entire length of its trajectory, giving its historical and 
social coordinates” (36). To say that topoi are ideologemes, then, is to point out the 
factors of cultural variance and temporal drift that, in hindsight, are conspicuously absent 
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in Aristotle’s discussion of the topoi. To figure in the problem of change, in fact, is to 
divest Aristotle’s definite article, the, of any definite qualities. There is no “the topoi” but 
only certain, available topoi as they function in a specific, transitory situation. 
Postmodernity shatters the Athenian myth of stasis. 
 This, anyway, would be the proper postmodernist position. It is a position I 
generally accept, though I would point out that the enduring relevance of terms like 
archetype and ideograph bespeaks both the durability of certain rhetorical categories and 
the often slow, incremental processes of cultural change within which the reciprocal 
change of topoi occurs. The qualification accepts the letter of Jameson’s conception of 
postmodernity as the “free play of signifiers” while, in a sense, belying the spirit of 
Jameson’s thesis. If stability is an ontological myth, it remains a pragmatic category on 
some fronts insofar as discursive and cultural formations often change very slowly. By 
invoking Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of the utterance, though, Kristeva nods toward this 
sense of gradual drift. Against the unbending formalism of Saussurean linguistics, 
Bakhtin posits the utterance as the “real unit of speech communication” (Speech Genres 
67; emphasis Bakhtin’s). Bakhtin explains that utterances—which are bounded not by 
periods and semicolons but by “a change of speaking subjects”—represent links in an 
ongoing chain of discourse; they respond to previous utterances and anticipate the 
responses of future utterances (71; emphasis Bakhtin’s). It stands to reason that speech 
genres, the functional forms utterances take, will change over time as the chain of 
communication progresses through evolving ideological climates. To regard topos as 
ideologeme is to account for this progression, and to pose the question of incremental 
change. It is my position that topoi themselves evolve and, in doing so, contribute to the 
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larger evolution of rhetorical culture. This thesis will propel the final section on topoi and 
evolution below.  
 
Topos and Evolution 
Topoi evolve. Stated casually, such a proposition will probably turn few heads—
no more than any of the preceding attempts in this chapter to revise the classical term for 
postmodern conditions. Morson, for instance, stresses that verbal genres, unlike 
biological species, “rarely, if ever, display a single line of descent” (Long and Short 12; 
see also Frye, Fables 11); but such an observation hardly annuls the thesis that genres 
“evolve,” that they change slowly over time (see Miller, “Do Genres Evolve?”). When 
the verb evolve takes on distinctly Darwinian connotations, though, many humanists 
grow uneasy, and often for good reason. Leah Ceccarelli’s Shaping Science with 
Rhetoric, for example, describes the “imperializing” metaphors of conquest that 
characterize E.O. Wilson’s Consilience, a book ostensibly designed to unite scientific and 
humanistic inquiry under a single project, but that, to the nonscientist, feels a lot like 
epistemological colonization (Ceccarelli 128-53). Amid the corporatization of higher 
education, and the professionalized threats to the liberal curriculum, humanists have 
every right to be wary of scientistic hubris and disciplinary gerrymandering. I myself am 
a committed humanist and harbor such concerns in abundance. 
 It is one thing—a good thing—to study the rhetoric of science, critique the more 
harmful uses of scientific epistemology, and to defend the humanities against disciplinary 
encroachment. It is quite another, from one’s perspective as a humanist scholar, to 
dismiss science qua science or to cynically degrade any theoretical insights originating 
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from the sciences. Both these positions can be seen in the career of John Angus 
Campbell, a rhetorician I greatly admire. Campbell’s scholarly career rests principally on 
an excellent series of articles regarding Charles Darwin and the rhetorical context for his 
Origin of Species. These articles cover Darwin’s polemical style (“Polemical Mr. 
Darwin”), the relationship between rhetorical and scientific invention (“Scientific 
Discovery”), cultural contexts for the Origin (“Scientific Revolution,” “Why Was 
Darwin”), and Darwin’s strategic enlistment of rhetorical allies (“Invisible Rhetorician”), 
among other matters (see also Davies; Depew; White 130-34). “To claim that Darwin 
was a rhetorician,” Campbell stresses in one essay, “is not to dismiss his science, but to 
draw attention to his accommodation of his message to the professional and lay audiences 
whose support was necessary for its acceptance” (“Charles Darwin” 69). It is, then, with 
some confusion that one might read contributions to Campbell and Stephen C. Meyer’s 
Darwinism, Design, and Public Education, a collection composed largely of rhetoricians 
and other non-scientists attempting to discredit Darwinian evolution as science. If 
Wilson’s imperializing metaphors represent disciplinary hubris, so, too, do many of these 
essays and their attempts to undermine scientific consensus in the name of “pluralism” or 
“teaching the controversy.” (What controversy, exactly—and where should one teach it?) 
Campbell’s work on Darwin the rhetorician need not translate to his positions in favor of 
allowing intelligent design into the science curriculum. It is, in my view, unfortunate that 
they have. 
 Also pertinent is Thomas M. Lessl’s Rhetorical Darwinism: Religion, Evolution, 
and the Scientific Identity, a book whose pun of a title represents both the subject matter 
of “evolutionism”—or the “spiritualization of scientific knowledge” (xi), the progression 
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of which Lessel traces between Francis Bacon’s Enlightenment and the present—and the 
theory of slow, incremental changes in rhetorical formations, the process by which 
concepts like evolutionism “evolve.” Like Campbell’s work on Darwin, Lessl’s book 
includes a fascinating and persuasive body of historical work. Lessl then projects his 
ideas forward into a latter-day polemic against science’s place in public discourse, a 
position that, from my perspective, devolves into an uncomfortable bifurcation between 
religion and science, one bolstered in part by ungenerous readings of scientific advocates 
(see Wetherbee, “Descent”). In my review of Rhetorical Darwinism, though, I point out 
that one (likely inadvertent) effect of Lessl’s method is to demonstratively suggest the 
viability of Darwinian models of cultural transmission in rhetorical criticism (“Descent” 
n6). 
 I advocate for such a model below, but I consider my own position on Darwinism 
and the humanities a moderate one. In the last two decades, “literary Darwinists” like 
Joseph Carroll have painted a dire portrait of the state of the humanities. For Carroll, 
writing in 2011, the vapid language games of poststructuralism threaten the integrity of 
humanities, and their hegemony can only exert a “degenerative pressure” by which 
critical theorists and literary critics (he says nothing of rhetoricians, but one assumes we 
are also culpable) come to occupy a reclusive epistemological corner of the academy 
overshadowed by the “ever growing prestige and power of the scientific understanding of 
human nature” (Reading Human Nature 75). Carroll hopes, instead, that “the pace and 
production in Darwinist publication will continue or increase; the institutional resistance 
of the postmodern establishment will crumble from within, almost silently, softly 
metamorphosing into dust, like the Soviet empire, as a result of intellectual dry rot” (85). 
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In Darwinian Misadventures in the Humanities (2009), by contrast, Eugene Goodheart 
characterizes the neo-Darwinian “scientism” of many evolutionary psychologists, 
sociobiologists, and literary Darwinists as “a failure to respect the boundaries that divide 
the natural sciences from the humanities” (10). After dealing with Darwinian affronts to 
literature, religion, and ethics, Goodheart concludes his book with a defense of 
“dualism,” of the separate magisteria of the sciences and humanities (see also Gould, 
coiner of the momentous and controversial phrase “non-overlapping magisteria” in 
reference to science and religion). If the boundary between the two “should not be 
impermeable,” it is telling that Goodheart’s examples of productive cross-pollination are 
all of novels that benefit from characters who are scientists—not from theories or 
moralities that benefit from a dialectic with science (107). 
 I am moderately sympathetic to Goodheart’s concerns and only minimally 
sympathetic to Carroll’s. Yet, finally, I agree with Carroll that Darwin deserves, at least, 
a right to “join the party” (Reading Human Nature 77). Darwin remains, after all, among 
the most momentous thinkers of the last two centuries, and his theory of evolution by 
means of differential fitness offers immense explanatory power—not only in the 
biological sciences, where it now a unifying principle, but also in the arena of language. I 
agree with Richard Dawkins that “Darwinism is too big a theory to be confined to the 
narrow context of the gene” (Selfish Gene 191). Rhetoricians ought to at least consider 
what Darwin offers. 
 
 
Darwinian Language and Rhetoric 
 98 
 
As Campbell’s work has illustrated, Darwin’s driving metaphors and analogies—
“natural selection” itself the most famous one—bespeak both the role of rhetorical 
invention in the development of Darwin’s theories and the naturalist’s interest in 
communicating his ideas in a publically comprehensible form. I will suggest, further, that 
Darwin suggests a productive analogy between nature and human culture. In the Origin, 
for example, he writes 
Nothing is easier to than to admit in words the truth of the universal 
struggle for life, or more difficult—at least I have found it so—than 
constantly to bear this conclusion in mind. Yet unless it be thoroughly 
engrained in the mind, the whole economy of nature, with every fact on 
distribution, rarity, abundance, extinction, and variation, will be dimly 
seen or quite misunderstood. (ch. 3; 52; emphasis added) 
Darwin is speaking, here, of the human conceptual system and its limitations. To 
comprehend a new idea in anything but the “dimmest” of light, the mind needs points of 
familiar reference. This is one reason why Darwin introduces the metaphor of 
economy—complete with its constituent analogues of supply and demand, abundance 
and scarcity—that usefully demonstrate the similar competition for resources in nature. 
Reciprocally, though, Darwin’s metaphor also suggests the role of rhetorical invention in 
the origins of Darwinism itself. Metaphors like “economy” and, later, the “polity of 
nature” express a deep-seated analogy between nature and society in Darwin’s thinking 
(ch. 4; 84), one that permits Darwinism an epistemological intersection with social 
theories of language. 
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 With this analogy in mind, one can turn to Darwin’s explicit pronouncements on 
language, of which there are many in The Descent of Man. Darwin writes, “We find in 
distinct languages striking homologies due to community of descent, and analogies due to 
similar process of formation” (ch. 3; 445-46). “Languages, like organic beings,” he 
continues, “can be classed in groups under groups; and they can be classed either 
naturally or according to descent, or artificially by other characters” (446). More 
specifically, individual words also compete with each other. In addition to matters of 
brevity and concision (or, perhaps, what Barthes would term “density of connotation”) in 
determining the certain words’ survival, “mere novelty and fashion may be added; for 
there is in the mind of man a strong love for slight changes in all things. The survival or 
preservation of certain favoured words in the struggle for existence is natural selection” 
(466). Again rises the tacit metaphor of economy. There exists only use for so many 
languages and so many words among so many people, so competition among words is 
natural selection insofar as natural selection is economy. My point is not that “mere” 
metaphor here fuels a series of spurious claims in Darwin’s work, but that a common 
epistemological foundation between his thoughts on nature and culture allows Darwin to 
accurately and productively broach the matter of linguistic evolution. This maneuver does 
not guarantee Darwin authority on the subject of language, but it does suggest, in my 
view, that his thoughts on language should be taken seriously—as many recent scholars 
do. 
 If words evolve, topoi evolve. If topoi evolve, rhetoric evolves. I am, as far as I 
know, the first to pursue the subject of topical evolution, but others have discussed 
evolution and rhetoric more generally. In Darwin Pharmacy: Sex, Plants, and the 
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Evolution of the Noösphere, Richard M. Doyle suggests a co-evolutionary interrelation 
between human rhetorical performance and hallucinogenic plants. Here, Doyle’s 
“evolution of rhetoric” corresponds to the available symbiosis between human rhetors 
and rhetoric-enhancing drugs (127-73). Taking a more conventional approach to matters 
of nature and culture, Alex C. Parrish’s Adaptive Rhetoric: Evolution, Culture, and the 
Art of Persuasion is the most recent and thoroughgoing statement on prospect of rhetoric 
as a bioevolutionary act. Drawing on George Kennedy’s work in Comparative Rhetoric, 
as well that of biologists like E.O. Wilson, Parrish diligently pursues the thesis that 
“persuasion is a special form of animal signaling” describable by natural and cultural 
forces both (23). I am largely receptive to Parrish’s project and the interdisciplinary 
cooperation further inquiry of its ilk could ideally yield—though, in the meantime, I 
genuinely wonder which subjects rhetoricians ought to take up and which are best left to 
scientific fields like biocommunication. Happily, my own interests in Darwinism 
circumvent such a potential turf war. Diverging from Doyle and Parrish’s projects, I will 
focus specifically on the Darwinian evolution of nonhuman, discursive units of 
communication. 
 
Topos, Meme, and Evolution 
In a particularly insightful passage from A Grammar of Motives, Burke takes up 
the example of Darwin’s Origin in relation to the dramatistic terms of agent and scene. 
The “agent-scene” ratio, in Burke’s terms, describes the spectrum of emphasis between 
overt environmental determinism and overt individualism. Darwin’s species, for Burke, 
amounts to an “agent-minus”: “[Species] might be classed under the term agent to the 
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extent that their behavior has to be accounted for, at least in part, by some purely internal 
principle of motivation. . . . Yet such organisms reflect the same reduction of 
circumference as we have previously observed with respect to scene” (155). In other 
words, species, in and of themselves, do act as agents—they attempt to ensure their own 
survival. They are also profoundly bound by the environmental scene, which is why the 
most valiant actions of a polar bear marooned in the Sahara will still be for naught. 
 I believe the same “agent-minus” status applies to memes. The evolutionary 
biologist and public intellectual Richard Dawkins famously coined meme in his book The 
Selfish Gene. Dawkins imagines the meme as the cultural analogue to the biological gene: 
“Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making 
pots or building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping 
from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool 
by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called 
imitation” (192). The “success” of a given meme, Dawkins tells us, boils down to three 
criteria, the same he uses to assess genes: “longevity” (how long a meme persists in 
human usage), “fecundity” (the purchase or appeal of a meme in context), and “copying-
fidelity” (how faithfully a meme replicates) (194). Dawkins would later clarify his 
particularly scientific understanding of the meme: “A meme should be regarded as a unit 
of information residing in a brain. . . . This is to distinguish it from its phenotypic effects, 
which are its effects in the outside world” (Extended 109). But meme theory, or 
memetics, has been taken up by commentators much more enthusiastic and prolific than 
Dawkins himself, most notably Darwinian philosopher Daniel Dennett in Consciousness 
Explained, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, and Freedom Evolves; psychologist Susan 
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Blackmore in The Meme Machine; Robert Aunger in The Electric Meme; and Kate Distin 
in The Selfish Meme. Of further interest are contributions to the now-defunct Journal of 
Memetics (1997-2005), as well as a host of other books, articles, and edited collections 
related to the subject (Aunger, Darwinizing; Benzon; Gatherer, “Macromemetics,” “Why 
the ‘Thought Contagion’”; Gillett; Kronfeldner; Johnson; c.f. Richerson and Boyd). 
 The meme is a controversial concept, incurring distain from both audiences in 
science, for whom the term is not scientific enough, and in the humanities, for whom the 
term represents a scientistic transgression into the arena of cultural studies (see Rose). 
Interestingly, both Goodheart and Carroll speak ill of memes. For the traditional 
humanist, they are products of an irrevocably scientific epistemology (Darwinian 3). For 
the literary Darwinist, memes are an unfortunate metaphorical shorthand distracting from 
the real forces of evolution (Literary Darwinism xii-xiii; Burman). Popular science guru 
Steven Pinker, further, suggests that memes have more in common with “epidemiology 
than . . . evolution” inasmuch as ideas resemble “contagious diseases that cause 
epidemics, rather than advantageous genes that cause adaptations” (210). And on the 
gene-meme analogue, evolutionary psychologist Alex Mesoudi criticizes the “particulate, 
all-or-nothing transmission of discrete units” suggested by meme theory (41). 
 These criticisms are not to be taken lightly. It bears note, too, that some theories 
of memes are wholly incompatible with humanistic inquiry. Aunger, for instance, takes 
some of Dawkins’s later comments on memes to an extreme, insisting that because 
“[a]rtefacts and behaviors fail the replicator test,” memes must physically exist in the 
brain—and even “persist in a brain in a vat” (324). It is beyond me to refute or confirm 
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such a hypothesis—except to say that this version of the meme does not immediately 
benefit rhetoricians. 
 A version of the meme that does benefit rhetoricians—particularly in its relevance 
to topical invention—is that advanced by Dennett. In terms reminiscent of Barthes’s 
lexias, Dennett defines memes as “distinct memorable units”—“the smallest elements 
that replicate themselves with reliability and fecundity” (Darwin’s 344). The 
transcendent argument of memeticists like Dennett and Blackmore is that culture evolves, 
in a Darwinian sense, through the selection of memes. In any given set of cultural 
parameters, there exists a population or “economy” of memes, to return to Darwin’s 
metaphor, individual “species” of which compete under the conditions of variation, 
replication (heredity, in biological terms), and differential fitness (Dennett, Darwin’s 
343). A macroscopic perspective, then, can trace broad trends in cultural drift—for 
instance, the gradual decline and cloistered eradication of some overtly racist memes like 
blackface or the proliferation of memes related to movements like Occupy Wall Street. 
From another perspective, what Dennett and Blackmore term the “meme’s-eye view,” the 
critic can imagine the individual meme (say, a unit like “we are the 99%”) using humans 
and cultural apparatuses to stay in existence (Dennett, Darwin’s 361-69; Blackmore 37-
52). Thus, one returns to Burke’s category of the “agent-minus.” Memes could easily be 
regarded as an agency—that which human agents use to communicate or persuade—or, 
when pooled into a “memeplex,” or complex of coadaptive memes, sum to a sort of 
discursive “scene” or context. But one can also perceive memes acting as agents, albeit 
rather simple agents propelled by the single motivation to replicate and persist. 
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 Above, I liken memes to species rather than genes. This is a deliberate choice, and 
one, I think, that benefits meme as a rhetorical keyword. Memes are particulate and 
discrete, and the movement of culture involves the flow of discrete textual fragments. But 
memetic transmission should not be understood, in Mesoudi’s words, as “all-or-nothing.” 
Individual memes can evolve, and the subject of topoi-as-memes helps illustrate how. 
The prospect of topical evolution introduces two forms of interrelated change: 
connotative and formal, the former of which is necessarily primary. In the United States, 
the connotative meanings of a term like “socialism”—still useful as a topos—have 
changed drastically over the last century; once a divisive term of considerable eulogistic 
following, it is now, essentially, what Weaver calls a “devil term” or “term of 
repulsion”—what they are and we aren’t (222). The word “socialism” has stuck but the 
ideologeme “socialism” has changed enormously. This process of change amounts to 
evolution insofar as replication of the word “socialism” through the decades has exploited 
the means of a changing historical climate; the “fitness” of “socialism” the meme lies in 
its connotative flexibility. I would argue that ideology has been the missing term in many 
accounts of memetics, particularly those concerned with the psychology of individual 
brains. (This category would include Blackmore, with whom I otherwise find much to 
agree with.) The matter of ideological climate provides the Burkean scene for memetic 
agents. When, in other instances, the form of a meme changes (for instance, when the 
Christian ichthys sprouts legs to satirize intelligent design), the new form must evoke 
enough connotative density to make itself useful in human discourse. 
 My argument is this: Rhetors use topoi to argue and communicate; topoi use 
rhetors stay in existence. The topoi that emerge and survive are those whose connectivity 
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remains opportune. Kairos is the necessary lifeblood of the topos, but it is also the force 
that dries up and sweeps aside obviated topoi. There is also, I would argue, a sense in 
which rhetoricians can configure evolution as an alternate path of inquiry to that of 
history. Rhetorical history, in its dominant iterations, remains centrally a matter of human 
actors: Platos and Aristotles, Burkes and Perelmans, Lincolns and JFKs. Evolution 
provides an alternate model centered on the interactions of human agents, topical agents, 
and ideological parameters. Evolution also accounts for the aleatory dimensions of 
rhetorical culture—the unexpected and unforeseeable coinages and developments that 
unsettle the “sediment” of discourse and shape the trajectory of culture. Rhetorical 
criticism cannot predict events like “binders full of women,” though a Darwinian attitude 
toward rhetoric folds such unforeseen events into a coherent vision of cultural change 
through the explanatory power of “fitness.” The recent proliferation of Internet memes—
or, in Limor Shifman’s terms, “groups of content items” that circulate online, and among 
which riffs on “binders full of women” posed a potent example (39-42, 2-4)—only 
illustrates further the potency of memes-cum-topoi (see also see also Knobel and 
Lankshear; Lewis; Vie, “Cokelore,” “In Defense”; Wetherbee, “Picking Up”). While 
some memeticists disparage the fast-and-loose terms by which Internet users describe 
memes (see Dennett, Intuition Pumps 274), I believe the web only makes apparent and 
pressing what more capable memeticists have been arguing for decades. The meme is an 







The sort of topical criticism that might result from the terminological symposium 
I provide in the chapter should, I think, return to two central questions sets of questions. 
One would concern the work a certain topos accomplishes or might accomplish in a 
delimited set of rhetorical parameters—the famous “rhetorical situation” of Lloyd 
Bitzer’s coinage. These questions necessarily isolate a manageable swath of cultural 
history for analysis, looking at the connectivity of a certain topos, or set of topoi, in that 
context, and examining the functional genres (archetypes, ideographs, lexias, and so 
forth) those topoi take. The second set of questions would involve the question of change. 
On this front, rhetoricians might examine the evolution of one of more topoi over 
historical time, paying attention to the dialectic between topos and ideological climate. 
While allowing for aleatory developments, rhetoricians might also speculate about future 
evolutions based on present-day uses of certain topoi—what possible avenues they enable 
or limit. These issues surface in the remaining chapters. In Chapter 3, while relying on 
illustrative topoi from debates about gay marriage and Occupy Wall St., I advance that 
thesis that rhetorical epideixis merits consideration as not only the rhetoric of “praise and 
blame,” but also of cultural evolution. Chapter 4 then merges the topical theory I develop 
here with a Bakhtinian approach to the rhetorical appropriation of voice, analyzing how 




EPIDEIXIS AND/AS CULTURAL EVOLUTION: 
THE EXAMPLES OF “GAY MARRIAGE” AND “WE ARE THE 99%” 
 
In February of 2004, a contentious election year that unfolded before an 
increasingly grim and unpopular war in Iraq, the incumbent president George W. Bush 
proposed legislation to add a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage at the 
federal level. Speaking to the press in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, the 
president spun a familiar narrative: the virtuous defenders of tradition needed to stand up 
against a small minority of cantankerous upstarts. He spoke: “In recent months . . . some 
activist judges and local officials have made an aggressive attempt to redefine marriage. . 
. . And unless action is taken, we can expect more arbitrary court decisions, more 
litigation, and defiance of the law by local officials, all of which adds to uncertainty.” 
Soon after, he added, “Marriage cannot be severed from its cultural, religious, and natural 
roots without weakening the good influence of society.” The terms of Bush’s brief speech 
appeared carefully chosen—culture, religion, nature, and certainty aligned against 
aggression, revisionism, and arbitrariness—and the argument made waves. As those 
following American politics in 2004 likely remember, the hot-button phrase “gay 
marriage” surged into the national lexicon that February, bringing in tow precisely the set 
of connotations Bush seemed to intend. Most Americans took the term to be an 
oxymoronic coupling squarely opposed to the ideographic borders of tradition, morality, 
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and family values. Bush revitalized the language of 1996’s Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA). Marriage—itself a sort of god-term—was under attack and suddenly required 
defending against this profane, interloping adjective. 
 A lot—in terms of rhetoric and public policy both—has happened since then, and 
recent results are not what Bush would have hoped. The federal amendment was never 
ratified, national support for gay marriage has swelled from approximately 38 percent in 
2004 to 59 percent in 2014, elements of DOMA have been ruled unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court, and same-sex couples can now obtain marriage licenses in the majority 
of American states (see Capeheart). On the rhetorical level, the nation has seen a shifting 
of terms and connotations surrounding “gay marriage.” Democratic candidates who once 
sheepishly acknowledged that of course they believe “marriage is between one man and 
one woman” now lend avid support to the rights of same-sex couples. Republicans who 
once stood behind the bulwark of “traditional marriage” find their defenses crumbling. 
Despite the effects it had in diverting attention away from the floundering Iraq War and 
into the Republicans’ bread-and-butter realm of “moral values,” Bush’s proposed 
legislation also, as journalist Jonathan Capeheart puts it, “sparked public debate about 
marriage equality that ignited a historic backlash.” As Capeheart contends, the LGBTQ 
community has the Bush administration Justice Antonin Scalia to “thank”—in an odd 
sense—for accelerating the ideological drift on the matter of same-sex rights. 
Capeheart is right: hindsight suggests that gay rights would not have advanced by 
such leaps and bounds had Bush not highlighted “gay marriage” as an issue in the first 
place. But I think the standard terms for rhetorically analyzing this kind of the situation 
require revision. Typically, we describe such process of rhetorical transformation through 
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the humanistic, rationalist metaphors of “sparking a debate” or “beginning a 
conversation.” The “debate” metaphor is surely useful, though it offers the simplistic 
image of two orators offering two positions. This is not how civic discourse, writ large, 
progresses. The “conversation” metaphor, especially as it follows from Burke’s image of 
the interminable discussion in the parlor (Philosophy 110-11), is much better, but even 
the Burkean parlor implies the perpetuation of discourse chiefly by human actors in a 
bracketed space, with little to say, at least explicitly, of the discursive resources that 
surround and constitute these speakers. Put another way, “debate” and “conversation” 
metaphors tend to imply an unalloyed vision of civic discourse by way of what Aristotle 
terms deliberative rhetoric—political rhetoric that deals in the future of the polis and 
draws from in the practical knowledge of matters like war and peace, economy, and 
security (Rhetoric 1.3-8.1358a-66a). My impression is that deliberation aptly describes 
the rules of speculation, but not the gradual processes of cultural change itself. For this—
for an evolutionary understanding of the kind of rhetorical change that arose around the 
topos of gay marriage and its adjunct terms—we should turn to the category of epideixis. 
Like topos, I contend that epideixis—which Aristotle somewhat misleadingly 
limits to the ceremonial rhetoric of “praise and blame” (Rhetoric 1.3.1358b)—connects 
usefully to evolutionary principles. If the concept of evolution were incompatible with 
our inherited lexicon of rhetorical criticism, then any evolutionary study of topoi, or 
rhetoric more generally, would of course prove counterproductive. But where I introduce 
the concepts of meme and topos to theorize evolution at the micro level, this chapter will 
explore the function of rhetorical epideixis in cultural evolution on a broader scale. My 
argument, in brief, is that epideictic rhetoric both sustains the parameters of ideological 
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life—as many recent rhetoricians have likewise claimed—and macroscopically accounts 
for the same sense of incremental cultural drift that rhetoricians can microscopically trace 
in the individual topos. A return to epideixis, thus, can help us study the shifting 
parameters around a topos like “gay marriage” or—as I discuss in more detail below—
the sense in which a term like Occupy Wall Street’s “we are the 99%” interlinks with 
broader political rhetorics. In this chapter, I first offer a historical and theoretical sketch 
of the concept of epideixis before then theorizing the sense in which epideixis coexists (or 
alloys) with political rhetoric and contributes to the evolution of ideology and individual 
topoi. I make reference throughout to the example of the “gay marriage” topos, before 
then turning to that of Occupy’s “we are the 99%.” Finally, I note the problems an 
evolutionary perspective raises in the common trend of “deliberative determinism,” or the 
assessment of rhetorical practice solely on its immediate, practical effects. 
 
“The Rhetoric of Belief and Desire” 
George A. Kennedy wrote in 1963 that epideictic rhetoric “is a form of literature 
which has relatively few admirers today” (Art of Persuasion 153), a pronouncement that 
Michael F. Carter, in 1991, labeled “an understatement” (209). Unease toward epideixis, 
which we can trace back to Aristotle’s and especially Plato’s own wariness of emotive 
public performance, stems from a perceived opposition between the frivolity and bombast 
of the ceremonial orator, on one hand, and the hard-headed purposefulness of statesmen 
and litigators—practitioners of deliberative and judicial (forensic) rhetoric—on the other. 
It is true enough, as Kennedy claims in his commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, that 
epideictic rhetoric “remain[s] a problem for rhetorical theory, since it becomes the 
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category for all forms of discourse that are not specifically deliberative or judicial” (47), 
but Carter joins with a set of twentieth-century and postmillennial rhetoricians—
including Burke, Perelman, and Olbrechts-Tyteca, plus Lawrence W. Rosenfeld, Bernard 
K. Duffy, Celeste Michelle Condit, Jeffrey Walker, Dale L. Sullivan, Gerard Hauser, and 
others—who have both rehabilitated the stature of epideixis and teased out its specific 
functions. 
 Readers of the Rhetoric will gather that Aristotle thought epideixis a less 
important matter than deliberative and judicial rhetorics, the other two entries in his 
tripartite taxonomy of oratorical genre. This is likely due in part to Aristotle’s antipathy 
toward the sophists, who, as general outsiders banned from the podia of deliberation and 
forensics, favored epideixis as their rhetorical genre of choice (Gorgias’ Encomium of 
Helen, for example). But Aristotle does provide a useful point of departure. After 
introducing all three genres, he allots only a single chapter to the idia of epideixis 
(1.9.1366a-68a), but its contents do merit attention. There, Aristotle enumerates the set of 
virtues worth praising—“justice, manly courage, self-control, magnificence,” and others 
(1366a)—and delves into the proper techniques of “amplification” by which rhetors elicit 
the best connotations in the words of praise (1366b-68a). (One sees here the precursor to 
what Burke, following Jeremy Bentham, would call “eulogistic” and “dyslogistic terms 
[Rhetoric 92-93].) Here, one begins to sense the kinship between rhetorical epideixis and 
Aristotelian poetics. It is telling that Aristotle turns to the poet Sappho to illustrate the 
blameworthiness of shame in his chapter on epideictic idia because, in the Poetics, 
Aristotle reciprocally refers back to rhetoric as the authoritative study of what is “pitiable, 
terrible, important, or probable” (Rhetoric 1367a; Poetics 19.1456a). It would appear that 
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Aristotle, at this juncture in the Poetics, has chiefly in mind his Rhetoric’s chapter on 
epideixis because the virtues and vices discussed there correspond most directly to the 
thematic subject matter of drama. 
The connection between epideixis and poetics is noteworthy because many critics 
have emphasized the kinship between classical epideixis and what we now term 
literature. In the words of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, “the epideictic genre of 
oratory seemed to have more in connection with literature than with argumentation” (48). 
A sort of “show-piece” or “work of artistic virtuosity,” the epideictic speech, these 
authors claim, remains nonetheless essential for gaining “adherence” to certain virtues 
and “establish[ing] a sense of communion” that, in turn, enables certain action-driven 
arguments (or deliberations) in the future (48, 50, 51). Epideixis lays groundwork. By 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s understanding, then, George W. Bush might make a 
series of ceremonial pronouncements affirming the good of Christian faith and traditional 
families in late 2003 and early 2004 that are designed to lay the ideological foundation 
for his proposed amendment banning gay marriage in February 2004. The former set of 
speeches would be epideictic while the latter would be chiefly deliberative. The former 
set might also occasionally mimic more “literary” discourse in order to “amplify” the 
virtues necessary to later bolster action defending “traditional marriage.” (Bush was 
famous for his foot-in-mouth, perhaps anti-literary, blunders, but one might argue that his 
folksy everyman delivery constituted one version of “literary” amplification, and helped 
construct an ethos well equipped to demonstrate consubstantiality with much of the 
American public [see Sullivan, “Ethos”].) 
 113 
 
Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca formulate a momentous addition and revision to 
Aristotle’s useful but somewhat dismissive discussion of epideixis. Even this 
reformulation, though, is significantly “incomplete,” as Condit notes, because “[n]ot all 
speakers of epideictic are established community leaders with long-term argumentative 
goals for their speaking” (“Functions” 286). Where Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca 
characterize epideixis in terms of oratorical intent alone, Condit offers a series of pairings 
designed to account for the motives and effect of epideictic rhetoric. These are 
“definition/understanding, display/entertainment, and shaping/sharing,” one or a 
combination of which will characterize virtually all epideictic speeches, and all of which 
connect rhetorical practice to “[t]he creation of poetically compelling public dramas” 
(288). These themes of self-definition, exhibitionism, quasi-literary entertainment, and 
community recur. Other rhetoricians have posited similar, basically complementary, 
criteria for epideixis: Carter deploys research from religious studies to look at the “ritual 
functions” of epideixis; Sullivan positions epideixis among the “orthodoxies” of 
education, legitimation, demonstration, celebration, and criticism (“Epideictic Rhetoric,” 
“Epideictic Character”), while stressing the role of an audience “caught up in a 
celebration of their vision of reality” (“Ethos” 128); and, more recently, E. Johanna 
Hartelius and Jennifer Asenas stress Judith Butler’s notion of “citationality” in the 
circulation of epideictic discourse. 
The recent critical rehabilitation of epideixis is clearly a collective effort, but my 
own use of the term below entails a particular debt to Jeffrey Walker. In Rhetoric and 
Poetics in Antiquity, Walker’s effort to demonstrate the mutually constitutive roles of 
rhetoric and poetics in classical societies begins with a realignment of Aristotle’s three 
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oratorical genres. For Walker, deliberation and forensics belong fundamentally to the 
category of “pragmatic” rhetoric, while epideixis constitutes a second independent 
category. Advocating for an “expanded, basically sophistic” understanding of epideixis, 
Walker forwards a sense of the concept that includes “everything that modernity has 
tended to describe as ‘literature,’ and more” (7). Where pragmatic discourses require an 
expedient purpose and “and audience of . . . ‘judges’ or ‘deciders’” (magistrates, rulers, 
or electorates), epideixis addresses a broader populous and “shapes and cultivates the 
basic codes of value and belief by which a society or culture lives” (8, 9). Epideixis, 
finally, is “the rhetoric of belief and desire,” that which “mnemonically sustains the 
culturally authoritative codes of value and the paradigms of eloquence from which . . . 
pragmatic discourse . . . derives its ‘precedents,’ its language’ and its power” (10). In this 
sense, epideixis is “primary” while pragmatic rhetorics constitute a “‘secondary’ 
projection” of epideictically sustained practices and ideological principles into specific 
fora. Walker’s configuration, here, has much in common with Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s. Again, epideixis provides a necessary groundwork for pragmatic rhetorics, 
through the act of cultural sustenance is no longer the sole job of the orator who plans to 
speak deliberatively in the future. That orator (the George W. Bush from my example 
above) may still partake in epideixis—indeed, it is hard to imagine how he could avoid 
it—but epideixis now becomes, additionally, the domain of poets, dramatists, 
songwriters, and other writers, speakers, and performers who bridge rhetoric and poetics 
or have a hand, as Sharon Crowley contends, in firming up cultural commonplaces 
(Toward  73-74). Burke notes that “human interest” journalism represents a clear 
twentieth-century instance of epideictic rhetoric (Rhetoric 70). Fleshing out the modern 
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context, I would add that, media film, television, photography, Internet videos and 
memes, and even video games contribute significantly to the epideictic sustenance of 
cultural values and iconography. The topoi that circulate within these diverse texts and 
contexts can and often do, as Walker suggests, present themselves for speakers in 
“pragmatic” occasions. But the same circulation of topoi, I will argue, also necessarily 
entails the sustenance and remaking—the evolution—of cultural ideologies themselves. 
 
Epideictic-Deliberative Alloying 
I am interested, as a rhetorician, in both the essentially functional, productive and 
“pragmatic” uses of persuasion (what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytetca conceive as 
“argumentation” proper) and the processes through which rhetoric—whether by incident, 
intention, or both—continually draws and redraws the available storehouses of persuasive 
material. The latter, again, represents Walker’s “primary” function of epideixis and the 
former the “secondary,” pragmatic extensions thereof. I believe that both these functions, 
though, often occur more-or-less simultaneously in the same situation or text. 
Let us return to the example of Bush’s speech that introduces his proposition for a 
constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. Here is one excerpt, with sentences 
numbered for and key terms italicized for reference: 
[1] Marriage cannot be severed from its cultural, religious and 
natural roots without weakening the good influence of society. [2] 
Government, by recognizing and protecting marriage, serves the interests 
of all. [3] Today I call upon the Congress to promptly pass, and to send to 
the states for ratification, an amendment to our Constitution defining and 
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protecting marriage as a union of man and woman as husband and wife. 
[4] The amendment should fully protect marriage, while leaving the state 
legislatures free to make their own choices in defining legal arrangements 
other than marriage. 
The deliberative crux of the oration comes, of course, in sentence 3, which articulates its 
exact purpose, and extends into sentence 4, which names some implications of the new 
policy. These two sentences, true to deliberative convention, deal expressly with political 
policy and the future of the nation: their denotative, explicit meaning is clear. But 
sentences 1 and 2 are much hazier. In a sense, the first sentences fill out the paragraph as 
a complete microcosmic expression of Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s formula: the first 
sentences lay an epideictic groundwork for the deliberative recommendations of the 
second two. This is an interesting analytic thesis, but still, I think, too tidy. Rather, it 
seems, elements of epideixis and deliberation alloy together in the composite text on a 
more fluid basis. 
 I believe that the following formula holds: while primary, epideictic rhetoric need 
not integrate deliberative or forensic motives, secondary, pragmatic rhetoric necessarily 
weaves epideictic elements into its own discursive fiber. This is another sense in which 
epideixis proves primary. In Bush’s sentence 1, the ideographic terms of “culture,” 
“religion,” and “nature” gather around a core conception of social “good.” As ideographs, 
these terms are all denotatively diffuse but “pregnant” with highly emotive, connotative 
meaning (McGee, “Ideograph” 7). By clustering these terms together, Bush nudges 
audiences into a hermeneutic space whereby each term might be connotatively 
understood in relation to the other: culture, in a eulogistic sense, represents 
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commonsensical inherited tradition derived largely from religious (presumably Christian) 
belief and ritual, which in turn derives from natural (i.e. God-given) law; social “good,” 
apparently, derives from a harmonious adherence to all three. This is an approximation, 
but the critic can do little more than approximate when interpreting such terms. It is 
difficult, likely impossible, to pin down the exact definitions of culture, religion, and 
nature Bush has in mind because the rhetorical potency of such terms is essentially 
connotative. But Barthes reminds us of the powerful “density of connotations” one sees 
in these terms (S/Z 13-14). In Maurice Charland’s parlance, these terms are 
“constitutive”: their “ideological ‘trick’ . . . is [to] present that which is most rhetorical, 
the existence of a [people], or of a subject, as extrarhetorical” (137). Synthesizing 
Burkean identification with Althsserian interpellation, Charland posits constitutive 
rhetoric as “the textual nature of social being,” the means through which individuals are 
“hailed” as subjects (137-38; Althusser 118). As “a form of epideictic discourse 
concerned with the problem of community identity” (Jasinski 213), constitutive rhetorics 
must enlist terms that signal an a priori identity. The key terms of Bush’s speech, in this 
instance, hail Americans as subjects of tradition, faith, and natural law, and provides 
faintly didactic clues as to what such terms might mean, and by extension how audiences 
might conceive themselves. 
 A political statesman cannot, in other words, call a press conference and 
deliberatively propose that America adopt a certain purposeful definition of culture, or 
religion, or nature. But a deliberative oration in favor of banning gay marriage may 
depend directly on these terms—and on a specific reading of these terms that constitutes 
the right audience. These terms, to be clear, qualify as rhetorical topoi in the sense I have 
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advocated, as semantic nodes whose connotative compactness economically orients 
audiences to broader spheres of understanding; they prove useful because they offer 
networks of associative linkages into the short space of a single word each. An alloyed 
epideictic-deliberative speech like Bush’s, then, provides two functions. Its deliberative, 
denotative function is to pressure congress into writing a federal ban on gay marriage into 
law. Its epideictic, connotative function is to revise and fortify a certain vision of 
American-ness and public morality (see Hauser), the indispensable units of which are 
these topoi. Conservatives are now losing the gay marriage war (more on that below), but 
they won the first battle by fortifying certain topical nodes in the short term. Bush and 
others reintroduced topoi like “protecting marriage” (effusively so—see sentences 2, 3, 
and 4 above!) and “defense of marriage,” as well as more abstract but momentous terms 
like “moral values,” consistently and coherently enough to realign the rhetorical 
landscape in their favor—at least for the course of 2004. Metaphors like “protection” and 
“defense,” as I suggest in Chapter 2, here provided bilateral vectors of associative 
movement between the topoi of family and tradition (“marriage” providing another 
happy, eulogistic term that Americans abstractly value) on one hand, and paternalism, 
patriotism, and principled conflict on the other. In 2004, one could trace the connotative 
evolution of a topos like “moral values” as it gained coherence in relation to these other 
nodes and became a tacit expression of religious commitment and opposition to certain 
gay rights. The ability of topoi like “protecting marriage” and “moral values” to curtail 
gay rights without explicitly maligning the LGBTQ community accounted, in large part, 




Evolution, Epideixis, and the Geometry of Rhetoric 
What Bush and his political allies failed to anticipate, of course, were the long-
term, largely aleatory effects of propelling a topos like “gay marriage” into the public 
sphere. Figure 2, rendered from Google Trends’ records of popular search terms since 
2004, is illustrative of “gay marriage’s” rhetorical life as a topos since then. 
 
Figure 2: A Google Trends rendering of the search terms "gay marriage," "moral values," and "marriage equality" 
between 2004 and 2015. 
As the graph indicates, early 2004 saw a dramatic spike in the public’s interest in “gay 
marriage” following Bush’s press conference and subsequent efforts to federally prohibit 
same-sex marriage. Though dipping and spiking through national discourse on a steady 
basis since then, gay marriage has remained a consistently important issue to the public, 
and that term—more than “marriage equality,” “same-sex marriage,” or any other—has 
remained our chosen appellation for the issue. While the graph of “gay marriage” towers 
over those of “moral value” and “marriage equality,” the modest spikes of interest in 
these adjunct terms hint at the historical apparatus of connotation surrounding “gay 
marriage.” The Right’s “moral values” peaks in late 2004, coincident with the Bush-
Kerry election and numerous state-level proposals to constitutionally ban gay marriage. 




































American history takes on a dyslogistic caste. The evolution of “gay marriage” since 
amounts basically to a slow transformation from a dyslogistic to contested to increasingly 
eulogistic term. (“Gay marriage” is eulogistic in liberal social circles, anyway, in a sense 
that it was not in 2004, even if many social conservatives still perceive the term as 
dyslogistic.) The Left’s most frankly eulogistic revision of the term, “marriage equality,” 
has failed to overtake “gay marriage” as the default appellation, but one notices an 
increased interest in “marriage equality” in late 2012 and early 2013, a period that 
follows Obama’s public endorsement of equal marriage in May 2012 and coincides, in 
2013, with both legal challenges to DOMA and new marriage equality laws in states like 
Rhode Island, Delaware, and Minnesota. “Marriage equality,” at the very least, has 
become a significant node in the connotative backdrop by which Americans assess “gay 
marriage.” 
 The common characterizations of epideixis as rhetoric designed to “[strengthen] 
adherence to what is already accepted” rather than “chang[e] beliefs” (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 54) are certainly productive, though they cannot account for the role of 
epideixis in the sort of ideological drift I describe here. Heterogeneous postmodern 
societies, by definition, circumscribe a plurality of orthodoxies, such that few epideictic 
speeches can uncontroversially reaffirm American belief the way that an Athenian orator 
could comprehensively account for his nation-state’s doxa (McGee, “Text”). By 
necessity, then, our epideixis is selective. Every instance of epideictic rhetoric deploys 
some topoi and ignores others. And those it does deploy it often does so in a selective 
way, prodding the topos’ connotative evolution in one direction or another. Without 
discounting the material effects of history, I contend that ideological change results 
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largely from the macrocosmic sum of such choices, the mutually enabling interaction 
between human agents (rhetors) and discursive agents (topoi, memes). Rhetoricians, 
moreover, are well-equipped to study this dimension of ideological change. 
 I will pick up this thread of my argument again below. First, though, I want to 
raise the question of how rhetorical theory tends to picture the rhetorical situation—the 
act of mapping that R. Allen Harris has called “the geometry of rhetoric.” Visual 
schemas, most famously the “rhetorical triangle,” prove useful and comforting, tidying 
the turbulence of rhetorical praxis into an orderly diagram. Simplifications like this one 
are productive and necessary insofar as they abstract trends and tendencies out of 
otherwise indecipherable disorder. The greatest problem with the rhetorical triangle, 
though, is that it is less a triangle than a triad of free-floating nodes (see fig. 3a). The 
“triangle" usefully prescribes a harmonious relationship among speaker (ethos), subject 
(logos), and audience (pathos), but says little of the connective fiber linking these nodes. 
In a broad sense, to be sure, we understand rhetoric itself to supply such fiber, but 
theories of topical invention can and should explain the connections among speaker, 




Figure 3a: The traditional rhetorical triangle offers little sense of what connects speaker, subject, and audience. 
Topoi, conceived as connective “places,” can be justly regarded as attempts to 
make sense of this connective fiber, as tools of not only invention, but navigation. Let me 
offer three possible models of such topical navigation based on three different 
understandings of topoi. First, W. Rhys Roberts’s translation of Aristotle’s koinoi topoi to 
“lines of argument” implies a more-or-less deterministic set of pathways (fig. 3b). Here, 
presumably, the rhetor would select one or more “lines” that accord with his audience 
and subject matter, and the heed the prescriptive directions of those “lines.” This model is 
basically mechanistic and accounts neither for the resources of ideology nor the fuller 
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Aristotelian metaphor of “place.” It is useful only for illustrating the conceptual 
shortcomings of the “line of argument” metaphor. 
 
Figure 3b: The phrase "lines of argument" implies deterministic pathways among the three nodes. 
 As I note in Chapter 1, Aristotle allots the idia drastically more attention than he 
does the koinoi topoi, suggesting that the dutiful rhetor should familiarize himself with a 
great survey of cultural, philosophical, and technical knowledge instrumental to 
successful rhetorical practice. The “common” domains of topics, which Quintilian later 
termed “regions” or “haunts” (5.10-20-22), appear to be, for Aristotle, a matter of second 
resort—places to “go looking” for if one’s memory of appropriate idia does not 
immediately suffice. It follows that a second, more sophisticated (and sophistic), model 
of the rhetorical triangle would conceive the idia as stepping stones en route from corner 
to corner, and koinoi topoi as significant “regions” in which rhetors could seek out 
suitable footholds (see fig. 3c). This model is less deterministic than what “lines of 




Figure 3c: "Special" topoi provide nodes that link speaker, subject, and audience. 
 The third model (fig. 3d), which I will cautiously advocate, dispenses with 
linearity in favor of nodal associations. There exists no one “path” between speaker, 
subject, and audience, but there does exist a complex network of topical nodes the rhetor 
may invoke in order to forge connective links among others. This is the model that best 
illustrates Miller’s thesis that “[a] topos might be thought of as . . . a point in semantic 
space that particularly rich in connectivity to other significant or highly connected points” 
(“Aristotelian” 141-42). It is also the model that best accounts for the Aristotelian 
conception of “place” as mediator between form and cultural context—the conception of 





Figure 3d: Particularly "fit" topoi link economically to other significant rhetorical nodes. 
 So it is, for example, that to utter “moral values” in a 2004 political speech was to 
tacitly excite a network of related topoi—“gay marriage,” “defense of marriage,” “family 
values,” “tradition,” “faith”—as well as the commonplace propositions such topoi 
connote: “marriage is between a man and a woman”; “homosexuality is immoral”; “faith 
is the basis of morality”; and so on. Generally, speaking the “fittest” topoi are those 
providing the most economical utility. “Moral values” emerged as particularly useful to 
Republicans in 2004 because the term connotatively implied a set of commonplaces that 
were easier not to explicitly speak. As Susan Blackmore remarks in her chapter on the 
“meme’s eye view,” “incessant thoughts” and other particulate bits of discourse are 
examples of memes that exploit “opportunities for replication” (39, 37). What 
rhetoricians ought to add is that memes are sustained socially as well as cognitively: it is 
not enough for the meme “moral values” to be “catchy”; the phrase also must be socially, 
discursively useful, and the matter of its utility is a matter of rhetorical affordance. Its 
memetic fecundity and topical utility are nearly synonymous. 
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 But memetics introduces the dimension of time, and thus shakes up the static 
revision of the rhetorical triangle I describe above. As I argue elsewhere, memetics 
“should compel us to challenge the traditional fixity of topoi” and to challenge “the 
traditional urge to conceptualize topos, text, and context in a secure, static matrix” 
(Wetherbee, “Picking Up”). It becomes clear, by my own terms, that what I diagram 
above (fig. 2d) is not a comprehensive model but a useful snapshot or a moving 
formation. Its topoi, artificially frozen for the convenience of graphic representation, 
constitute what I have elsewhere termed “the moving parts of the rhetorical situation” 
(Wetherbee, “Picking Up”). If deliberation is the rhetoric of immediate utility (rhetor A 
invokes topos B for purpose C), then epideixis is the rhetoric of topical cartography. 
Language theorists like Vico and Bakhtin, who emphasize the topos and the utterance as 
catalysts and anticipators of further discourse, remind us that one rhetorical situation 
begets the next; and epideixis constitutes the reassertion and revision of terms which the 
next rhetorical situation unfolds. In 2004, the Bush Administration successfully exploited 
and reified a set of available topoi concerning faith and tradition in order to meet many 
deliberative goals (reelection, the passage of many state-level gay marriage bans). They 
also, in the short term, met the epideictic goal of sustaining a certain discursive culture of 
religious traditionalism. What Bush could not foresee were the long-term effects of 
loosing the “gay marriage” topos into the political sphere. Among other things, the 
positive connotations of “moral values” declined and the term’s memetic value waned; 
the terms by which one could quietly demonize same-sex marriage lost stature. Where 
Stanley Fish, in the 1990s, observed the right “hijacking the magic words” of the left, the 
left turned the tables in the “gay marriage” debate (“How the Right”). Fueled by many 
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factors—most notably, I’m sure, the increasing visibility of gay friends and colleagues in 
straight Americans’ day-to-day lives—“gay marriage” evolved, as did the constellation of 
significant terms and other topoi surrounding it. I do not intend to record an incremental 
history of that evolution here, but what does bear emphasis are the aleatory dimensions of 
topical interaction. It would have been difficult in 2004 to predict that, eleven years later, 
“gay marriage” would remain a viable topos, but for reasons mostly opposite to those the 
Bush Administration percieved. 
 
Occupy Wall Street and “We Are the 99%” 
I choose, here, to single out Occupy Wall Street and their slogan of “we are the 
99%” because the Occupy Movement existed largely in a strange limbo between 
epideictic and deliberative motives. As few likely remember, the movement began with a 
small flame. Responding to a call from the anti-consumerist Canadian media outlet 
Adbusters, demonstrators congregated in Zuccotti Park of Manhattan’s financial district 
on September 17, 2011. The ensuing protest targeted the politics of economic disparity 
metonymically symbolized by their chosen location. And if New York was the first 
match, the kindling of income inequality soon proved to mantle the globe. By October, 
the Occupy Movement was a worldwide phenomenon, extending to six continents and 
positively lighting up the United States and Europe with hundreds of protests. How far 
and wide did Occupy finally reach? A map compiled by the Occupy Directory specifies 
over 1500 separate “Occupy” events in 82 nations. 
 As early as mid-October of that year, former New York governor and Occupy-
supporter Elliot Spitzer declared victory. “Occupy Wall Street has already won,” he 
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wrote. “It has already altered our political debate, changed the agenda, shifted the 
discussion in the newspapers, on cable TV, and even around the water cooler.” Spitzer 
continued, “Suddenly, the issues of equality, fairness, justice, income distribution, and 
accountability for the economic cataclysm—issues all but ignored for a generation—are 
front and center.” This was a reasonable position to take amid the spate of Occupy 
protests around the world and their common spirit of righteous unrest. Finally, it seemed, 
citizens around the globe were recognizing the problem and voicing their grievance. 
Their collective presence was hard to ignore. 
 But how clear was Occupy’s message? Not very, argued the author and political 
hobbyist Aaron Sorkin. In a September 2012 New York Times editorial, the West Wing 
and Newsroom screenwriter observed that Occupy had “fizzled” under its own 
obtuseness. By Sorkin’s estimation, Occupy failed across the board: it never disintegrated 
the banks that were “too big to fail”; it levied no new restrictions against Wall Street nor 
prosecuted any of the plutocrats responsible for the financial crisis of 2008; it failed to 
“change the debate over executive compensation or education reform.” Ultimately, for 
Sorkin, the sense of angst Occupy did successfully voice was inevitable with or without 
the movement—a movement that, unlike the political right’s grassroots corollary in the 
Tea Party, offered too muddled a message to make a real difference. Sorkin offered an 
anecdote to sum up Occupy’s shortcomings: “I remember “watching one protester with a 
sign that read ‘Google = Jewish Billionaires.’ Another protester ran over and ripped up 
the poster. The messages had become decidedly too mixed.” 
 It has now been four years since Occupy began. The heat of collective protest has 
abated and so has the sense of disappointment that those protests yielded fewer concrete 
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results than many had hoped. It is finally an opportune time to look back and reflect. 
Hindsight shows us that Spitzer may have declared victory a bit prematurely—at least on 
matters of political policy—but it suggests also that Sorkin’s cynicism may have been 
overstated. Whatever Occupy failed to accomplish in terms of policy, the movement is 
not shaping up to be the historical footnote Sorkin presaged. Why so? In abstract terms, it 
has proven difficult to forget Occupy, to emotionally distance oneself from the images 
and rallying cries of a global populace and its cumulative indignation, however 
disarrayed the movement’s thesis. Occupy’s apologists often claim, and rightly so, that 
the movement “changed the discourse” or “altered the conversation.” Sorkin himself 
admits that “[t]he chant, ‘We are the 99 percent,’ has become part of the lexicon.” 
 The topics of this chapter are largely synonymous with questions of how one 
“changes the discourse,” “alters the conversation,” or “enters the lexicon,” and what such 
things mean rhetorically. Let me first suggest that Occupy’s primary victory has been an 
epideictic one. The movement, in other words, has contributed to discourse more than 
policy, though it has helped to reshuffle the terms by which we understand economic 
policy. Whatever the inconsistences or failings of Occupy’s “message,” their slogan “we 
are the 99%” has etched itself into public memory. As the website Know Your Meme 
documents, Occupy’s catchphrase spread virally across venues from Mother Jones to 
Buzzfeed to Forbes shortly following its appearance on a protester’s poster in September 
2011 (“We Are”). Hindsight suggests that “we are the 99%” has emerged as what Burke 
might term the “essence” of Occupy (Attitudes 252-54). Lacking the economy of public 
memory to store away the complex, often muddled details of Occupy’s genesis and 
progression, we collectively select an economical nugget, an essence, and “99%” presents 
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itself. Failing a coherent thesis or successful set of pragmatic demands, Occupy is 
fortunate to have spawned a eulogistic synecdoche for the movement as a whole. 
Derivatives of the topos “We are the 99%” have proven memetically fit and rhetorically 
useful even while its movement of origin has repeatedly spluttered in the deliberative 
sphere. 
  “We are the 99%” emerged as a viable topos in 2011, one that organized the 
anxieties over national, and global, income inequality into an unusually memorable, 
emotive rallying cry. Even if one grants Sorkin’s criticisms of the movement, it is 
difficult to deny both the constitutive and connotative powers of the slogan. “We are the 
99%,” by shifting the epideictic terms associated with wealth, has made it more difficult 
to eulogize the archetypes of benevolent wealth—the Horatio Alger myth, the “rugged 
individual,” the “pro-business” politician—in the service of, for instance, lowering tax 
rates for the topmost brackets. Thanks in larger part to Occupy, there now exists a vibrant 
set of counter-topoi opposed to right-wing standbys like “class warfare.” 
 To understand how the epideictic incursions of “we are the 99%” have influenced 
deliberative occasions, one can examine the 2012 presidential race. While the complete 
phrase “we are the 99%” has significantly dwindled from public memory, Occupy did 
succeed in turning the word “percent” itself against Wall Street and the Republican Party, 
to the point where any reference to population in terms of percentages risked evoking the 
set of connotations surrounding Occupy’s “99%” topos. And when a surreptitiously 
filmed video leaked in September 2012, GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney 
unwittingly wrote himself into Occupy’s narrative. “There are 47 percent of the people 
who will vote for the president no matter what,” he told supporters at a fundraiser. “All 
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right, there are 47 percent who are with him, who are dependent upon government, who 
believe that they are victims . . .” (qtd. in Corn). As Charles M. Blow later wrote in a New 
York Times editorial, “With that, any caviar-and-toast-points dreams [Romney] may have 
had of flitting away the days in the White House were toast.” Romney’s wealth and his 
wavering reputation as an out-of-touch plutocrat intersected with the Occupy narrative 
the moment he spoke the word “percent.” It is not surprising that a private remark to 
supporters would read, publically, as politically ungraceful, but Romney’s dismissive 
words about a large “percent” of the population, as Hartelius and Asenas might put it, 
inadvertently appeared to “cite” Occupy’s terms, and thereby invite associative 
connections to the topoi of income equality surrounding “we are the 99%.” By 
categorically maligning 47 percent of the population as delusional self-perceiving 
“victims,” Romney both trivialized the plight of low- and middle-class wager-earners in 
America and lent a public, human face to the archetype of callous businessman ostensibly 
responsible for America’s income disparity. The topos of the “47%” came to 
metonymically represent the less desirable points of Romney’s ethos, a public 
construction that gained a certain coherence in connection to the “99%” topos. The 
epideictic impact of this term reverberated through a number of “pragmatic” contexts, 
including the deliberative juggernaut of the 2012 election. 
 
Against Deliberative Determinism 
As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note, epideixis is the rhetorical genre “most in 
danger of turning into declamation, of becoming rhetoric in the usual and pejorative sense 
of the word” (51). It is true enough that the many disparaged facets of “rhetoric”—
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bandwagon appeals, manipulation, fearmongering, verbosity, intellectual “emptiness,” 
disregard for “the facts,” and so forth—are more characteristic of epideixis than of 
deliberation or forensics, and it is true that such qualities often merit criticism. But to 
dismiss epideixis categorically is something like cursing water itself for the rainstorm 
overhead when one is also sailing on an ocean and enjoying a Perrier. As the work of 
Walker, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Condit, and others demonstrates epideixis is 
necessarily constitutive of human cultures. Hauser adds, moreover, that epideixis fulfills a 
frankly noble and virtuous purpose: “[T]he didactic function of epideictic suggests that as 
a public sphere ceases to celebrate public morality and, instead, substitutes a scientistic or 
a bureaucratic model of public relations for political relations, the public that inhabits this 
sphere is denied the very instruction on which its survival as a politically relevant body 
depends” (19). This is not to say, I would add, that epideictic didacticism cannot inspire 
oppressive, exclusive, and frankly harmful visions of public morality, but it is to say that 
the revision of such morality occurs not though rejecting epideixis wholesale (as if one 
could), but a counter-epideixis offering new terms, recasting old ones, and nudging 
evolutionary drift in certain directions. 
Many media personalities, critics, and common citizens, disparage rhetoric as 
oppressive, manipulative, and vapid. Rhetorical failure, or the failure of rhetoric itself, is 
often cited when a movement like Occupy can’t quite articulate a discrete thesis—or, 
more generally, when any set of appeals fails to translate over the short term into a 
corresponding change in policy or behavior. I am calling such assessments of rhetorical 
failure deliberative determinism, and I believe they often result from an impoverished 
comprehension of rhetoric as a complete process. For example, the old canard that “you 
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can’t really change someone’s mind, so why try?” implies a field of discrete, isolated 
discursive moments that succeed or fail in precisely those binary terms. (They typically 
fail, says the pessimist.) Such immediate terms of success and failure might rightly 
inform the assessment of deliberative rhetoric in isolation, but they provide a poor metric 
for assessing epideictic effects—and, by extension, a radically limited understanding of 
rhetoric and cultural change. My thesis has been that, to understand such change more 
productively, we should account for the symbiotic relationships among discursive topoi 
and human rhetors, as well as the field of cultural drift that results, in no small part, from 
their interactions. This set of emphases, again, need not pass over deliberative rhetoric 
and its conflicts, but it should account for the processes by which deliberative rhetorics 
stem from epideictic storehouses of rhetorical knowledge and textually alloy themselves 
to epideictic rhetorics. 
In his essay “The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy,” John Dewey contends 
that Darwin’s principles of incremental change by natural selection entails a “new logic 
[that] outlaw, flanks, dismisses—what you will—one type of problems and substitutes for 
it another type. Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins and absolute finalities 
in order to explore specific values and the specific conditions that generate them” (13). 
So too with rhetoric. Though, I believe, terms like topos and epideixis durably hold, 
rhetorical criticism must consistently recalibrate to account for the ideological evolution 
of its units of study. Rhetorical formations and individual topoi all carry what Henri 
Bergson terms the “vital impetus”: their evolution is not teleological but self-perpetuating 
in the pursuit of further vitality (97-108). And because vitality both derives from existing 
contexts and shapes new ones, as the examples of “gay marriage” and “we are 99%” each 
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illustrate, the “effects” of rhetoric cannot finally be measured by deliberative success and 
failure alone. This does not mean, of course, that we cannot bracket certain situations and 
certain swaths of rhetorical history for the sake of analytic convenience. But rhetorical 
criticism will benefit from fixing one eye on the possibilities and uncertainties of 
evolutionary drift. The classical notion of epideixis adapts fruitfully to describe this drift, 




THE TERMINISTIC SCREAM:  
INTERNALLY PERSUASIVE DISCOURSE AND TOPICAL ASSOCIATION 
 
Kenneth Burke once professed that, rather than the pseudoscientific 
“parliamentary” methods of polling and submitting questionnaires, “[t]he future is really 
disclosed by finding out what people can sing about” (Attitudes 335; emphasis in 
original). At least for the moment, I will take literally Burke’s provocative synecdoche, 
his use of song to stand for the whole productive capacity of human discourse. So I begin 
with a song. 
In his 2010 pop-country hit “Voices,” singer Chris Young’s refrain puns on the 
psychiatric cliché of “hearing voices.” The result is an equally clichéd, but catchy, set of 
truisms about family and tradition: 
I hear voices like my dad sayin’, “Work that job but don't work your life 
away.” And mama tellin’ me to drop some cash in the offerin' plate on 
Sunday. 
And granddad sayin’, “You can have a few but don't ever cross that line.” 
Yeah, I hear voices all the time. 
These are, quite certainly, the sorts of things people can sing about, and rarely the sorts 
things on which Gallup polls the electorate. But aside from an epideictic affirmation of 
hard work, family, faith, and good fun—values typically implied in the country-singer 
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ethos—“Voices” displays little that is rhetorically exceptional. It is, in other words, a 
perfectly tame, generic pop-country single designed in the tradition of rheto-poetical 
epideixis, what Jeffrey Walker terms “the rhetoric of belief and desire” (10). The song 
serves no pragmatic, deliberative call to action, but lauds and perpetuates a set of 
shopworn virtues. As Sharon Crowley would say, it “firms up” a set of cultural 
commonplaces familiar to audiences of country music, or, in Burke’s parlance, stakes out 
a “consubstantial” ideological ground where singer and audience can meet (Toward 73; 
Burke, Rhetoric 20-23). 
 Something similar is true of virtually all pop music—so why bring up Burke’s 
dictum alongside this unremarkable ditty? I do so because Young’s lyrics manifest with 
uncanny lucidity the Soviet linguist, philosopher, and literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
theory of internally persuasive discourse—the sense in which individuals internalize and 
negotiate the truncated words of others as an act of “ideological becoming” (“Discourse” 
341). Bakhtin’s theory, which I take up below in greater detail, helps articulate the 
process by which individuals come to discrete fragments of rhetorical material, or 
rhetorical topoi, not exactly as “building blocks” of discourse (see Jeff Rice 32; 
Bloomquist 135) but as nodes rich in connectivity manifested largely by their infusion 
with the voices of others. Bakhtin’s term returns us to Burke’s initial provocation: 
internally persuasive discourse gets at both “what people can sing about” and the 
available tones through which we can hear such song. As Young goes on, his narrator 
hears more voices. He recounts his dad’s advice that he’ll be “a quitter for the rest of [his] 
life” if he leaves the football team; his mom reminds him to pray every night; his 
grandma cautions that “if you find the one, you better treat her right.” Such words, as 
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Bakhtin tells it, are “fundamentally and organically infused with the image of a speaking 
person” (“Discourse” 347): Young’s narrator, we gather, has assimilated the virtues of 
“working hard” and “sticking it out” into his own internal discourses, but he articulates 
those virtues to himself through the image and vocal intonation of his father. Young’s 
listeners, then, hear these virtues repeated through the meta-filter of the singer’s own 
voice—a low country drawl characteristic of the genre. In the individual consciousness, 
such internalized words of others sum less to an ideological edifice than a series of nodes 
that help individuals navigate the plurality of voices composing social heteroglossia. 
From within, we “hear voices” that tell us how to interpret those voices we encounter 
without. 
A second example—this one concerned not with what we can sing about, 
properly, but what cries we can rally around. In the 1976 Sidney Lumet film Dog Day 
Afternoon, a pair of would-be robbers, Sonny and Sal, attempt to heist a large sum of 
cash from a Brooklyn bank—enough, Sonny hopes, to pay for his partner’s sex-change 
operation—only to find that most of the bank’s money has already been picked up and 
removed. The movie morphs from crime thriller to social drama when a media frenzy 
erupts around the botched heist. In the most celebrated scene, Sonny (played by a young 
Al Pacino) rallies the growing crowd by appealing to their antipathy for the police. 
“Attica! Attica!” he yells repeatedly, marching to and fro while the masses behind the 
police line respond in a crescendo of cheers. Sonny refers here to the controversial, 
bloody, and racially charged Attica prison riot of 1971, which ended when New York 
state troopers and corrections officers retook the facility by force, killing ten hostages and 
twenty-nine inmates in the process, and wounding many others (Attica 373-74). The 
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confrontation, which was widely regarded to indicate the poor leadership and draconian 
tactics of the New York police force and governor’s office, has been called “[w]ith the 
exception of the Indian massacres . . . the bloodiest one-day encounter between 
Americans since the Civil War” (xi). 
While Dog Day Afternoon’s “Attica!” references a charged moment in American 
history, the scene also creates a moment in itself. The one-word excerpt is widely 
regarded as one of the great lines in the history of American film, even landing on the 
American Film Institute’s list of the all-time best 100 quotes in American cinema 
(“AFI’s”). For rhetoricians, two things are worth noting about this particular fragment of 
exclamatory discourse. First, it exerts a sort of connotative imperialism whereby, after 
seeing the film, one likely perceives “Attica” to mean something beyond a particular 
corrections facility in upstate New York or a particular historical incident from 1971. As 
Bakhtin puts it, “Words that acquire special weight under particular conditions of 
sociopolitical life become expressive exclamatory utterances: ‘Peace!’ ‘Freedom!’ and so 
forth” (Speech Genres 85). Dog Day Afternoon recasts “Attica!” as such a repeatable 
utterance. The exclamation, by necessity, becomes something of an abstraction—
powerfully emotive and connotatively dense, but denotatively diffuse—still capable of 
forging associative links to the historical event, yes, but also of linking outward to a more 
general set of tensions between the authorities and the public as dramatized in the film. 
Second, if you’ll pardon the pun, Pacino’s emphatic delivery of the line becomes a 
terministic scream. Like Burke’s “terministic screens,” Pacino’s voice supplies a filter of 
“selection” and “deflection” such that the unadorned word “Attica” and the expletive 
“Attica!” function as altogether different utterances (Burke, Language 45). The first, 
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Burke might say, at least allows a more dispassionate, definitional, “scientistic,” reading, 
while the second eschews “objective” tonalities in favor of those more frankly “suasive” 
and symbolically active (45-46). For those who have seen Dog Day Afternoon, the 
utterance “Attica!”—garbed in italics and an exclamation mark—will likely enter the 
consciousness through the authoritative timbre of Pacino’s voice. It becomes, we might 
say, a fragment tethered to an ethos. 
The same is certainly true of the homespun clichés composing Young’s refrains in 
“Voices.” The examples from “Voices” and that from Dog Day Afternoon all represent 
Bakhtin’s notion of internally persuasive discourse insofar as all are memorable, 
repeatable fragments—discursive memes—internally spoken by others’ memorable 
voices, and thus pre-packaged with ethical appeal. In “Voices,” for example, a fatherly 
ethos colors the sentiment “don’t be a quitter” and a sage, grandmotherly ethos sustains 
the virtue of compassion toward one’s family. As I stress below, all these examples, too, 
can function as rhetorical topoi—as “places” from which rhetors can begin and sustain 
acts of rhetorical invention. But the differences between these examples also bear note. 
Young’s examples are decidedly more elastic and long-lasting than “Attica!”: they 
represent long-held, enduring assumptions that undergird common perceptions of 
“traditional” American life. “Attica!” is not necessarily less powerful than Young’s more 
commonplace sentiments of “have faith,” “work hard,” “treat your loved ones right,” and 
so forth, but it is more specific and more intimately tied to a socio-historical moment of 
rhetorical ignition. (Hence my ability to paraphrase Young’s virtues, but not “Attica!”) I 
develop these important similarities and differences further below, first by recounting 
Bakhtin’s theory of internally persuasive discourse in more detail, then by synthesizing 
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Bakhtin’s theory with classical rhetoricians’ conceptions of topoi and commonplaces to 
forward the explicitly rhetorical function of inner speech. I then shift focus to examine 
two more examples of internally persuasive fragments abstracted from their original 
contexts: the poet Robert Frost’s “good fences make good neighbors” and GOP 
presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s 2012 campaign gaffe “binders full of women.” 
Together, these two very different examples help illustrate the theoretical breadth of 
internally persuasive discourse as a concept pertinent to rhetorical invention. Finally, I 
close by considering the effects of my theoretical offerings on rhetorical praxis, 
highlighting the interplay between rhetorical agents and internally persuasive “voices” in 
the public sphere. 
 
Internally Persuasive Discourse 
In “Discourse in the Novel,” Bakhtin posits that “the ideological becoming of a 
human being . . . is the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (341). As 
an extension of Bakhtin’s blanket theory of dialogism, which sees all communication as 
chains of linked “utterances” that respond to prior discourses and anticipate further 
response, this sense of “ideological becoming” rejects images of the autonomous, 
romantic individual, favoring instead that of the individual born into language. The self, 
Bakhtin tells us, is invented from the available means of discourse. Together with V.N. 
Vološinov and P.N. Medvedev (the other key members of his intellectual circle), Bakhtin 
forwards the psychological primacy of language as a key tenet of dialogism. In 
Vološinov’s words, language supplies “the semiotic material of the psyche,” such that 
individuals constitute their own identities through a sort of “inner speech” that manifests 
 141 
 
on the border between the internal self and the external, social world (29, 26). In 
Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics and “Discourse in the Novel,” Bakhtin also champions 
the novel as a genre unique for its ability to dramatize and circumscribe the many 
competing and intersecting discourses that compose social life—a genre, as Kay Halasek 
notes, that resists the authoritarian monologism of the Stalinist rhetoric that weighed on 
Soviet intellectuals in Bakhtin’s time (“Starting” 4). In theorizing the novel, Bakhtin 
poses by extension what Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson call “the novelistic self,” 
an individual consciousness whose identity takes form only “as a conversation, often a 
struggle, of discrepant voices with each other, voices (and words) speaking from different 
positions and invested with different degrees and kinds of authority” (216, 218; emphasis 
in original). 
 Bakhtin identifies internally persuasive discourse, which he defines as those 
words of others that individuals “assimilate” and “tightly interw[eave] with ‘one’s own 
word,’” as a primary component of the novelistic self (“Discourse” 345). While less 
famous than some of Bakhtin’s other key concepts (e.g. heteroglossia, chronotope, the 
carnivalesque), internally persuasive discourse is one that many of Bakhtin’s major 
commentators have stressed as crucial to the theorist’s thought (Emerson; Booth, 
“Freedom”; Morson and Emerson 218-23; Morson), while rhetoricians have probed the 
concept’s particular uses in rhetorical pedagogy and hermeneutics (Trimbur; Bialostosky, 
“Liberal Education”; Farmer; Halasek, Pedagogy 116-44; Zappen 40-45, 141-61; 
Haskins and Zappen). Below, I stress the role of internally persuasive discourse in 
rhetorical invention, but first it is necessary to further tease out Bakhtin’s sense of the 
term in the dialogic formation of individual identities. Bakhtin contrasts internally 
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persuasive discourse with what he calls authoritative discourse, likening the latter to 
recitation from rote memory and the former to “retelling in one’s own words” 
(“Discourse” 341). As Bakhtin explains, the authoritative word—which stems from 
sources like “religious dogma,” “scientific truth,” and “fashionable” texts—“enters our 
verbal consciousness as a compact and indivisible mass; one must either totally affirm it 
or totally reject it” (343). Thus, while Bakhtin presents them much as a dichotomy, 
authoritative and internally persuasive discourses would appear to exist on a sort of 
continuum: “calcified” words like those from Biblical scripture often enter consciousness 
as purely authoritative, but their hard edges can erode over time, allowing assimilation 
into the individual’s own language (344-46). This assimilation, again, often maintains the 
image and voice of the speaking other, but the “novelistic self’s” maturation and 
“evolution” involve making peace with words that our “half-ours, half-someone else’s” 
(“Discourse” 345; Morson and Emerson 221). 
 In other words, the folkishly affecting quotes from Young’s “Voices” qualify as 
more internally persuasive than “authoritative” because the song’s narrator is able to 
integrate them more-or-less organically into his own speech, rather than approaching 
them as “dead quotation[s]” or things “that [fall] out of the artistic context” (Bakhtin, 
“Discourse” 344). In Burke’s terms, fatherly adages like “Don’t be a quitter” still 
constitute “symbols of authority” because they can “command” the individual into certain 
modes of thought, but they also represent only part of a larger matrix of competing words 
and voices—one authority among many (Burke, Attitudes 332). In Dog Day Afternoon, 
Pacino’s character effectively synthesizes the communally dissenting voices of others 
into a rallying cry (“Attica!” is not his word alone) but does so with such strong effect 
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that he leaves his own voice imprinted on the word. Thus, Pacino’s injection of pathos 
can persuasively enter another’s individual consciousness with the word “Attica” itself. 
The process of assimilating such memes, as several scholars have noted, shares much 
with Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky’s understanding of the linguistic development of 
children’s consciousness (see Emerson; Trimbur; Farmer). Vygotsky’s thesis that 
“meaningful speech” constitutes “a union of word and thought” has a very Bakhtinian 
ring, and likely speaks to the intellectual climate the two thinkers shared (Vygotsky 212; 
Emerson). But the key difference between Vygotsky and Bakhtin’s projects, as Morson 
and Emerson note, is Vygotsky’s emphasis on the “earliest stages of language 
acquisition” versus Bakhtin’s on the complex maturing consciousness (218). Bakhtin, 
thus, highlights the perpetual evolution of “ideological becoming” even into old age, but 
perhaps most potently in late adolescence and early adulthood when the internal clash of 
competing voices is especially strong. Trimbur offers one potent example from that stage 
in life: a Christian college student finds herself in dialogic tension between the internally 
persuasive voices of her English teacher (Trimbur himself), her family, and her Bible 
(218). One can imagine, perhaps, adages like “think critically” from the teacher’s voice 
internally wrestling with the mother’s “be respectful” and the Gospel of Matthew’s 
“judge not lest ye be judged.” Such an internal struggle could yield any number of 
outcomes, including the rejection of the teacher’s authority or the toppling of scriptural 
quotation from a pedestal of “authoritative” discourse onto the field the “internally 
persuasive.” These individual, vocally imbued fragments can in themselves exert a 
powerful rhetorical force—one, I’ll argue, best understood by synthesizing topical theory 




Inner Word and Topical Invention 
In order to forge a connection between Bakhtinian inner voice and rhetorical 
topoi, an initial word is in order about Bakhtin’s famously vexed relationship with 
rhetoric in general. As Ekaterina V. Haskins and James P. Zappen aptly put it, Bakhtin’s 
“seemingly ambivalent, even contradictory, attitude toward rhetoric helps to explain the 
equally varied and even contradictory responses of contemporary scholars and critics” 
(329). Bakhtin frequently maligns rhetoric in the same terms by which he describes 
“authoritative” discourse, as language designed to achieve immediate victory by silencing 
potential respondents. At best, Bakhtin has argued, rhetoric serves as a “distanced echo” 
of true cultural dialogue, one “narrowed down to an individual polemic,” while at worst it 
insists on “the unconditionally innocent and the unconditionally guilty [where] there is 
complete victory and destruction of the opponent” (“Discourse” 325; Speech Genres 
150). By its association with monologism, Bakhtin appears to indict rhetoric for 
objectifying the consciousness of opponents and interlocutors, of remaining “deaf to the 
other’s response” and masquerading as “the ultimate word” (Problems 292-93; emphasis 
in original). Responding to such opposition between “monologic” rhetoric and “dialogic” 
poetics, Don H. Bialostosky has posited “dialogics” as an alternative mode of inquiry to 
rhetoric and dialectic (“Dialogics”) and John M. Murphy has cautioned rhetoricians to 
take seriously the monologic and manipulative facets of their field’s central concept. Yet, 
as Halasek notes, Bakhtin’s celebration of the novel entails an exuberant discussion of the 
numerous “rhetorical genres” that sum to its heteroglossic composite: “The novel,” 
Bakhtin writes, “and artistic prose in general, has the closest genetic, family relationship 
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to rhetorical forms” (Halasek, “Starting” 2; Bakhtin, “Discourse” 269; see also Problems 
106-22). Elsewhere, Bakhtin repeats the definitional truism that “all rhetorical genres . . . 
are oriented toward their listener and his answer”; thus, while “monologic in their 
compositional structure,” rhetorical utterances can apparently invite dialogic exchange by 
initiating a chain of discourse (“Discourse” 280). 
 Here, I second Haskins and Zappen’s synoptic assessment of Bakhtin and 
rhetoric: “This seeming ambivalence toward rhetoric is actually an ability to see rhetoric 
both ways—as both monologic and potentially dialogic—both unresponsive to the point 
of seeking the complete destruction of the other and receptive to the other by virtue of 
rhetoric’s basic orientation toward the audience” (330). In his periodic commentary on 
rhetoric, Bakhtin’s Janus-faced attitude seems to account for both the muzzling 
authoritarianism of Stalinist rhetoric and the classical paradigm of ethical, civically 
productive rhetoric as espoused by figures like Aristotle and Quintilian. Of especial note 
in making the latter connection is a later article of Bialostosky’s, “Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
and Bakhtin’s Discourse Theory,” that synthesizes the two theories. Bialostosky’s thesis 
is the Bakhtinian theory of utterances (concrete speech-acts demarcated by a change in 
speaking subjects) and speech genres (the functional “shapes” utterances take)—
articulated most fully in his essay “The Problem of Speech Genres”—amounts to a 
deliberate revision of Aristotle’s rhetorical theory (Bakhtin, Speech Genres 60). Bakhtin 
seems to adopt a classically rhetorical posture in his prescription that “[b]oth the 
composition and, particularly, the style of the utterance depend on those to whom the 
utterance is addressed, how the speaker (or writer) imagines his addressees, and the force 
of their effect on the utterance on the utterance” (Speech Genres 95). Yet, Bialostosky 
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argues, Bakhtin rehabilitates the frankly “performative” facets of rhetorical practice—
broadly classified under the canons of delivery, arrangement, and style—at the expense 
of invention, the canon Aristotle privileges (394). In other words, the description of 
rhetorical communication in terms of utterance and genre necessarily foregrounds the 
stylistic subtleties that yield different interpretations from and effects on audiences and 
interlocutors—again, the difference between “Attica” and “Attica!” While Cicero and 
other Roman rhetoricians stress the “amplifying” effects of inventive devices like 
commonplaces much as they do stylistic figures of amplification (Cicero, De inventione 
2.49; Rhetorica ad Herennium 4.25), Aristotle’s rhetorical taxonomy, at least cursorily, 
implies rigid separation of invention, to which he allots Books 1 and 2 or the Rhetoric, 
from arrangement, delivery, and style, each of which he discusses more fleetingly in 
Book 3. This is the split Bialostosky recognizes when he argues that Aristotle’s and 
Bakhtin’s “two rhetorics are complimentary, but . . . Bakhtin’s rhetoric is functionally 
prior to Aristotle’s and ultimately governs it. There can be persuasion without argument, 
grounded in shared evaluation expressed through intonation, and the selection and 
disposition of arguments in rhetorical utterances must be ruled by their provocations and 
their anticipations of response, not by their availability alone” (406). Bialostosky’s 
pronouncement sounds much like Burke’s now-canonical dictum that rhetor must learn to 
“talk the language” of her audience for persuasion to become possible (Rhetoric 55). It is 
a difficult point to disagree with. 
 I do agree with Bialostosky’s assessment here, but would slightly reframe his 
terms of analysis by pointing out a potential intersection among the rhetorical canons. In 
particular, I identify a certain reciprocity between invention and style. If, as Bialostosky 
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argues, a Bakhtinian stylistic awareness of suitable speech genres necessarily precedes 
any formally inventive attempt to draw forth the “available means of persuasion,” I 
would contend that a more elastic sense of invention already enters into the notion of 
genre and style Bakhtin and Bialostosky have in mind. Specifically, what Bialostosky 
terms “provocations and their anticipations of response” corresponds roughly to the 
rhetor’s need to select connotatively appropriate material in the process of invention. In 
Chapter 1, I reread Aristotle’s commentary on topoi in the Physics to suggest that the key 
conceptual idea behind Aristotelian topoi is not the need for twenty-eight quasi-
dialectical “common” heuristics, nor the distinction between “common” and “special,” 
but the topos as agent of “orientation,” a device by which the rhetor can economically 
forge associative links to stores of knowledge and belief shared by his audience. In 
practice, such topical deployment often involves the fusion of invention and style. A 
catchy appellation like George W. Bush’s “axis of evil,” for instance, can undertake a 
powerful topical process of association. As Crowley’s explains, the word “evil’ can 
“excite a network of emotions habitually associated with the devil,” thus potentially 
evoking a web of tacit but penetrating web of associations among Christian audiences 
(59). Likewise, “axis” can summon World War 2 imagery of the jackbooted Gestapo or 
kamikaze bombers. The power of “axis of evil” is not denotative but connotative. To use 
the term is not to explicitly equate North Korea, Iraq, and Iran to a satanic revision of 
Hitler’s Germany or Imperial Japan, but the term’s speaker may profit from such 
associations. Such is economical power of topoi in general. 
 Bush’s voice claims “axis of evil,” though, much as Pacino’s claims “Attica!” If 
one speaks to an audience familiar with Bush and his use of the phrase, is difficult to 
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speak “axis of evil” without evoking invisible shudder quotes. That is: we tend to hear 
Bush speaking “axis of evil” phrase even when another body speaks the phrase; as 
Bakhtin would say, we encounter the phrase attached to the image of person who, in our 
public memory, originally spoke it. And this phenomenon has discernable rhetorical 
effects. Insofar as Bush’s ethos suggests untrustworthiness and even buffoonery among 
many political circles—even right-leaning ones—“axis of evil” now struggles to gain an 
effective, unironic reading among many audiences. The phrase’s failure to evolve beyond 
the condition of Bush’s implied voice, so to speak, has encumbered its rhetorical fitness. 
This is not to say “axis of evil” functions no longer as internally persuasive discourse, but 
that the inner voice associated with the phrase can undercut its original, unironic set of 
associations. Bush’s detractors will infer a voice that, much like Wayne Booth’s 
“unreliable narrator,” persuades to the contrary of the intended “message” (Rhetoric of 
Fiction 158-59). 
 The example of “axis of evil” illustrates a larger trend regarding commonplaces 
and inner voices. In Arguing and Thinking, the social psychologist Michael Billig notes 
the rhetorical nature of thought itself: “As the mind oscillates between alternatives, it 
successively champions the case for one decision or another, changing its set of 
justifications and criticisms. The considerations, calculations and reasons, which are 
entertained privately, would therefore resemble those which might be heard in public 
debate” (144). Billig draws from the Roman tradition of commonplaces developed in 
Cicero’s De inventione and the anonymously written Rhetorica ad Herennium, each of 
which list sets of contrary arguments applicable to the prosecuting and defending 
attorneys’ cases in judicial rhetoric. The Ad Herennium, for instance, recommends that 
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prosecutors defend information derived from torture with the claim that “men are 
compelled by violent pain to tell all they know,” while the defense attorney might counter 
that “one person is less exhausted by pain, or more resourceful in fabrication” (2.7.10). 
As Billig explains, such oppositional sets of “common sense” suggest that a given 
audience’s (or individual’s) corpus of common sense “is not unitary, but is composed of 
contradictory aspects” (234). What Bakhtin adds to the equation are the inner 
vocalizations of such commonplaces: the “oscillations” Billig identifies occur not only 
between different propositions and beliefs, but the internally persuasive voices that imbue 
such commonplaces. Internal opposition between, say, “winners don’t quit,” on one hand, 
and “it’s only a game” on the other is also opposition between a stern fatherly voice (one 
associated broadly with personable responsibility and achievement) and a more frankly 
feminized voice (one associated with compassion and caregiving). The conflict is also 
between the two ethē those tones imply. The high-schooler who identifies most readily 
with “traditional” masculinity is more likely to take the former voice seriously and 
therefore less likely to quit the football team. On this process of identification, Bakhtin 
identifies “intimate styles” as those generic constructions ideally allowing “speaker and 
addressee to merge completely” (97). It is ironic but, I think, accurate that many young 
men “hear themselves” in self-flagellating tones of quasi-militaristic authority (“never 
surrender;” “be a solder;” “be all that you can be”) and thus perceive such voices most 
“intimately.” 
 These are, again, commonplace statements. “Commonplace,” by Crowley’s 
definition, refers to statements and phrases achieving “wide dispersal among members of 
a community” (70). The commonplaces of Roman rhetoricians, thus, were not regarded 
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as inherently true as they were familiar and useful. For commonplaces to function as true 
topoi, according to the definition I have been advocating, they must not only be common 
but also connectively potent. Analyzing commonplaces through Bakhtin’s concept of 
internally persuasive discourse, I believe, yields the conclusion that commonplaces often 
function topically not only by linking to cultural knowledge and other commonplaces (the 
process Crowley dubs ideologic), but by linking, too, to sources of ethical appeal and 
authority through their inner vocality. So it is, without much reservation, that one might 
appropriate and tweak Bruno Latour’s thesis that objects can possess agency. For Latour, 
it is reasonable to conceive of objects—material things—as agents insofar as “any thing 
that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor”: hammers enable 
woodworking, kettles enable the boiling of water, and so forth (71). This is not to say, 
Latour stresses, that objects consciously “act” or “do things ‘instead’ of human actors,” 
but rather that social science must account for the “non-human” elements integral to 
social action as well as the human (72). The extension to rhetorical theory and topoi is 
logical: topoi “act” insofar as they enable arguments with built-in appeal to ideological 
consensus and authority: In a chiasmic relationship, human rhetors use topoi to make 
arguments and topoi use human rhetors to proliferate. And while topoi do not think or 
feel, they do speak. The internally persuasive voices through which groups appropriate 
topoi augment their utility in rhetorical discourse.  
 
“Good Fences Make Good Neighbors” 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on two particularly compelling instances of 
vocally imbued topoi. The first was born of literature and lives in politics: In 1995, 
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Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia wrote, “Separation of powers, a distinctively 
American political doctrine, profits from the advice authored by a distinctively American 
poet: Good fences make good neighbors” (qtd. in “Justice Scalia’s” A22). The reference 
is one many scholars of literature will recognize from Robert Frost’s 1914 poem 
“Mending Wall”—and many such scholars will share the New York Times editorial 
board’s chagrin as they reprimand Scalia for his misreading: “The poet Robert Frost gave 
no such advice, though Justice Scalia is not the first to say he did. [Frost’s] poem, 
‘Mending Wall,’ makes the case against walls” (“Justice Scalia’s” A22). The Times is 
correct, of course—they are, at least, if one subscribes to anything but a willfully 
idiosyncratic reading of Frost’s original poem. In “Mending Wall,” Frost’s narrator and 
his neighbor together repair a rock wall between their properties while the narrator coyly 
points out the futility of the endeavor: 
  We wear our fingers rough handling them. 
  Oh, just another kind of out-door game, 
  One on a side: It comes to little more: 
  There where it is we do not need a wall: 
  He is all pine and I am apple orchard. 
  My apple trees will never get across 
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him. 
He only says, “Good fences make good neighbours.” (35) 
The famous quotation becomes a strange artifact in the context of the poem. As Bakhtin 
notes, a simple sentence like “What joy!” can achieve quite different ends as an utterance, 
either sincere or bitingly sarcastic, based on its context in a larger, composite utterance 
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(Speech Genres 85). Something similar is true here. In Bakhtin’s terms, the poem 
satirically dialogizes the would-be monologic (authoritative) assertion that “good fences 
make good neighbors.” Where “good fences” would read, at least superficially, as a 
“dead quotation” and an instance of “calcified” authoritative discourse (“Discourse” 
344), Frost reinscribes the dictum into a dialogic exchange that undermines its authority. 
We can reasonably deduce that the poem, as a whole, rebukes “good fences” since Frost 
erects its hierarchy of voices to favor the narrator’s as more thoughtful and complex, 
while the “good neighbors” dictum seems to indicate, more than anything else, the 
neighbor’s doltish incapacity to hear dissent. 
But we do not always come to “good fences” as readers of poetry or dutiful 
parsers of heteroglossic strata. Scalia certainly didn’t; nor is he the only public rhetor to 
quote, or misquote, Frost in this fashion. “Good fences make good neighbors” has 
become an adage that circulates widely in argumentative and political rhetoric, 
addressing topics from domestic immigration policy to conflict in the Middle East to 
Scalia’s take on separation of powers in American government to local affairs. A 
ProQuest Newsstand search of English-language newspaper, for instance, yields close to 
3000 instances of the phrase and its derivations in prominent papers between 1979 and 
2014. I include a few characteristic examples from recent publications: In Fort Wayne’s 
Journal Gazette, Frank Gray states, “Robert Frost wrote that good fences make good 
neighbors, and so far it appears that some fences along Westbrook Drive will continue to 
keep residents and the city on good terms” (C1). Advocating for regional partitioning of 
Iraq, Red Jahncke writes in the Providence Journal, “All of this would follow the 
wisdom of America’s foremost foreign-policy expert and Mideast specialist, Robert 
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Frost, who reasoned, ‘Good fences make good neighbors’” (1), a sentiment echoed by the 
Washington Post’s editorial board, who invoke the same quote and attribution to make 
the same argument: “We should heed the words of poet Robert Frost: ‘Good fences make 
good neighbors’” (“Settling” A20). The Los Angeles Daily News editorializes that 
“[Farmers and ranchers] aren't the kinds of folks inclined as a rule toward regulation for 
regulation's sake. But they are the kinds who understand completely that good fences 
make good neighbors” (“For California’s Sake”). And in a letter to the Hartford Courant, 
reader Judy Singer offers a local analogy to fences recently erected in Israel: “[I]f the 
people of Massachusetts were blowing themselves up in Connecticut restaurants, Gov. M. 
Jodi Rell and our legislators would be debating a fence right along with the three-strikes 
legislation. Of course, that would be less shocking here than in Montana. New 
Englanders know that good fences make good neighbors” (A10). 
I could go on, but these examples suffice to illustrate a few trends. Gray, Jahncke, 
and the Washington Post editorial board—along with Justice Scalia and many others—
directly and unironically attribute “good fences” to Frost. I hope, however, my argument 
makes clear by this point that the issue is not one of simple “misreading” or of philistine 
pundits who flunked American lit. On the contrary, many of them do know their Frost—
or appear familiar enough with his reputation to recognize, as Scalia puts it, the 
“distinctively American” poetic ethos he potentially brings to an argument. There is, 
Bakhtin would remind us, no single, unitary “Robert Frost” all readers are guaranteed to 
infer, but his associations with quintessential “Americanness,” blue-color labor, 
unpretentious intellectual refinement, and the Atlantic Northeast are all widely assumed. 
We infer, in other words, a sort of “essence” of Frost, a construct similar to what Booth 
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famously coined as the “implied author,” the literary re-creation of the flesh-and-blood 
man, and a term Seymour Chatman has revised to account for the complete authorial 
presence “as reconstructed by the reader from the narrative” (Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction 
74-75; Chatman 148). But in this case, of course, it is not exactly textual reconstruction 
that allows political commentators to claim “good fences” as Frost’s sentiment. Instead, 
what enters play is a hazier sense of Frost the inferred “person” and public figure. As 
Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tytecta explain, “the concept of ‘person’ 
introduces an element of stability”: “In argumentation, the person, considered as the 
support of a series of qualities, the author of a series of acts and judgments, and the object 
of a series of appraisals, is a durable being, around whom is grouped a whole series of 
phenomena to which he gives cohesion and significance” (294, 295). In the popular, 
public imagination, then, it would appear Frost’s “stability” and “durability” of character 
cohere around the abstractions I name above and not necessarily around complex 
pronouncements from his poems. The Daily News’ editorial board is able to imply Frost’s 
authorship of “good fences” without mentioning him by name through a thematic link to 
agricultural labor, a common subject of the poet’s work. Singer, the Hartford Courant 
reader, does something similar through an appeal to regional identity—“New Englanders 
know that good fences make good neighbors”—which works because Frost’s residence, 
from boyhood to death, in New England is common enough knowledge, especially to 
Singer’s Connecticut audience. The problem of “misreading” Frost arises, then, because 
the connotations of the “good fences” topos—for instance, the American virtues of land 
ownership, self-reliance, and respect for property—cohere all too well with the vague 
sense of “Robert Frost” that exists in the public imaginary. 
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“Good fences” also benefits as a meme from this coherence: the ethical appeal 
prepackaged into the phrase, that of the great “quintessentially American” poet, bolsters 
the “fitness” of “good fences” as a replicable rhetorical device. This association, of 
course, wasn’t always the in place, and one can trace the evolutionary-rhetorical history 
of the term in an abstract sense. As folklorist Wolfgang Meider notes, a number of 
similar maxims from around the world precede “good fences.” These include, “‘There 
must be a fence between good neighbors’ (Norwegian), ‘Between neighbors’ gardens a 
fence is good’ (German), ‘Build a fence even between intimate friends’ (Japanese),” 
among others (70; emphasis in original). In American letters, Mieder notes a number of 
dicta that loosely connect fences and neighborliness—for example, an 1804 farmer’s 
almanac that advises, “Look to your fences; and if your neighbor neglects to repair and 
keep in order his half, do it yourself; you will get your pay”—before Blum’s Farmer’s 
and Planter’s Almanac, out of North Carolina, finally prescribed that “good fences make 
good neighbors” in those precise words (70, 71). But, as Mieder explains further, Frost’s 
1914 appropriation of the phrase in “Mending Wall” supplies the “ultimate significance” 
of the term since. This claim is more or less empirically verifiable: Figure 4, produced 
from Google’s Ngram Viewer, illustrates the frequency of “good fences make good 
neighbo(u)rs” in titles from the Google Books database between 1830 and 2000, graphed 
in proportion to the total number of books available from each year. One notices an 
isolated bump in frequency around 1850, which coincides with the Blum’s almanac 
Mieder identifies as coining the phrase in print. But the phrase’s frequency begins to 
increase rapidly only after “Mending Wall’s” publication in 1914, and has only escalated 
since. From a rhetorical stance, we might say Frost’s ethos ignited the phrase’s vitality.  
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It is worth noting, though, that the success of “good fences” is likely in part a 
matter of style—or, more specifically, of what Richard Lanham has recently termed 
“stylistic filtration” (19). By Lanham’s argument, the sheer glut of information available 
to the public sphere demands devices of selection. Rhetoric’s role in persuasion, 
according to Lanham, doubles as the “economics of attention,” the ability to present 
information such that it “sticks” in public consciousness, thus circulating widely and 
efficiently (21). “Good fences make good neighbors,” in other words, has likely beat out 
other iterations of the same sentiment thanks to its catchy, anaphoristic deployment of the 
adjective “good”: it economically and memorably packages a set of attitudes about 
citizenship and property. This quality, no doubt, is what enabled readers to initially 
abstract “good fences” from its satirical position in the poem and resurrect it as an 
unironic dictum. As Bakhtin explains, “When the individual sentence is analyzed 
separately from its context, it is interpreted to the point of becoming a whole utterance” 




Figure 4: A Google Ngrams graph indicating the frequency of “good fences make good neighbor(u)rs between 1830 
and 2000, graphed in relation to the total number of books available from each year. 
Note, though, that Bakhtin does not label such abstraction from the whole an act 
of misinterpretation. Such a negative evaluation would be hard to mete out insofar as the 
circulation of fragments informs the rhetorical praxis of quotidian life; people lack the 
discursive economy to track down the context of each fragment that surfaces in the media 
or in everyday speech. Yet, “good fences” still carries a shade of its context insofar it 
suggests Frost’s name and character. (And in this sense, it matters little that the phrase 
“isn’t really his”—that it was coined before his birth in an almanac from North 
Carolina—because the social force of public memory ascribes it to Frost.) As Google 
Ngrams tells us, Frost’s association with the term would appear to matter more than any 
stylistic quality itself because “Mending Wall” is what set the phrase circulating. To 
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return to Bakhtin’s terms, it appears to matter most that we encounter “good fences make 
good neighbors” through the internally persuasive voice of the quintessential American 
poet. “Good fences” comes to inhabit quotation marks, either implied or explicit, that 
refer back to Frost and bank on his credibility as a tool for economizing attention. This is 
not to say we hear Frost’s “voice” in “good fences” as immediately or literally as we 
might hear Bush’s in “axis of evil” or Pacino’s in “Attica!” but it is to say that the phrase 
potentially evokes the image of the speaking poet in tones of poetic authority. One need 
not hear Frost literally speak to imagine such tones. Indeed, the vast nebulousness and 
malleability of Frost’s ethos—what Burke has called the transformative “resources of 
ambiguity”—proves an asset (Grammar xix; emphasis in original). Much like, for 
example, the founding fathers, Martin Luther King, Jr., or Shakespeare, Frost lends an 
utterly uncontroversial, eulogistic voice to the arena of American politics: liberals and 
conservatives alike can claim him, as can urban sophisticates and rural blue-collars, men 
and women. There appears scant rhetorical risk in beginning a sentence, “As Robert Frost 
once said …” And unless one writes for an audience of literary scholars, this formula 
appears true even if the author is about to misrepresent the content of Frost’s poem. The 
content of “Mending Wall” is less the point than the connotative totality of Frost’s 
internally persuasive voice. By extension, the inventive capacity of the phrase as a topos 
derives not only from its face-value content nor its replicable catchiness, but also the 
hazy sense of authority connoted by Frost’s voice. One might even argue that Frost’s 
“good fences” represents a secular, latter-day corollary to the scriptural topoi advocated 
by St. Augustine or Hippo in the early Middle Ages—those that couple Christian 
authority, vocalized as authoritative or internally persuasive discourse through the figure 
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of the sage clergyman, Christ, or God Himself, with the cultural logos of Biblical 
narrative. Frost’s poetry is mostly secular, but his place in the American literary canon 
allows his voice to both stand in as a sort of synecdoche for American values and to 
enable arguments that benefit from appeals to such. 
 
“Binders Full of Women” 
Internally persuasive voices, though, are often more discrete and immediate than 
Frost’s. Such is the case in my second example. Anyone who paid attention to the 2012 
presidential campaign between President Barack Obama and Republican challenger Mitt 
Romney will likely remember my second example of a vocally imbued topos, “binders 
full of women.” After a surprisingly weak performance from Obama in the first of three 
televised debates between the candidates, Romney entered the second on October 16, just 
three weeks before Election Day, enjoying a small surge in the polls. That surge 
dissipated, though, following a disastrous performance—one triggered, in no small part, 
by Romney’s unwitting coinage of the meme “binders full of women” (see Neuman; 
Parker). During the debate, Romney fielded a listener’s question about pay equity for 
women. He spoke to his own experience as governor of Massachusetts. The exact quote 
was: “And—and so we—we took a concerted effort to go out and find women who had 
backgrounds that could be qualified to become members of our cabinet. I went to a 
number of women's groups and said, can you help us find folks? And I brought us whole 
binders full of—of women” (“Transcript”). 
These final words hit a cultural nerve, fragmented loose, and ricocheted across 
news and social media outlets at a breakneck pace. Like “good fences make good 
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neighbors,” Mitt Romney’s gaffe thus represents a discursive fragment detached from its 
original context and recast as a separate utterance. As I argued in Chapter 2, fragments 
like “good fences” and “binders” function as what Roland Barthes terms lexias, “units of 
reading” one can demarcate according to their “connotative density” (S/Z 13). The 
Internet, to be sure, has a great deal to do with how “binders” was abstracted from the 
second debate, and I discuss elsewhere how Romney’s flub—along with his odd 
commentary on Sesame Street’s Big Bird clandestine crack about the “47 percent” of the 
population whose votes the GOP need not pursue (see also “2012”)—also deserves 
rhetorical attention for its modal affordances as an “Internet meme” subject to 
appropriation and remix in various online spaces (Shifman; Wetherbee, “Picking Up”). 
Here, though, I will limit my discussion to the vocal infusion of “binders” and its 
rhetorical effects. One can begin to articulate these effects by contrast to Frost’s “good 
fences.” The principal difference between the two topoi is one of immediacy: much like 
“Attica!”—only, perhaps, more so—“binders” stems from and necessarily refers back to 
a particular historical-cultural event. As Romney uttered the phrase, it quickly forged a 
set of connotative links to timely cultural knowledge of Republican misogyny and 
corporate soullessness exemplified, for instance, by Todd Akin’s then-recent comments 
on “legitimate rape” and the capitalistic greed underlying the Wall Street bailouts. Burke 
explains the importance of timeliness in one particularly insightful passage: 
[I]f the Aristotelian concern with topics were adapted to the conditions of 
modern  journalism, we should perhaps need to catalogue a kind of 
timely topic, such as that of the satirical cartoon, which exploits 
commonplaces of a transitory nature. The transitoriness is due not to the 
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fact that the expressions are wholly alien to people living under other 
conditions, but to the fact that they are more persuasive to people living 
under one particular set of circumstances. (Rhetoric 62) 
In other words, a specific event like a presidential election requires the rhetorical 
mobilization of transitory knowledge: Republican problems with the female electorate 
and corporate greed both qualify as perennial concerns, but both issues were particularly 
charged in 2012. “Binders full of women,” thus, entered rhetorical praxis as transitory 
topos pejoratively linking one public figure’s voice and ethos to a set of timely issues. 
 Bakhtin would stress, too, that Romney’s voice—the distinctly aural connotations 
of “binders”—instrumentally ensured such associations. This is another sense in which 
“binders” was more immediate than “good fences,” for Romney’s literal voice, in 2012, 
circulated ubiquitously in the media in a way Frost’s likely never did. This fact of 
Romney’s candidacy meant that the voice infused in “binders” became largely self-
referential. While one could deploy “good fences” in the context of the 2012 election, for 
instance, to critique Obama on immigration policy, the effect of Frost’s internally 
persuasive voice would be predominantly supplemental. It could fortify an argument in 
its tacit appeal to the quintessentially American wisdom the poet, but the argument would 
remain, most centrally about Obama (or Romney), not Frost. To deploy “binders full of 
women” in late 2012, by contrast, was generally to select Romney as the subject of one’s 
argument. An October 2012 editorial from the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, for example, 
quips, “Mitt Romney does not have a binder full of women. He has a binder full of 
women’s issues he intends to ignore, scorn, or obfuscate” (“Women in Binders” A16). 
Meanwhile, another editorial from that month, this one from the aggregate news site 
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AllAfrica.com, censures the Nobel committee for awarding the 2012 Peace Prize to the 
European Union despite the “neo-colonial” burden the EU places on many African 
countries while historically neglecting the achievements of Africans, women, and African 
women especially: “It seems the committee’s binders full of women are collecting dust 
next to their binders full of Africans” (“EU Awarded”). These editorials take exigence—
in Lloyd Bitzer’s famous sense of the term, as an “imperfection marked by urgency” 
(6)—from different developments on different continents. Because a presidential election 
epitomizes such a state of urgent imperfection, the former’s stakes for the American 
electorate are clear. It effectively endorses Obama. As Bitzer explains, exigence 
comprises “a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations” that dictate the 
parameters of a rhetorical situation; Romney’s importance as a presidential candidate 
saturated American rhetoric to the point where one could scarcely bring him up without 
making a positive or negative argument about his candidacy. The more interesting point, 
though, is that the second editorial effectively drags the American election into an 
argument about a different topic. AllAfrica.com uses the American election to supply the 
terms of critique against the Nobel committee’s decision. By riffing on “binders,” the 
author, in a sense, ventriloquizes Romney’s voice into the corpus of the Nobel 
committee. The message is: You should be better than this; you (literally) sound like Mitt 
Romney. A tacit, enthymematic “middle premise” about Romney’s fitness for command 
underlies this argument. The argument is made possible only by a transitory shared 
understanding of the internally persuasive discourse bound up in “binders”—by the 
evocation of Romney’s voice. 
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 Such critique-through-ventriloquism requires a different sort of internally 
persuasive discourse than that attached to “good fences.” As the “axis of evil” example 
above illustrates, Bakhtin’s terms seem malleable enough to conceive something like 
ironically persuasive internal discourse attached the image of an untrustworthy speaking 
person. Some basic criteria still apply: the inner voice in question and the character it 
implies still must harmonize and cohere with the connotative total of the message it 
speaks. Americans tend to perceive in Frost’s ethos a set of assumptions consonant with 
those of the dictum that “good fences make good neighbors.” By speaking “binders full 
of women,” Romney stepped into a connotative trap largely of his own design. He gave 
economically potent voice to a set of ideas easy to link to the archetype of the white, rich, 
out-of-touch, misogynistic businessman. This is not even to say that Romney, the flesh-
and-blood man, is or was all of those things, but it is to say that “binders” helped vocalize 
a social perception to that end. As Burke might say, the metonymic and synecdochical 
functions of “binders” necessarily “reduce” Romney, his identity, and his discourse to an 
economical nugget (Grammar 506): Romney’s “binder” becomes metonym for the entire 
scene of androcentric corporate bureaucracy; the phrase itself becomes synecdoche for 
the second debate and Romney’s narrative of loss; and Romney internally persuasive 
voice, as intoned in the phrase “binders full of women,” comes of stand for the whole of 
his character. In Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s terms, Romney the rhetorical “person” 
comes to cohere around “binders” and its negative associations. Such (for Romney) 
unfortunately “coherent” associations were, again, not created by the “binders” topos, but 
the phrase’s inception did mark an exceedingly convenient point of invention: it became 
easy to indict Romney for sexism and classism through a quick act of suggestive 
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ventriloquism. The circulation of Romney’s voice contributed heavily to his undoing as a 
presidential candidate. 
 
Rhetorical Agency and the Fragmentation of Voice 
Chris Young’s refrain that he “hears voices all the time” is seconded by Bakhtin, 
who writes, “I hear voices in everything and dialogic relations among them” (qtd. in 
Morson and Emerson 98). Whether these voices Bakhtin references belong to specific 
and current public figures and celebrities, more mythic figures from cultural memory, or 
individuals from one’s own intimate experience, they are all at once pervasive and 
fragmentary. We generally come to folkish truisms like those from Young’s song though 
archetypical but nonetheless potent voices—the father, mother, teacher, clergyman, and 
so forth. “Good fences make good neighbors” provides more specificity through its 
association with a certain literary authority, but “Frost” himself—or the socially 
reassembled essence of the man—is also a vague, archetypal construct. Pacino’s 
“Attica!,” Bush’s “axis of evil,” and Romney’s “binders full of women” are more precise 
and internally persuasive within certain socio-historical parameters. All, though, are 
rhetorical topoi vitalized by vocal connotation. 
 Despite Michael Calvin McGee’s famous call for rhetoricians to attend to the 
postmodern fragmentation of rhetorical discourse (“Text”), the splintering of voice itself 
into topical nuggets marked by internally persuasive discourse has received scant 
attention. This phenomenon as I have illustrated it, has numerous implications for 
rhetorical theory and practice. I have been exploring those more theoretical implications 
throughout this chapter, but one point worth stressing further is that different topoi can 
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have very different shelf-lives, and that the longevity of a certain topos often centrally 
depends on its vocal plasticity. If one were to graph “binders full of women” as I do 
“good fences” above, the result would yield only one frenzied spear of commotion above 
October and November 2012 before quickly dwindling away to almost nothing. 
“Binders,” in other words, was unable to adapt past the circumstances of the election; it 
was unable to unshackle itself from the voice of Romney, a figure whose perceived social 
importance plummeted once he conceded the election to Obama. Topoi like binders tend 
to burn brightly during their periods of relevance—for a moment, the importance of 
“binders” soared high above the steady, plodding circulation of “good fences”—but then 
changing circumstances extinguish them. A topos like “good fences” owes its longevity 
to the productive ambiguity of Frost’s voice: he speaks to us authoritatively, but in broad 
terms. 
 But what of individual rhetors acting in real-life circumstances? Do my 
theoretical claims bear on their praxis? I believe they do, and I will offer a few 
concluding thoughts as to why and how. It may come as a surprise, to start, that I do not 
believe my theoretical offerings entirely negate the traditionally romantic notions of 
“finding one’s voice.” Indeed, “finding” may be the apt verb because, as rhetoricians like 
Thomas M. Lessl have long held, “voice” is not created from scratch but chosen more-or-
less categorically based on the rhetorical effects of different vocabularies, timbers, tones, 
and so forth (see Lessl, “Priestley Voice”; Rhodes). “Finding” a voice is a matter of study 
and selection. Moreover, one may “claim” a voice insofar as that voice comes to 
organically resonate with the individual’s own ethos. But here is where matters get 
thorny. The first point to stress is that while the individual rhetor may “claim” a voice (or 
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a voice may claim her), the individual does not necessarily control, much less “own,” her 
voice once it enters the social sphere. When one individual’s fragmented voice enters the 
consciousness of others as internally persuasive discourse, it becomes dialogized into a 
new contextual matrix, and the voice’s “owner”—for lack of a better word—loses control 
of the ensuing relations. The stakes, of course, are higher for individuals in the public eye 
than they are for private citizens, but the process is similar. Disagreements or 
incongruities between individuals, as Bakhtin explains, represent the “surface upheavals 
of the untamed elements of social heteroglossia,” the tangible manifestation of deep 
ideological disparities implicit in the many voices that compose any complex, 
heterogeneous society (“Discourse” 326). But such “surface upheavals” between public 
figures echo though the deeper currents of heteroglossia, helping to shape the ideological 
terrain as they reverberate. Romney’s utterance of “binders full of women” stuck in the 
currents of social heteroglossia, working its way into the discourse of others and dragging 
the voice of its author along. 
Public rhetors, in other words, must contend with the fragmentation and 
circulation of their own voices. Romney could scarcely control the public appropriation 
of his own once he spoke “binders full of women,” but he might have performed any 
number of individual agentive acts to prevent such a rhetorical misstep. A slight revision 
of wording—“binders full of women’s resumes,” for example, or simply “lists of 
qualified women”—would have supplied no meme-worthy phrase fit to pejoratively 
usurp the candidate’s voice. (And conversely, in 2008, Obama worked assiduously and 
successfully to associate his own voice with memes like “yes we can” and “change we 
can believe in”; such associations can be forged intentionally.) It is obviously harder to 
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fault Frost for failing to foresee the circulative potential of “good fences make good 
neighbors.” With some detriment to the poetic tenor of his composition, he might have 
replaced “good fences” with a more prosaic substitute (“Shut up and help me fix the 
wall!”) if he wished the narrator’s critique of needless borders to more plainly trump the 
neighbor’s advocacy for them. But, regardless, the “life” of “good fences” falls largely 
into the realm of the aleatory: rhetors and writers can rarely prognosticate with any 
precision how their own words and voices will fragment and circulate in the economy of 
discourse. Often, the best rhetors can do is speculate—apply some calculation to the 
tenors of their voices, the connotative density of their phrasing, and the ideological 
parameters within which their words might echo. The public rhetor is an agent, but her 
agency depends in part on anticipating the acts of other agents. 
But enough on the role of high-profile agents—the Mitt Romneys, Robert Frosts, 
Al Pacinos, and Chris Youngs whose voices circulate broadly in social heteroglossia. 
Since I can hardly counsel nonhuman agents (topoi themselves), I direct this chapter’s 
concluding remarks to the many human agents whose cumulative action gradually and 
quietly shapes the landscape of public discourse. As Celeste Michelle Condit has argued, 
the parameter of public rhetoric exist in slow, subtly changing flux: “The noun rhetorical 
formation should always be understood as carrying the connotations of the verb form” 
(255). In the polity of rhetoric, as in that of nature, change occurs gradually and 
incrementally. I will add, too, that the gradual rhetorical change Condit perceives is both 
fluid and particulate. There exist discernible topoi—“good fences,” “binders,” “axis of 
evil,” and so on—that retain formal stability as long those forms profitably enable 
arguments. This relative stability makes topoi convenient sites of analysis and praxis 
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both, but individual rhetors should understand that the selection and repetition of topoi is 
in no way a neutral act. Because topoi replicate from text to text, the selection of a given 
topos doubles as an invitation to one’s audiences and interlocutors to repeat that topos in 
further discourse. As Lanham reminds us, there exists room in the economy of discourse 
for only so many specific, particulate topoi to proliferate. To echo “binders full of 
women” during the 2012 election cycle, therefore, was also to tacitly impede the 
invention and circulation of arguments about other elements of the election and 
Romney’s candidacy. Democrats can still give thanks that “binders” galvanized their 
cause and drew legitimate attention to Romney’s shortcomings, but all rhetors should 
shoulder the ethical implications of the topoi they choose to repeat. 
The same goes for the more fluid internally persuasive voices that append 
themselves to individual topoi. As Bakhtin’s translator and key commentator Michael 
Holquist stresses, “Heteroglossia is not just a swirling mass of contending languages; 
each language is the profile of an ideology, the site of a world view” (44). So it is that the 
structure of voices composing one’s society is also a structure of ideology. The quotidian 
praxis of public discourse, as Bakhtin puts it, represents a steady conflict between 
“centripetal” and “centrifugal” forces. The former set of forces attempts to reign in 
heteroglossia toward a compact, localized center of discursive power; it organizes 
heteroglossia in a strict hierarchy. The latter seeks the democratic, utopian proliferation 
of diverse voices. In this chapter, I did not deliberately set out to present the white, male 
perspective on internally persuasive discourse and topical association, but it is no 
coincidence that most of the examples convenient to illustrating my argument rely on the 
voices of white men. Even if these white, male voices can be satirically dialogized, as 
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Romney’s was, they provide the “default” tones of our internally persuasive discourses. 
Political exigencies, especially those as momentous as presidential elections, certainly 
require that rhetors often echo the voices of power. But we should keep in mind questions 
about the big picture and the slow drift of rhetorical praxis. As we choose means of 
persuasion, are we enabling minority voices—those of women, racial and ethnic 
minorities, LGBTQ communities—to have a place in the future of civic discourse, or are 
we only reifying the upper tiers of cultural heteroglossia? While rhetors may 
unapologetically borrow authoritative voices from the ranks of the politically ascendant 
and the annals of cultural mythology, we all ought to keep in mind the long terms stakes 




THE FUTURE OF THE “TIMELY TOPICS” 
 
It is a testament to the encyclopedic scope of Kenneth Burke’s intellectual project 
that, for all the critical and theoretical commentary on his work, many of his more minor 
ideas and coinages have travelled under rhetorical theory’s collective radar. One such 
coinage, which I discuss in preceding Chapter 4, is the “timely topics.” Here, from the 
Rhetoric of Motives, is Burke’s primary statement on that term: 
Thus, if the Aristotelian concern with topics were adapted to the 
conditions of modern journalism, we should need to catalogue a kind of 
timely topic, such as that of the satirical cartoon, which exploits 
commonplaces of a transitory nature. The transitoriness is due not to the 
fact that the expressions are wholly alien to people living under other 
conditions, but to the fact that they are more persuasive with people living 
under one particular set of circumstances. (62) 
The core ideas expressed here relate rather clearly to the scope of this project. One might 
describe the genre of the satirical cartoon, for instance, as a didactic pastiche of timely 
memes: political caricatures, symbols of American mythology (Uncle Sam, Lady Liberty, 
partisan donkeys and elephants, and so on), and narrative tropes unsubltly labeled by the 
news of the day. (Mitt Romney’s binder might wear the bolded tag “Corporate America” 
in a 2012 cartoon.) It is difficult, indeed, to imagine a political cartoon all of whose 
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component images and captions lack topical vibrancy. The short space of such cartoons 
requires economic selection, usually in the form of a tropological links among established 
topoi in the form of people, phrases, and symbols. 
 Burke suggests that “a statement about the ‘timely topics’ would seem to be, not 
an extension of the rhetorical motive into fields not traditionally considered part of it, but 
merely . . . the application of classical theory to a special cultural condition set by the 
modern press” (63). Shortly thereafter, Burke expounds further on these new avenues of 
the “rhetorical motive”: “The extreme heterogeneity of modern life, however, combined 
with the nature of modern postal agencies, brings up another kind of possibility: the 
systematic attempt to carve out an audience, as the commercial rhetorician looks not 
merely for persuasive devices in general, but for the topics that will appeal to the 
particular ‘income group’ most likely to be interested in his product, or able to buy it” 
(64). It is true, certainly, that Burke’s America of 1950 was “radically heterogeneous” 
compared to the culture of the Aristotelian polis, and it is true, further, that the 
postmillennial Information Age has pushed such heterogeneity much further. Burke’s 
satirical cartoons and postal systems still exist, but so too do Internet memes, Twitter 
hashtags, viral videos, and the ceaseless desperation of a 24-hour news cycle. (If he were 
rewriting the Rhetoric for the new millennium, Burke himself might have noted the 
Romney-related Amazon binder review I refer to in the Introduction.) In a sense, this 
latter-day proliferation of media entails more detail, more nuance, more substance; rather 
than two or three perspectives on a given event, courtesy of two or three major news 
outlets, we have dozens, or hundreds, including first-hand accounts from citizen-
journalists armed with smartphones. This is a good thing in more ways than one. The 
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live-Tweeting of the Arab Spring uprisings, for instance, was a fascinating and complex 
media event. What Burke calls the “carving out” of audiences is less of a rhetorical 
gymnastic than it once was because of the greater diversity of discrete coexisting 
cultures, subcultures, discourse communities, and media outlets. The public rhetor, today, 
often “knows her audience” in intimate terms that Edward R. Murrow or Walter Cronkite 
could only guess at. 
 As this project has described, however, the present-day profusion of media 
production also requires more intense competition for attention of audiences, and 
therefore more intense competition among rhetorical topoi whose ongoing survival 
depends on their use and replication by human rhetors. Such topical struggle entails 
complications. Think, for example, of the two roughly coincident events of Islamist 
violence that occurred in early January of 2015. Between January 3 and 7, the West 
African jihadist group Boko Haram stormed the Nigerian town of Baga, killing 
somewhere between several hundred and several thousand Nigerians, and displacing 
more. On January 7, two Al-Qaeda-affiliated gunmen breached the headquarters of the 
satirical French periodical Charlie Hebdo in Paris, killing eleven and wounding eleven 
more in retaliation against allegedly blasphemous depictions of the prophet Mohammed. 
While both events were horrific, any metric ought to confirm that the sheer experience of 
needless human suffering resulting from the Boko Haram attack outweighs that from the 
Charlie Hebdo incident: more people were killed, wounded, and displaced in Baga than 
Paris. And yet, the latter received far, far more media attention in the West. Writing for 
Time, Charlotte Alter argued that Americans’ empathetic “disconnect” played into the 
hands of the African jihadists: “When terrorists kill villagers in non-Western countries, it 
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feels like one of many bad things that happen to people in far-away places. When 
terrorists attack Western cities Americans might live in, hotels Americans might stay in, 
or nightclubs Americans might dance in, it feels like a bad thing that could happen to 
you.” 
 This is a problem of rhetorical identification, but also of topical evocation. 
Following the Charlie Hebdo attack, the meme “Je suis Charlie” (“I am Charlie”) and its 
hashtag variant #JeSuisCharlie lit up social media and the Western news cycle. As Alter 
notes, some Twitter-users circulated a parallel hashtag, #IamBaga, to raise awareness 
about the massacre in Nigeria, but their efforts garnered comparably scant attention. In 
January 2015, Charlie Hebdo became a rather exclusive synecdoche for the West’s 
collective ire against militant Islam; accordingly, “Je suis Charlie,” that simmering node 
of topical vitality, pulled a vast breadth of “timely” rhetorical energy into its orbit. “Je 
suis Charlie,” in three words, rallied the commonplaces of free speech, anti-extremism, 
and international (Western) solidarity—and perhaps those of Islamophobic mistrust as 
well, though the spectacle of the moment made it difficult for dissenters to challenge the 
topos itself. In short, the phrase made itself readily available to rhetors concerned with 
issues of Islamism and free speech. If, say, a French, British, or Dutch parliamentarian, in 
early 2015, were to have advanced legislation curbing religious exceptions to free speech 
laws, the phrase “Je suis Charlie” would have suited her deliberative ends. To repeat “Je 
suis Charlie” in such a case is not, exactly, to state one’s apathy toward the plight of 
Nigerians, but it is to apply further pressure on the topical diversity of the epideictic 
sphere; when the means of persuasion so comprehensive localizes in a single topos, 
attention necessarily diverts from other topoi (such as #IamBaga) and their associated 
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issues. In this sense, one can appropriately question the ethics of circulating a single 
topos like “Je suis Charlie” without expressly condemning the motivations or deliberative 
ends of the rhetors responsible for its replication. We need, in other words, a measured 
analysis of both the deliberative effects of specific topoi and, simultaneously, the 
epideictic effects of those same topoi on the textual composition of culture itself. 
 As I have suggested repeatedly, fragments of discourse now travel more quickly 
and broadly than they ever have before—though they also face a more diverse and 
competitive environment. Because of this, individual topoi and rhetorical culture writ 
large now coevolve together at a brisker, more volatile pace. We rhetoricians should 
attune ourselves to the textual and contextual factors that will constitute the future of the 
timely topics. We should take notice of how topoi evolve, how they enable inventive 
connections, and how they organize our attention. As critics and rhetors, we must learn to 
responsibly and critically interact with the topoi that surround us. We need to learn from 
examples like “binders full of women” and “Je suis Charlie”—and we also need to 
critically analyze comparable topoi that arise in the future, and speculate carefully about 
the consequences of their use. 
 Such critical thought is difficult. I stress, in multiple instances, the aleatory 
dimensions of cultural evolution and rhetorical utility. No one (besides the shooters 
themselves) exactly saw the Charlie Hebdo shootings coming, and no one exactly 
planned “Je suis Charlie” as a measured, collective response. These things just 
happened—or, more precisely, they reflect the unpredictable violence of ideological and 
political incongruity, as well as the frantic, cumulative grasping for discursive resources 
that succeeds such violence and inadvertently supersedes other rhetorical struggles. We 
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cannot predict history. By extension, we cannot know which topoi will surge in vitality 
next month or next year; nor can we know with certainty the lives such topoi will lead in 
public discourse. 
 My closing argument, though, is that none of this absolves us from ethical and 
critical responsibility—especially those of us who study and practice rhetoric. How do 
we cope? Here, I identify three distinct but mutually reinforcing avenues of criticism that 
rhetoricians might pursue into the matters of topoi and cultural evolution. I will call them 
historical, current, and speculative criticism. 
 Historical criticism of topoi will attempt to better understand and learn from the 
rhetoric of the past. Such inquiry will establish the individual topos as a site of historical, 
transtextual analysis. Fredric Jameson once brought the dictum “Always historicize!” to 
bear on textual analysis (Political 9). For the rhetorical historian interested in topoi and 
their evolution, historicizing becomes an act of recreating the action of the past, or 
picking through the past’s textual sediment to understand how discourse, culture, and 
history interacted. Such historical inquiry should broaden our comprehension of what is 
rhetorically possible—of what specific topoi can do and what rhetors can do with them. It 
should also tell us how topoi and cultural circumstances evolve together through the 
repetition of rhetorical acts. Such criticism will highlight the documented relationship 
between topoi and cultural change. 
Current criticism of topoi will cast an explanatory lens on the interaction among 
topoi, rhetors, and texts in the present and recent past. Such criticism will stay abreast of 
discursive trends in political rhetoric and broaden our sense of what it means to be 
rhetorical critics and agents in the new millennium. While taking notes from historical 
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criticism, current criticism should remain attentive to the functions of recent topoi and the 
rhetorical climates they work within and help create. This category, I believe, applies to 
most of the specific examples I cover in the present project. 
Speculative criticism will turn the insights of historical and current criticism 
toward the future. The future perpetually eludes us, of course, but rhetoricians can and 
ought to speculate about how certain varieties of topoi might function following certain 
significant events—say, the next momentous Supreme Court ruling, terrorist attack, or 
political stunt in the name of religious freedom. It is, indeed, no trivial question to ask 
how civic rhetors should discursively respond to such events in a manner that is both 
deliberatively effective and nudges the epideictic drift of cultural evolution in the best 
direction. This balance should remain our concern as we think about future interactions 
between human and discursive agents. 
The route to such a balance, I’ll add, will derive only from a coalescence of 
historical, current, and speculative thought: we must understand how humans and topoi 
have interacted and do interact to assert the best courses of interaction for the future 
rhetorical climate we want. Such criticism will be difficult. Early in De Oratore, Cicero 
insists that every responsible orator must first be a consummate student of his culture’s 
knowledge, “[f]or it is from knowledge that oratory must derive its beauty and fullness, 
and unless there is such knowledge, well-grasped and comprehended by the speaker, 
there must be something empty and almost childish in his utterance” (1.6.20). Because 
the velocity and heterogeneity of our rhetorical culture outpaces anything the Roman 
rhetorical patriarch could have imagined, we are now in a position to add to Cicero’s 
astute thesis. The “childishness” Cicero perceives in the unknowledgeable rhetor 
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translates not just to using rhetoric badly, but to being used by rhetoric. Because we 
human rhetors are the medium through which topoi must either propagate or expire, we 
must accept the role critically. Because the “fittest” topoi are often among the most cruel 
and divisive, we must alter the conditions of fitness—which is to say, we must alter 
ourselves when necessary. In the closing sentences of The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins 
contends, “We are built as gene-machines and cultured as meme machines, but we have 
the power to turn against our creators. We, alone on Earth, can rebel against the tyranny 
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